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Abstract 
The philosopher Martin Heidegger argued that the truthful life was at risk of 
being lost in Western technological culture in the name of increasing control, 
efficiency, and agility.  As the risk is actualised, so the human essence as truth maker 
is obscured and life itself feels poorer. This thesis draws on Heideggerian philosophy 
to demonstrate the loss in two dominant styles of contemporary strategic management: 
the world-picturing and, more recent, agile style. It builds a theory of post-agile 
strategic practice, which I call adaptive, to address this loss. Consistent with 
Heideggerian philosophy, I utilise a transformative disclosure methodology and a 
literary, paradigmatic case reading method to address the questions: Why is agile 
strategic management so unsatisfying? How do Heideggerian scholars shed light on 
this dissatisfaction? How do Heideggerians understand the emerging style and what 
strategic management practices can I propose for the future? After introducing agile 
strategic management and the impoverishment of life that it fosters, I set out how 
Heidegger’s philosophy of truth, thinking, and the sacred both sheds light on the 
problem and suggests a remedy for it. I closely read paradigmatic texts of the world-
picturing and agile strategic management styles to demonstrate how business strategy 
theorisation lines up with extraordinary closeness to Heidegger’s philosophical 
assessment. I then analyse three Heideggerian prototypes for an adaptive style of 
strategy practice, concentrating on one paradigmatic text to identify their principal 
weakness: the omission of the sacred. I illustrate and contrast paradigmatic cases of 
both the agile and adaptive styles drawn from the beer industry and draw on the 
adaptive case to construct a theory of adaptive strategy practice, which addresses the 
problem of the loss of truth, suggesting pedagogical and strategic management 
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practices. I conclude by summarising its findings and contributions, noting some 
limitations and connections to other studies and suggesting further lines of research.  
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Preface: A Question of Personal Strategy Practice 
I experienced first-hand strategy’s historical transformations from analysis to 
agility over a ten-year period. In 1993, my employer, the UK leader in logistics 
services, employed strategy consultancy McKinsey & Co. to support a group-wide 
corporate strategy exercise. As a junior member of the team, I gathered market and 
performance data to complete McKinsey’s strategic tools and templates while the 
consultants facilitated the process and its major discussions. As a recent graduate in the 
human and life sciences, this was my first experience working with management 
science tools and techniques. I detested gathering data in the world of business. 
Compared to my scientific training, the facts seemed so unstable and the decision to 
accept one interpretation over another so arbitrary, but I loved completing the tools and 
the feeling of the power that access to their answers gave me over my peers. Clarity 
and certainty were powerful, and the power was exciting. The feeling that one was 
changing the direction of a company was undeniably thrilling. Even though the relation 
was thin, the recognition that came from announcing to my peers that I was working 
with McKinsey & Co. was seductive. I started to dress a little like the McKinsey 
consultant working with my business – preppy sweaters, chinos, floppy fringe, Ralph 
Lauren suits, the look of Ted the Harvard-educated professional from the movies The 
Last Days of Disco and Barcelona. I was struck by the consultants’ irascibility, 
certainty and scepticism and adopted them as my own. We mapped sector market 
channels, assessed customer supply chain performance with very simple measures of 
volumes, inventory turns and truck fill rates, mapped our own business units on the 
McKinsey portfolio matrix, guided strategic decisions according to the matrix 
positions, and constructed action plans and resource requirement assessments. In each 
sector, we strove to maintain and build our business’s strategic leadership position. 
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However, upon completing the exercise we began again. It seemed that the effect of 
segmental mapping and planning was simply too blunt to reflect the reality of 
individualised purchasing that characterised our markets. We lost grip on what was 
happening with real customers’ operations. Far from being criticised for their broad-
brush tools, McKinsey were re-hired, this time to work at a more granular level and 
construct and implement a key account planning process that conducted similarly 
detailed analyses but this time of single customers to propose strategies to dominate 
supply chains with our services. The process led to my employer winning the largest 
logistics deal ever signed in the UK to create a shared-use distribution network for the 
small-consignment drinks industry and this success was sufficient to cement the idea 
of a granular strategic process. At the end of the key account management exercise, the 
segmental strategic planning was integrated with the key account planning to make a 
single customer-oriented planning system that worked up from single clients to inform 
the corporate strategy, which, in turn, was reduced to the light-touch context setting of 
defining corporate mission, vision and values. 
But this move, from broad brush to granular, was not simply a shift in degree 
but in kind. We were on the way out of analysis and planning and towards something 
different – a kind of continual creative reinvention of whatever state of affairs prevailed 
and eventually, even this continual creative overcoming was left behind in favour of 
pure agility, the reconfiguration of logistics systems for no other reason than the 
possibility of further reconfiguration. Whatever logistics solution we recommended 
and instituted in one cycle we would tear it up and propose a different solution when it 
was time for the contract to be renewed. In this context, our next move was to engage 
another firm of consultants, Ernst & Young, but this time to refresh our ability to 
innovate in each of the key accounts. Senior executives’ concern was that we were 
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losing our reputation for innovation and ever-greater levels of added-value. While the 
McKinsey approach was clever, was it really thinking? The new consultancy firm 
mobilised a team of thirty consultants based in the UK and US and I was asked to be 
one of two UK strategy executives on the team. This consultancy had a quite different 
approach to McKinsey. Instead of detached, scientific, “quants”, the new group were 
playful, artsy and informal. We formed a sixty-strong team, bonding over days of team 
building, training and preparation. The centrepiece of the work was the consultancy’s 
proprietary playful Group Decision-Making workshop – the Accelerated Solutions 
Environment or ASEi (Pergamit & Peterson, 1997; Humphreys & Jones, 2006, 2008). 
After six weeks of preparatory research, more than one hundred senior executives and 
consultants gathered in Chicago for an immersive, collaborative, creative workshop. 
The team played with LEGO, Plasticine, and found objects like twigs and strips of 
fabric. They mixed up hierarchical reporting relationships, played music in the 
background to set the tone of the different sessions, and self-organised as they worked 
in mimicry of non-linear dynamic systems. They made three-dimensional models, read 
diverse texts and used them as metaphors with which to invent new business. They 
staged theatrical plays, declared their freedom from the “historical baggage” of their 
personal identities, and eventually re-conceived of the business not as a set of ballistic 
offerings fired to land in a projection of a stable, future outside world but as a fluid 
process-led company that experimented and learned from its commitments with 
individual clients. The linear processes developed by McKinsey were curved around 
into loops that continually adapted to the client as the client changed to overcome old 
habits and assumptions in the pursuit of constant creativity. It was notable that, whereas 
McKinsey foregrounded the supply chain mapping tools that helped strategists develop 
the coverage and productivity of one’s warehouse network, the fuel efficiency, fill rates 
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and reliability of one’s fleet of trucks, and the skilfulness and courtesy of one’s delivery 
drivers, in the new world those tools were pushed to the background and were replaced 
by commitment loops to assess, orientate, decide and act with individual clients. 
Whereas in the previous world, one took pride in being the best trucking strategist by 
designing the optimal approach to running a trucking operation at a point in time and 
plotting a course to excel at it. In the new world, the virtue of trucking excellence is 
replaced as the source of meaningfulness simply by the ability to adapt and control. In 
this new agile style, the trucking firm’s core activity was simplified, deconstructed, 
standardised, and directed at thematised objectives of shareholder value and thinned 
out to ensure reliability or even dispersed and replaced by any other activity to which 
the value in a broad domain of activity has migrated even if only loosely connected to 
trucking (Gadiesh & Gilbert, 1998). It didn’t matter much where the profit came from, 
as long as it came. If the firm and its people needed to reinvent ourselves wholesale, 
we would do just that. We found ourselves managing handfuls of KPIs rather than a 
richly experienced trucking operation, doing food processing, tray-washing, car-part 
sequencing and line-side delivery, truck scheduling, parcel tracking, and even 
providing finance for managing inventory, supplying temporary electricity generators, 
washing and recycling retail delivery trays, or processing food, or sequencing car parts. 
Were we a logistics company or a bank? The most meaningful life for such an agile 
strategist was one in which she had prepared herself to live with no attachments and to 
make herself a reliable coordinator of action between nodes in a shifting network 
producing successful simplified performances in any contingency (Ford & Ford, 2008). 
At first, I loved the authenticity we were asked to make manifest. Gruff truckers 
declared their secret love of Kylie Minogue, women on the team were listened to, 
effeminate men took leadership roles, and creative, artistic skills were in demand 
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everywhere. I dropped my preppy look and arrogant air, began to dress more casually 
and showed more of my personal interests, New Age upbringing and intellectual 
interests. For a time, it felt like a mini-Utopia but, gradually, I became disillusioned 
with the transformation programme. From my perspective, my senior management and 
the consultancy team colluded to neutralise a certain kind of original thinker on the 
project. Anyone who questioned the drive for shareholder value through flexible 
optimisation or argued for keeping hold of trucking and warehousing as a central 
practice, was marginalised as “not getting it”. The consultants and senior executives 
were selecting people to attend show-piece events who best fitted in and that didn’t 
rock the boat with pesky questions about meaningfulness or true quality of the service. 
It was the same old, same old of arrogant but testy senior male executives, mimicking 
creativity but always challenging others to question their assumptions, while leaving 
their own unquestioned. Over and over again, they side-lined the marginal and difficult 
people from both sides of the team. I was advised to learn how to fit in.  
In 1999, I left and began working with a small UK-based consultancy (UKC) 
that licensed an approach to strategic change from US-based Transformational 
Technologies called “commitment-based management” (Goss, Pascale & Athos, 1993; 
Goss, 1996). Their approach developed the idea of transformative iteration to 
encompass not just the transformation or “reinvention” of the business but also, 
necessarily, of its executives. For the first time in my experience, I was working with 
a strategic management approach that professed not to leave out of its bounds the 
assumptions and worldviews of strategic managers. It was my first encounter with the 
fully-formed new style of agility. 
The consultants that I met were very different to the many McKinsey, Bain, 
BCG, Accenture, CGE&Y, KPMG and OC&C consultants that I had met or worked 
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with on various occasions over the previous ten years. They did not have starred double 
first degrees from Oxbridge, they hadn’t graduated magna cum laude from the Ivy 
League universities and weren’t “double cuffed young Turks” brandishing MBAs from 
HBS, LBS or INSEAD. They didn’t play the game by focusing on the “brightness and 
rightness” of their analyses, indeed they often appeared to do almost no analysis at all. 
They behaved in an idiosyncratic manner, clapping into the corners of rooms to clear 
the bad spirits, aggressively confronting and almost insulting clients, and leaving client 
social events early or even not attending at all because they weren’t interested in 
“schmoozing”. They talked a strange language of possibilities, declarations, stands, 
spaces, promises, and requests. For them, people, events, features and things weren’t 
just there, they “showed up”; people might be sitting in front of each other but they still 
asked them “where are you right now?” They frequently appeared cross with me and 
my partner for being “stuck”, for having “no possibility”, a reason that, as allegedly 
creative individuals with a combined three decades of successful consulting, we found 
incomprehensible. They frequently told me that I just didn’t “get” what they were 
doing. They appeared to inspire something akin to devotion from certain of their clients 
who seemed to see their services as deeper and their relationship as more valuable than 
a simple exchange of money in return for consulting services. They could point to 
books written by world-renowned philosophers and articles published in key 
management journals that suggested that they were “on to something”. 
These consultants were my first experience of a consulting approach that 
exhibited the agility that I sought, yet I felt uncomfortable with them. Why? They 
could, at least on the face of it, demonstrate their intellectual groundings. In fact, they 
regularly referenced key textsii drawing management insights from some of the greatest 
figures of twentieth century philosophy, including Heidegger, Gadamer, Wittgenstein 
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and Searle. The approach itself drew on writings of the Google founders’ PhD 
supervisor Terry Winograd and his colleague Fernando Flores, and on Flores’ other 
work with philosophers, Charles Spinosa and Hubert Dreyfus. Its commitment-based 
approach, which denied ultimate foundations for strategies and yet also downplayed 
the place for autonomous, all-knowing leaders, was advocated as emblematic of our 
fluid postmodern times (Thrift, 2005). However, something about their consulting 
approach seemed off to me. UKC displayed a profoundly illiberal streak in their 
consulting. They were aggressive in their advocacy of a client’s chosen commitment. 
They wanted clients to abandon their history and do the impossible. But sometimes, it 
seemed as if nothing was sacred to them. Nothing had authority to justify or ground 
their actions and choices outside of commercial success. Their commitment seemed 
total and unquestioned to anything – whatever it was. If one was going to commit and 
re-commit, an additional question emerged for me, when nothing, in itself, was sacred, 
and hence nothing could serve as an ultimate foundation for action, how could one 
distinguish something that was worth committing yourself to wholeheartedly from a 
commitment to something financially valuable but that depleted the sense of what 
mattered most to them as people? In other words, when did one know that one was 
pursuing the real thing or an absurdity? This, they could not answer. Their consulting 
practice was rigid and almost completely determined by texts treated as sacred, 
predominantly the key texts referred to above and their licensed training manuals. 
However, they had little direct contact with the authors of these texts despite the 
obvious fact that many of these authors were still alive and active. The texts themselves 
appeared to have ossified into a totalising dogma. Stray from the manual and the whole 
edifice could crumble. The work that they were doing with clients was profound. They 
were not simply intervening to challenge the superficial beliefs and models of the way 
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an industry or business worked but were profound interventions in the ways in which 
their clients understood themselves as humans and the world in which they lived. Yet 
the consultants themselves appeared to have had a rather narrow education. Most were 
under the age of thirty so one could assume that they had had limited opportunities to 
develop the kind of practical wisdom necessary to know the right thing to do in 
uncertain situations with different viable choices. Some had no degree-level education 
and most appeared to have only a superficial knowledge of the broader human sciences; 
of anthropology, psychology and sociology, of history, politics and economics, and of 
religion, philosophy and ethics. This appeared to me to seriously weaken their 
consulting effectiveness and ethics. I felt that their charismatic influence on clients as 
individuals encouraged Tartuffe-like dependence and could be potentially self-
contradictory to their profession of freedom. Ultimately, they drove even harder and 
faster for productivity and seemed to close down even further a feeling of freedom and 
of meaningfulness. 
They had given me my first experience of commitment-based agility and of the 
anomaly that lies at its heart and that shapes my research. Following Spinosa, Flores 
and Dreyfus’s modified use of Thomas Kuhn’s work on paradigm-shifting science to 
history-making in the more general worlds of social and economic life, I use the word 
anomaly to refer to a disharmony between one’s actions and one’s understanding of 
one’s own actions. This anomaly, when held on to and inquired into, is seen by an actor 
as pervasive in general life, affecting many actors in multiple situations, and which, to 
be resolved, requires that the conventional common sense governing what it makes 
sense to do must be revised (Spinosa, Flores & Dreyfus, 1997, p.193n.25). History-
making, a transformation from one holistic style to another, begins when an actor 
notices and holds on to such an anomaly. The commitment-based approach to strategic 
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management promised the possibility of existentially meaningful work and radical 
freedom yet, at the same time, necessitated the abandonment of anything that mattered 
other than the pursuit of agile efficiency. I understood my consulting work as liberating 
and yet in actuality it seemed only to constrain me and my clients even more perfectly. 
I was intrigued and shaped my consulting work and my research from this point to 
investigate, understand and resolve this anomaly. I contacted Hubert Dreyfus at 
Berkeley who kindly introduced me to Charles Spinosa with whom I conducted a 
correspondence for several years and eventually began working together. During our 
time working together, we helped a major UK fossil fuel energy company re-orientate 
towards renewable energy, an insurance company to transform its notion of exchange 
with its customers in the direction of mutuality, and a workforce solutions company 
towards sustainable flexible working practices. In each case, the anomaly that I had 
already identified was pervasive, the atmosphere and promise of meaningful work and 
freedom pertained but was whipped away and replaced by a tighter constraint of 
financial productivity in existing investor management forms. It is this anomaly that 
sits at the centre of my thesis. 
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1. Iteration and Adaptation in the Fast Company 
It can hardly have escaped you that in my later writings I no longer employ the term 
‘hermeneutics’. 
(Heidegger, 1971, p.12). 
Introduction: Sensing the Limits of Technology 
In this thesis, I analyse and resolve an anomaly in contemporary strategic 
management: the diminishment of existential meaning and freedom in the pursuit of 
ever-greater financial productivity and flexibility. I draw on Heideggerian philosophy 
to illustrate and resolve this anomaly by revising common-sense notions of what we 
are doing when we are making strategyiii. Chapters 3 through 6 provide the theoretical 
account of the anomaly and its transformation. Chapter 7 deepens and illustrates these 
accounts by inquiring into the paradigmatic cases of the global brewing industry’s 
largest brewer and one of its principal craft beer competitors. I show how the rhetoric 
of the brewing industry leader promotes the freedom of dreams but its management 
practice diminishes both freedom and meaningfulness. I also show how the leading 
craft brewer is successfully tackling this anomaly and how its success suggests more 
general lessons for strategy makers. I articulate these general lessons in Chapter 8. But 
before getting to these cases, I must more formally introduce my research domain and 
questions and set out how I propose to answer those questions. 
I analyse the communicative practice of making and keeping commitments that 
exemplifies contemporary commerce’s agile style. This agile management style, first 
and most clearly articulated by a group of postmodern philosophers in the 1980s and 
converted into an influential management consulting approach in the 1990s, is itself 
exemplary of a broader technological style in Western culture. I use the term 
“technological” with the sense Heidegger had in his later writings (Heidegger, 1962, 
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1968, 1993, 2012a, 2012b). For Heidegger, “technology" is not a description of the 
equipment human beings use but rather of a general cultural ethos or historical style 
that is becoming the hallmark of contemporary Western life. Technology leads people, 
and hence managers, to see all entities, whether stock, production and distribution 
capacity, themselves, their employees, customers, and partners, and occasions, events 
and even time itself, as controllable but flexible resources whose possibilities can be 
either optimised, if fleeting opportunities are addressed fast, or wasted, if they are 
missed. For Heidegger, the technological style is one of agility. Hence, for Heidegger 
agile management would have exemplified the contemporary ageiv.  
The agile style has been defeating the more deliberative scientific style that 
prevailed among managers. That scientific style had managers picturing how more and 
more stable elements of a product’s network of sales and production activities worked 
together to influence their capacity to sell that product, predicting how those 
relationships would change in the future, and then repositioning the firm to benefit from 
those interactions and dominate their sector’s sales profitably and sustainably. Agility 
is beating scientific management by volatilising elements previously considered stable. 
Every entity is being broken into reconfigurable options, one or other option posited as 
valuable, the world reconfigured by managers to make the claim of value true, and then 
circling around and beginning again, in an endless iterative cycle of productivity. This 
volatilisation and co-optation of productive resources and its components includes the 
strategist herself. Now though, despite the agile market leaders’ success, they are 
beginning to lose and have accepted that they will continue to lose market share in their 
mature markets. Agile businesses are faltering because they can no longer maintain a 
role as, what I call, a sacred institution, one that gathers and focuses its followers’ 
understanding of life at its best and that provides those followers with the materials and 
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activities to participate in this most worthy, meaningful life (Dreyfus & Kelly, 2011, 
p.18). This sense of the sacred neither implies nor rejects any supernatural divine 
beings, it simply describes the moments of wonder or awe felt when participating in an 
activity that preserves a sense of relation to an authority beyond human control and 
thereby makes a good life into the worthiest lifev. For instance, as I will return to in the 
discussion in Chapter 8, in this important sense, beer and beer drinking is sacred to 
certain beer drinkers in much the same way that using iPads, iPhones and iMacs is 
sacred to Apple aficionados. Craft or real ale beer drinkers, when drinking and talking 
of quality beer, feel among themselves a moment of participation in a larger field of 
meaningfulness that is beyond their comprehension and control. In this case, this larger 
field of meaning is held open by the drinkers’ convivial connectedness to one another 
and to the brewers; to the beer’s ingredients, and the physical locality of the brewery; 
and to the feel of connection with a historically and geographically distant world, a 
connectedness that is the mark of a worthy life (Taylor, 2007). This sacredness appears 
most clearly when it is lost or threatened. Bemoaning Beck’s beer’s loss of quality after 
its brewing was moved from Bremen to St. Louis, a former Beck’s drinker wrote on 
the web page of its corporate owner AB-InBev, “I’m pretty bummed. I’ve been 
drinking this beer religiously for over 20 yearsvi.” These words did not mean only that 
he had been drinking Beck’s for years out of habit but rather that, for him, drinking 
Beck’s gave him an experience that stood out from the rest of his life and showed him 
what, beyond his control, mattered to him such as the meaningfulness held open by 
historic brewing practices, a community of belonging, and the provenance of 
ingredients and brewing. This experience had been desecrated by AB-InBev’s agility, 
which accumulates power to the single cause of efficient optimisationvii. However, 
while practitioner-oriented strategy books continue to tell stories of how, in sector after 
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sector, newer agile firms like AB-InBev defeat rule-bound, bureaucratic incumbents, 
these agile firms are increasingly vulnerable to businesses whose style preserves the 
sense of the sacred denied by the agile firms. Despite AB-InBev’s communicative 
speed and precision, its vigorous branding, product and packaging ingenuity, and its 
scale and process efficiency, it is losing to a mysterious commitment to craft beer, a 
commitment to acknowledging, participating in, being grateful for, indeed worshipping 
a power and a reality that vastly exceeds human control. Such a commitment to the 
beyond is most closely associated with the religiousviii. Over a ten-year period to 2014, 
craft brewers grew their share of the U.S. market by 173.6%, while AB-InBev’s share 
fell from 49.4% to 44.7%. AB-InBev is now having to learn whether its agile style, 
while believing itself to be infinitely flexible, can sit alongside and work with the 
religious craft beer style of the breweries it has begun to bring in by acquisition. 
AB-InBev’s example shows how, by co-opting every entity into a volatile 
productivity network, agility itself undermines both meaningful products and work and 
intensifies feelings of despair at this loss among customers and workers. The 
impoverishment of meaningfulness leaves both products and processes uncompetitive. 
Although Heidegger only hinted at a remedy for agility’s impoverishment, 
contemporary commercial culture is developing specific practices that preserve 
meaningfulness. Purely agile businesses, which minimise or even hide people’s 
participatory role as makers of meaningful lives, are being surpassed by businesses that 
retain and elaborate the general capacity for the sacred that sustains meaningful 
products and workplaces (Dreyfus & Taylor, 2015, p.161). My work explores why and 
how agility arose and the remedy that is emerging.   
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Thus, I have four research questions: 
1. Why is agile, strategic management so dissatisfying? 
2. What lies at the root of this dissatisfaction? 
3. How do today’s Heideggerians, who witness the changes in today’s 
commercial culture, understand the emerging meaningfulness? 
4. What strategic management practices can I propose for the future? 
My argument has four parts and draws on Heidegger’s thinking from across his 
careerix. I begin with the basic account of selfhood and practical meaningfulness that I 
take from Heidegger’s early philosophy of the 1920s.   
Heidegger claims contra Descartes that, instead of isolated, autonomous minds 
separate from the world and its objects, human selves or Dasein are first and foremost 
practical beings embedded in the world and coping with it skilfully in their everyday 
activities. A generalized human way of being emerges first as an infant self is socialised 
into the practices of a culture. These social practices provide a background 
understanding or, to use Heidegger’s specialised term, clearing, in terms of which 
one’s self, others, things, and actions are familiar and make sense. Propositional claims 
to truth, make sense only against the background of this practical clearing. 
The practices that make up the clearing are not rigid. Instead, they are volatile 
and can be appropriated, brought together by Dasein, differently within the free space 
of the clearingx configuring its own way of being and sense of selfhood. Thus, Dasein, 
takes a meaningful stand on its way of being from the intimation that its entire way of 
being could become meaningless. In short, it could die. And, as a flipside, life is 
meaningful to the extent that one commits wholly to own and express one’s way of 
being in the face of its inevitable annihilation. A self’s way of being comprises a three-
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fold structure of care. In this structure, selves are thrown ahead of themselves, into a 
contextual network of practical possibilities, an understanding, that renders everything 
encountered as meaningful. These practical contexts comprise teleological chains of 
equipment in tasks that serve as means to ends, ranging from the proximal—inscribing 
a sheet of paper with elaborate marks—to the ultimate—to be an evangelist creating a 
non-Latin Bible for the sake of proclaiming the word of God to mediaeval peasants 
(Sheehan, 2015, p.147). Humans are always already engaged in these contexts in some 
way or other. While things may be practically meaningful for tasks, the way in which 
things matter is disposed by mood, “The mood has already disclosed, in every case, 
Being-in-the-world as a whole, and makes it possible first to direct oneself towards 
something” (Heidegger, 1962, p.167). Thus, an evangelist would fervently translate 
and transcribe a Latin Bible thrown by a mood of pious zeal. Finally, while things 
matter and are practically meaningful, one turns back to make sense of the current 
situation using the language or discourse at one’s disposal in the shared culture. 
Second, while propositional claims to truth make sense only against the 
background clearing of practices, that background is not historically constant. In his 
later thinking of the 1930s to the mid-1950s. Heidegger described a hidden history of 
being in the West that traced holistic transformations in the prevailing style of the 
clearing. A style is the way general practices for dealing with selves, others, things, 
institutions, actions, and so forth, come in to their own, adapt to each other, and hang 
together as a meaningful whole. In new epochal styles, the meaning of older ways of 
being and living would be transformed. A Greek heroine such as Helen would appear 
an unfaithful sinner to a mediaeval Christian but a mediæval saint would, in turn, be 
woefully non-autonomous in the Enlightenment. Heidegger named the gathering or 
hanging together of a style, Ereignis.  
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Consistent with his earlier work, Heidegger sees that style works most basically 
to determine the truth of being through mood rather than through propositional 
thinking. One can experience how mood attunes one to the situation if one imagines 
walking in to a boardroom (other than Facebook’s boardroom) in jeans and a 
sweatshirt. In the absence of propositional statements, perhaps even in the absence of 
comment, one would quickly feel out of step with the entire situation. Following his 
interpretations of pre-Socratic philosophical and poetic texts, Heidegger came to see 
the moods as the divinities, messengers of the gods, that counter human wilfulness and 
point toward the clearing, a sacred authority beyond human control, which attunes their 
meaningful lives. Historically, the gods inspire humans to live lives in accordance with 
the ethos of the community. The history of Western thinking is thus the history of 
different gods that order different ways of thinking (Wrathall & Lambeth, 2011, p.163). 
Each new epoch is instigated by a new god who deranges the prevailing style and points 
towards a new arrangement. The style of each epoch was attuned by a mood carried by 
a divinity in the guise of sacred monuments or the works of thinkers considered sacred. 
Such sacred monuments and thinkers attuned selves to a style and brought “the God 
closer” (Wrathall & Lambeth, 2011, p.169). Such figures included the temples for the 
classical Greeks, cathedrals for mediaeval and Descartes’ Meditations for modern 
subjects. In Heideggerian terms, all three of these epochal styles belong to a mega-
epoch that he characterised as Machenschaft, or the epoch of planning, which arose out 
of the Platonic Greeks’ experience of the chaos Homeric world (Wrathall & Lambeth, 
2011, p.175; Lefkowitz, 2005, p.239). Philosophical thinking, subsequently, has been 
concerned with dealing with the Homeric world’s anomaly of instability. Thus, in the 
age of planning, everything becomes calculable and reliable, whether the Platonic 
ideas¸ God’s designs, or Descartes and Kant’s representations, and everyone is 
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disposed towards calculative control (Wrathall & Lambeth, 2011, p.175). The epoch of 
planning culminates in the technological or agile style. The agile style represents the 
“greatest danger” to our human essence because, uniquely, it has come about, not from 
a direct experience of countering by a god, but from an inward turning away from the 
gods and towards the self. It marks the beginning of a time when God neither plays a 
role of ultimate authority arranging or deranging human affairs, the so-called “death of 
God” (Nietzsche, 2001). In the absence of such a countering god, wilful, fluid selves 
in Western economies (Thrift, 2005; Sennett, 2006) are oblivious to their distinctively 
agile style. This turning away from the gods eventually dissolves any authority, even 
of the self, as a stable determinant of truth and meaningfulness.  In the technological 
age, there is no god to counter its nihilism, only a series of technical challenges to 
accomplish greater flexibility. Heidegger argued that we should not, indeed cannot, 
reject the agile understanding of being but he did argue that we can develop a free 
relation to it by recognising it, simply, as a style (Heidegger, 1977, pp.3-49).  
If Western selves were to experience how the current agile style is always 
already working as a background clearing positioning everything as an option for 
productivity, then they might glimpse its danger for meaningfulness and freedom. 
Heidegger speculated about this disruptive glimpse of the technological clearing as a 
background that enables truth but that must conceal itself to work, as an experience of 
the last god (Wrathall & Lambeth, 2011; Polt, 2013, pp.203-213; Sheehan, 2015, 
p.268). He considers the experience of the last god as throwing open the possibility of 
a free and meaningful relation to technology, indeed any style, by means of a new way 
of being towards things that he calls dwelling (Heidegger, 2012a, pp. 3-73).  
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Third, I draw on those Heideggerians working from Heidegger’s last thinking 
(Borgmann, 1987; Dreyfus & Kelly, 2011; Dreyfus & Spinosa, 1997; Spinosa, 1992, 
2000, 2001; Spinosa, Flores, & Dreyfus, 1997; Wrathall, 2011a, 2011b, 2013). 
Heidegger argues that while developing a free relationship to agility is a 
worthier life than being trapped in it, the worthiest life is organised around some sacred 
cultural thing or thinker. In my interpretation, in order for such things to gain traction 
as something other than a resource, one must have experience of the last god that frees 
one’s relation to agility, so as to be sensitive to the workings of agility as a background 
but one must also discover a so-called focal thing and focal practice from which a self 
can derive her sense of who she is and commit her life to that thing and the practices 
that bring it into its own (Borgmann, 1987, pp. 196-210; Wrathall & Lambeth, 2011, 
p. 178). Focal things have sacred worth, a religious authority beyond the autonomous 
practitioner’s will, that authorizes what counts as meaningful and ties back (re-ligare) 
the practitioners to one another, to the thing and to the world that sustains them (Polt, 
2013, p.208). In Chapter 3, I explore Heidegger’s account of dwelling in the fourfold, 
to see how focal things express traces of the divine lying beyond them. Though they 
may seem like a waste of time or in need of enhancement, we can discover and take up 
humble or marginal practices, like playing music or devoting oneself to craft beer, and 
sense their difference from lives where we constantly select among options to enhance 
the world and ourselves. Such focal things allow us to glimpse how, even in agility, 
some things already matter more than other things (Dreyfus & Spinosa, 1997; Spinosa, 
Flores, & Dreyfus, 1997). They use the term making history for the bringing of 
marginal practices from the past, the present and the emerging future to the centre of 
one’s life. If Western agile selves experience the history-making practice non-
technologically, non-optionally, then it will bring with it an authority that exceeds their 
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personal powers as self-willing agents. When we are involved with the practice, we 
feel it telling us that it is worth doing and we experience that authority as spiritual, 
personally addressed but out of reach of our will. However, the spiritual authority of 
Spinosa, Flores and Dreyfus’s history-making is itself diminished to the extent that it 
lacks the substantive attributes of gods from our traditions and completely omits an 
account of the last god as the experience of meaning in the already existing background 
agile clearing at work. I address these omissions. 
Fourth, Heidegger asked the question of how to cultivate Western selves to 
resist technological agility’s nihilism. For Heidegger, the principal issue of the 
contemporary age was to educate people in an “austere thinking” disposed to be open 
to mystery and thus to accept agility’s power but refuse its dominance (Wrathall, 
2011b).  
When a domain is governed by a paradigm or style, education brings our 
discriminations, dispositions, and taste into accord with the spirit of that paradigm. It 
is a spiritual education. For successful initial education, the teacher reproduces his own 
way of responding (or spirit) in the student. It is a way for the student to “grasp the 
prevailing paradigm” (Wrathall, 2011b, p.5). Given the pervasiveness of calculative 
thinking to Western life, education becomes the cultivation of the calculative spirit – it 
is an education in calculative thinking. 
Rather than an education in calculative thinking, Heidegger proposes another 
way called an “education in austere thinking”. In this education, the student comes into 
accord with the essential human condition – homelessness – the existential fact that 
there is no “true me” for myself or the world to be, rather we are open to different ways 
of being in the world. Thus, Heidegger argues that there is a way out of agile thinking 
to the extent that all, and we can begin with enough of this generation, “receive an 
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education in thinking”, directly or indirectly and become sensible of the style as a style 
(Wrathall, 2011b, p.2). 
To cash out this argument, I see businesses today doing exactly what 
Heideggerians describe to free their relation to agility and innovate their styles towards 
meaningfulness in a time of meaningless agility. The craft beer movement, which I 
discuss in this thesis, is one instance of a meaningful yet still innovative kind of austere 
thinking, which I will call, consistent with the adaptational sense of Ereignis, adaptive 
thinking. This transformation in thinking has three elements. 
a.     Adaptive strategic moves come from selves who are deeply involved and 
skilled in the core practice of their companies as a sacred, focal thing, whether brewing 
beer, turning planes around at the gate, getting trucks loaded and on the road quickly, 
or managing flexible workforces. Strategists must be practitioners or work closely with 
practitioners. While conceptual discussion and data analysis may play a part, strategists 
must have skills for doing the business’s core work in the currently prevalent style to 
such high levels of expertise that they can do the right thing in novel situations without 
thinking and the style of the practice becomes apparent as a style, which they honour 
but to which they are not bound as if it itself were sacred.  
b.     Such leaders who are practitioners or close to the front-line focal 
practitioner of the business must also have the capacity to identify anomalous 
configurations of behaviour. These anomalies, missed by non-experts, reveal the limits 
of the style of the existing clearing and prompt actions, quite different from their 
ordinary activities, to preserve and express some aspect that matters profoundly, even 
if they lack the words for it. Such configurations could be precursors of the death of 
the business’ current style or of its renewal. This adaptive strategic leader does not 
finesse away such configurations but explores them both conceptually and practically.  
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c.     The adaptive strategist then finds a way to join this new aspect and its 
unusual calling with the sacred focal thing and the dominant style of practice to give it 
the authority and power to gain a foothold in the market and even transform that market. 
For instance, I will show how ex-consultant turned brewer, Jim Koch re-discovered his 
family’s history of brewing beer and, through beer, discovered that complex, rich 
tasting craft beer mattered more to him than his consulting career even though it could 
not be produced as efficiently or reinvented as ingeniously as the mass-produced beers 
that his consulting skills fostered (Koch, 2016). Koch joined venerable family beer 
recipes with outsourced beer production to create a craft beer that masses of people 
could afford and yet that still carried the sense of sacred worth conveyed by poet Nikki 
Giovanni writing about Jim Koch’s Utopia beer: 
And now that I’ve found Utopia, I am at peace.  
I have Utopia, and if I were Egyptian I would be buried with it.  
I use it to start conversations and make friends.  
It is not for mortals. Or Americans. Utopia is for the gods.  
(Giovanni, 2013, p.3) 
 
However, following early suggestions by Spinosa, Flores and Dreyfus and 
specific advice by Wrathall, the task remaining for the Heideggerian ambition in the 
world of business is not simply to describe and celebrate the work of adaptive 
strategists such as Koch but to train a generation of managers to create strategies 
adaptively (Spinosa, Flores & Dreyfus, 1997, pp. 172-3; Wrathall, 2011b). In accord 
with Spinosa et al., I will show how Heidegger’s understanding of the history of being 
makes sense of the change of management style that has underpinned the success of 
agile companies like mass brewer AB-InBev. It also, more importantly, makes sense 
of the change taking place at present and of the meaningful future that is unfolding in 
28 of 334 
the case of craft beers. However, I also argue that the omission of the capacity for the 
sacred from Spinosa et al.’s account leaves them inadequately equipped to enact this 
future and I put right this omission. 
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Domain: Situating Agility and its Limits in the Wider Field of 
Study 
For now, another consideration weighs more heavily. When we say: The abyss of 
thinking is the essence of language. Its essence is the saying. The saying is the realm 
of the hinting-showing reaching. The realm is as the location of the belonging 
together of thinking and being–when we say this, it appears as though we only 
followed a chain of utterances. What so appears and can even be taken exclusively 
in this way every time is nevertheless simultaneously a hint into a saying that 
encircles itself and thereby directly remains open, just like a ring, which as a ring is 
indeed closed, but precisely as closed preserves all around a light and free space 
wherein perhaps something unsaid might make an address without showing itself. 
(Heidegger, 2012, p.165-166). 
 
Having introduced the topic of agility and its limit, I now situate agility in the 
wider field of the commitment-based approach to strategic management and explore 
how its secularity imposes a limit on the viability of agile strategic management. After 
outlining the research opportunity, I will set out my research strategy, contributions, 
and the structure of the thesis.  
Since the early 1990s, time has become a prominent issue in the notion of 
strategic management (Porter, 1991; Goodman, Lawrence, Ancona & Tushman, 2001; 
Hernes, Simpson, & Soderlund, 2013; Kaplan & Orlikowski, 2013; Vesa & Franck, 
2013; Hernes, 2014, Spinosa, Hancocks & Glennon, forthcoming). Taking time 
seriously has led to a transformation in strategic management practice advice away 
from the search for timeless success factors and towards dynamism in the form of the 
iterative coordination of commitments in which one commitment becomes the starting 
condition of the next (Ghemawat, 1991, 1999; Liedtka, 2003; Stacey, 2007, 2010; Sull, 
2008; Tsoukas, 2010a, 2010b). This emphasis on iterability, when considered not as 
repetition without change but as the constant change of repeated charged differences in 
different contexts (Spinosa, 2005, p. 495), brings out an inescapable interplay or, more 
specifically, “intertemporal binding” of past, present and future actions that commit an 
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organisation and its actors (Sull, 2003, p.170). Actions taken today are made possible 
by actions taken in the past and constrain those actions that can be taken in the future. 
Today, many of the largest and most profitable firms, including AB-InBev, have 
enshrined this iterability in their everyday management practices to adopt a so-called 
agile style of management that promises the freedom to succeed reliably in an 
unpredictable turbulent world (Sull, 2009; Zook & Allen, 2012; McGrath, 2013). The 
reliability of these firms is borne on a highly controlled communicative practice to 
coordinate commitments to respond to events by founding, strengthening and 
transforming the firm and its products (e.g., (Ghemawat, 1991, 1999; Haeckel, 1999; 
Saloner, Shepard & Podolny, 2001; Sull, 2003, 2009; Zook & Allen, 2012).  
My understanding of this transformation of strategic management rests upon 
three major moves: from timelessness to temporality; from lumpiness to emergence; 
from ratiocination to thinking. First, largely reflecting contributions from late twentieth 
century economics, the notion of strategic decision-making as a search for timeless 
strategic success factors was challenged. Since Chester Barnard’s early work to define 
executive roles and function in the late 1930s, strategy had been seen to involve a 
search for success factors, a few underlying drivers of performance such as market 
share or production experience which, if identified and managed well with algorithms 
or managerial routines, would lead to the success of the firm (Barnard, 1938, cited in 
Ghemawat, 1991). The most influential critique of Barnard’s approach came from 
Pankaj Ghemawat’s dynamic theory of the firm which criticised reliance on success 
factors for four reasons (Ghemawat, 1991). In practice, success factors proved hard to 
find amid the plethora of candidate drivers of performance. When success factors were 
settled upon it proved fatal to assume one had a competitive edge, indeed the same 
success factors were generally recognised as such by competitors. Even if factors were 
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settled upon, concrete causal mechanisms, upon which algorithms could be based, 
proved elusive. Finally, by ignoring time, the way historical actions constrained current 
practices and future success factors, Barnard’s approach tacitly endorsed myopic 
management and pushed aside contingency. Indeed, Barnard, explicitly stated that, 
although contingent uncertainties were an important part of ordinary management, the 
skill of business management “consists in avoiding so far as possible positions of 
uncertainty” (Barnard, 1968, p.10).  If the past had no effect on one’s options, if a 
strategist was free to choose any future path, then there was no reason to think through 
actions. The success-factors approach shot in the foot the whole image of a strategist 
thinking things through in order to make a decision, and yet the alternative image of a 
strategist who did not peer in to the future to plot a course stretched practical credibility. 
In order to address this temporal oversight, the notion of dynamic commitments as 
actions that influence the future was introduced. Emphasising commitments as actions, 
Ghemawat’s dynamic theory of the firm defined commitments as: 
A few lumpy decisions involving large changes in resource endowments – such as 
acquiring another company, developing and launching a ‘breakthrough’ product, 
engaging in a major capacity expansion, and so on – that have significant, lasting 
effects on firms’ future menus of opportunities or choices. 
(Ghemawat, 1999, p.121)  
 
Ghemawat’s approach to dynamic commitment making emphasised the 
irreversible “bet-the-company” nature of strategic decisions and explicitly criticised 
the, at the time, dominant success factor approach to strategy for its failure to,  
Explain why organizations need to think things through in considerable depth ... 
commitment, in contrast, explicitly suggests a need for looking before leaping: for 
trying to peer into the future before it becomes present.  
(Ghemawat, 1991, p.29).  
Writing ten years later in a series of books and papers outlining an iterative 
approach to strategy, Donald Sull accepted Ghemawat’s argument for the tendency 
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towards the irreversibility of commitments but criticised his emphasis on conscious 
rationality and “a few lumpy decisions”. Echoing foundational work on emergent 
strategy (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985; Pascale, 1984), Sull’s research demonstrated that 
Ghemawat neglected the kinds of incremental, non-financial choices and non-
conscious decisions that accumulate over time into a pattern of regular competitive 
behaviour. On Sull’s account of iterative strategy, “managers commit their 
organizations to future actions all the time, sometimes without even recognizing that 
they have done so” (Sull, 2003, p.3; 2008). So, in addition to major financial decisions 
to take up a new technology or close a plant, the scope of objects requiring decision 
was expanded, the nature of strategy making became iterative, and the practice of 
commitment making was identified as essentially conversational. First, Sull extends 
what he calls “managerial commitments” to include “any actions that an entrepreneur 
or manager takes that bind the organization to specific behaviors in the future” (Sull, 
2003, p.2). More precisely, Sull defines a managerial commitment as, 
An action taken by an agent in a time period that increases the probability that the 
agent’s organization will behave in a specified way in subsequent time periods by 
increasing the future costs of deviating from the specified behavior, up to the limit 
of excluding altogether the possibility of alternative courses of action. 
(Sull, 2003, pp.169-170).   
 
Secondly, building on structuration theory, Sull describes how an entrepreneur 
sets up a common understanding of the events and actions deemed meaningful by 
making so-called defining and reinforcing commitments that gather a coherent 
background understanding. This background understanding, Sull names it a success 
formula or, more colloquially, a groove, shapes in turn what is meaningful for all those 
actors involved in the domain and hence creates iterative loops as earlier actions shape 
future actions. The success formula gathers as managers and other employees make 
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cumulative commitments to a mental map of the world that shapes how they see their 
world. As the map develops and becomes widely shared, more and more of a firm’s 
people share a common understanding of the business the company is in, its way of 
creating value, and most important measures of success, its key customers, allies and 
competitors, and who and what they can ignore. The success formula gathers and 
stabilises as managers and employees reinforce this map with commitments to values, 
resources, processes and relationships that support it.  The success formula in a firm 
unifies the interpretations and actions deemed relevant (and irrelevant) by customers, 
investors, employees, suppliers, competitors, regulators, and other actors and, hence, 
enables those actors to make propositional true-false claims of the creation of value. 
When incumbent managers experience environmental anomalies or jolts that throw into 
question these background understandings, in Sull’s language when “grooves become 
ruts”, unsuccessful managers continue making more of the same reinforcing 
managerial commitments and, even though they are active, they become increasingly 
badly adapted for the world, in Sull’s language they get stuck in active inertia. 
However, some managers are able to deal with such jolts by making transforming 
commitments that disperse and reconfigures the existing background understanding of 
the business instituting a new success formula of what it now makes sense to do (Sull, 
2003, 2009). 
Thirdly, Sull argues that managerial commitments, whether gathering or 
dispersive, are made in loops of conversations comprising speech acts (Sull, 2008; Sull 
& Spinosa, 2007). Typical speech acts in business including declarations such as 
hiring, firing and promotion of personnel, promises such as public promises for profits 
to Wall Street or for guaranteed service quality to customers, and assertions, for 
instance, about relevant market conditions, competitive factors, new outcomes and 
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behaviours to be assessed. Thus, in Sull's view, agile managers replace linear, top-down 
managerial activities to make such commitments with iterative loops comprising four 
conversations to observe outcomes of actions already taken, make sense of the resultant 
situation, make choices of how to compete, take new actions, after which actors return 
again to observe and assess the outcomes of these actions and begin the cycle again 
(Sull, 2008). These iterative loops, which, in Sull’s words following Wittgenstein, bear 
a family resemblance to Weick’s sense-making (Sull, 2008), are commonly referred to 
in the management literature as OODA loops, in deference to the agile combat loop of 
Observe, Orient, Decide, Act developed by fighter pilots in the Korean War. Sull’s 
major contribution was to see how, in business, the OODA loop is primarily 
conversational in nature. The essential feature of these loops is that more and more 
factors that can affect the productivity of a business model, instead of being seen as 
stable objects and effectively bracketing contingency, are now seen as essentially 
volatile resources that can be drawn in to the iterative loop. These loops proliferate into 
extended networks of loops in order, ultimately, for an organisation to be able to 
respond to all surprises and assure the longevity of the organisation. In business, these 
cycles may begin with the basic workflow to satisfy a customer request for service but 
extend eventually to complex strategic and mission-setting workflows of individual 
businesses and multi-business corporations (Flores, 1993; Sull, 2003, 2009; Denning 
and Dunham, 2010; Zook & Allen, 2012; Casadesus-Masanell & Ricart, 2011). The 
logical culmination of the agile style would be a network of OODA loops stretching 
across sufficient micro and macro scales of time and space to create an organisation 
that can reinvent itself to create value in response to real-time events such as unique 
individual customer requests (Flores, 1993), industry-level catastrophes such as the 
disruption of the competitive game (Christensen & Bower, 1995) and even to 
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historical-cultural shifts such as the emergence in the twentieth century of disposability 
as a general cultural value and way of life (Spinosa, Flores & Dreyfus, 1997; Denning 
& Dunham, 2010, Chapter 13). 
In the third move away from the search for timeless strategic success factors, 
the nature of strategic thinking has been brought into question by certain practice-based 
strategy scholars (Tsoukas, 2010a, 2010b; Chia & Holt, 2009). Sull recognises 
emergence and non-conscious choice and throws into question Ghemawat’s emphasis 
on rationality, intentional, conscious calculation and wilful enactment of a few lumpy 
decisions. However, Sull’s iterative account fails to provide a satisfying account of how 
strategic thinking enables not only the freedom to radically transform but also to 
preserve meaningfulness while transforming. Sull’s iteration of propositional true-false 
claims succeeds in demonstrating how to make instrumental, pragmatic commitments 
but not why or how those commitments matter or don’t matter. In particular, Sull does 
not develop a satisfactory account of how thinking adapts to volatility while preserving 
and transforming the meaningfulness of the set of ontological truth commitments as to 
what is real and existentially important to a way of life. Sull privileges instrumental, 
propositional truth over existential, ontological truth. Ultimately, as I will show, a 
satisfactory account of such adaptive strategic thinking must enable not just the 
iteration of true-false claims in a productive cycle but the adaptive gathering and 
transformation of the holistic space of existential truth or meaningfulness in which truth 
claims can be made at all. This adaptive, rather than iterative, thinking will depend 
upon showing how strategic thinking based on propositional truth is first conditioned 
by a prevailing meaningful context of truth called a clearing, and how thinking works 
with the sacred to gather and transform the clearing, and hence the prevailing kind of 
thinking. Demonstrating this sacred aspect will be the key contribution of this thesis. I 
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must show that the problem of agility lies in its marginalisation of the sacred, 
understood as an authority, beyond the prevailing convention or the actors themselves, 
that authorizes what counts as meaningful and that itself resists co-optationxi.  
In its failure to recognise the sacred, agility is weakened for two reasons. Firstly, 
as a style of thinking that eliminates the sacred, agile thinking as optionalisation lacks 
a satisfactory explanation for the tenacity with which agile actors cling to it. If agile 
thinking was merely one option among others, then agility itself, were it to prove itself 
impractical or suboptimal, could be turned away from by agile practitioners in favour 
of, say, long-term visionary commitments to a strategic position. However, that does 
not reflect common experience (Spinosa, 1992, 2001). Rather, agile thinking, whether 
called agility, technological scientific rationalisation, cybernetics, or systems thinking 
is clung to by its practitioners in a manner that suggests it carries at least a thin sense 
of a religious commitment to something sacred. Namely, agility. This sense of agility 
as sacred, a thin sacred though it may be, nevertheless still serves to demonstrate that 
there is an authority, of which one is not the author, that is to be revered and preserved 
(Dreyfus & Spinosa, 1997) and hence as the soil for a remedy from its own secularity. 
Secondly, the very success of agile thinking conceals that other styles, each with its 
own kind of thinking, are possible. This has two implications. The concealment of other 
thinkings that have prevailed in earlier times, each with their own sacred authority 
whether Homeric gods, the Platonic Idea, Christian God, or Cartesian cogito, reveals 
the possibility that other lives were more meaningful and carried a thicker sense of 
worth than lives lived in an agile age where anything is rendered in to an option 
(Dreyfus & Kelly, 2011). This recognition can open up the search for things that bring 
a sense of existential meaning to one’s own life to which agility can contribute but not 
co-opt. Such things can produce a thicker sense of the sacred and dispose a thinking 
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that preserves and transforms one’s meaningful practice. Agile management is 
certainly successful in dealing with threatening surprises, at least at the levels of shocks 
to competitive and corporate business models, and it does bestow a freedom from 
caprice on its practitioners, inasmuch as they are prepared for disaster, accept it with 
confidence, and respond with serenity. However, ultimately, the very absence of 
distress with which the agile strategist prepares herself to receive surprises, comes, at 
least for some, at the heavy cost of the loss of the sacredxii. While critical organisational 
theorists have noted the meaninglessness of agile businesses from call centres to 
management consultancies (e.g., Fleming, 2009), mainstream business writers too, 
those who support it as a human achievement, have identified how agility – the capacity 
to turn surprises into profitable advantage – is not in itself sufficient to support worthy 
economic institutions. Beyond the ability to make profitable meaning out of nasty 
surprises, responses must also matter in ways that touch the deepest intuitions of the 
community of producers and consumers as to what constitutes a life well lived (Sull & 
Houlder, 2005; Christensen, Allworth & Dillon, 2012; Hamel, 2012). This concealing 
of the sacred and of the possibility of radical difference between styles diminishes the 
sense of the human being as receptive to religious events that bring meaningfulness 
and the possibility of the situated freedom to transform a way of life and open up a new 
style.  
In order to see a hint of how the sacred and thinking preserve and transform 
existential meaningfulness as well as instrumental meaning, we will turn to the work 
of a group of Heideggerian practice-based scholars and practitioners and their writings 
on strategy (Chia & Holt 2006, 2009; Spinosa, Flores & Dreyfus, 1997; Tsoukas, 
2010a, 2010b). Extending Sull’s work into non-conscious strategic commitments, all 
three sets of writers displace the central role of deliberative thinking by arguing that, 
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far from being the norm, conscious, rational strategic decisions are in fact rare and that 
practical coping coordinated by an existing style is more basic to strategic action. While 
all three sets of writers emphasise the coordination of commitments by the implicit, 
somewhat mysterious style of practices lying outside of human control, in their 
descriptions of the practices to enact such a life all three neglect the interplay of the 
sacred, in the guise of mood, with the communicative aspects of strategic thinking.  
In common with the agile practitioners, Heideggerian philosophers accept the 
volatility of the world but they maintain that accepting an interplay between humans 
and divinities beyond human control is essential to making sense of volatility in ways 
that amount to living a human life at its best (Dreyfus, 2005b; Sheehan, 2015). 
Heidegger understands divinities, acting through shared moods, as attuning humans to 
what matters most in a shared situation. In other words, for Heidegger, moods, rather 
than being the private emotions we typically understand them as in the West, are 
divinities, messengers from gods, beyond any human control, who condition humans 
to what matters most, to who they are, to what exists, to the right actions to take, and 
to the rightness of the execution of actions. In essence, sacred moods condition both 
instrumental, propositional truth and existential, ontological meaningfulness 
(Heidegger, 1998; 2012b). However, to date this Heideggerian interplay between 
moods, the sacred, and humans has been neglected by Heideggerian strategic practice 
scholars. Tsoukas, drawing on Heidegger, refers to the role of background practices in 
shaping emergent strategy (2010a, 2010b) and of emotions as “evaluative judgments” 
shaping action (Shotter & Tsoukas, 2014). However, he does not elaborate on how 
moods shape background practices and does not refer at all to Heidegger’s account of 
the sacred aspect of moods as messengers from non-human, divine authority.  While 
Chia and Holt (2009) name “obliquity” as the “very atmosphere of doing strategy” 
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(Chia & Holt, 2009, p.197) and “blandness” as essential for an alternative to 
“spectacular strategic intervention”, neither they nor Spinosa, Flores and Dreyfus have 
reflected the more comprehensive late Heideggerian account of sacred moods. 
The revelation of the concealed style of one’s background practices itself, 
normally experienced as an insight into the mystery and existential importance of one’s 
own basic assumptions, is considered by Heidegger to be an experience of composed 
openness to the most fundamental sacred, called simply mystery. Openness to mystery 
itself disposes the most basic kind of austere thinking that I have described as opening 
up and transforming current styles (Heidegger, 1966, pp.54-55). This contrast between 
agile thinking, other historical kinds of thinking, and a more basic, austere thinking and 
their connections to the spiritual is the focus of this thesis. According to Heidegger, the 
question of what matters is opened up, not by human will or any objective feature of 
the world such as a need for productivity or financialisation, but by a calling to think, 
which interrupts or counters the unmindful, common sense way of living (Heidegger, 
2004). At this call, sedimented ways of being are volatilised, austere thinking begins, 
and the stakes involved in expressing different selves and alternative ways of making 
meaning in a situation are made apparent. In effect there is either a gathering loop that 
preserves and deepens a clearing or a dispersive loop of transforming or twisting free 
and, in order to twist free, one must be countered by a call from a divinity:  
The call sets our nature free, so decisively that only the calling which calls on us to 
think establishes the free scope of freedom in which free human nature may abide. 
The originary nature of freedom keeps itself concealed in the calling by which it is 
given to mortal man to think what is most thought-provoking. Freedom, therefore, 
is never something merely human, nor merely divine; still less is freedom the mere 
reflection of their belonging together.   
(Heidegger, 2004: p.132-3) 
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Thus strategic thinking is our domain and these callings, as deranging and 
unifying events that dispose human actors to take up their role as freely thinking 
disclosers of worlds, are the focus of our questions (Spinosa, Flores & Dreyfus, 1997, 
p.178; Dreyfus & Taylor, 2015). I contend that an adaptive strategic management that 
takes account of the sacred would have the freedom to think through anomalies that put 
its own prevailing common sense in to question while preserving meaningfulness. An 
adaptive strategy would not be dogmatic or inflexible but would receive and respond 
to the sacred as the ground for what really matters and for the meaningful 
transformation of what matters. A worthier agile strategic management would be 
concerned, not only with jolting events that affect its competitive business model, but 
also with those anomalies that reveal that there is a fundamental agile style at work 
making the firm’s activities and identities sensible and worthwhile. 
Contributions 
I make four principal contributions in my study: conceptual, analytical, 
methodological and practical.  
Conceptually, I elaborate the basic distinction between nonconscious and 
conscious strategic thinking set out by the Heideggerian strategy scholars into 
disciplinary thinking of various styles and austere thinking. Disciplinary thinking 
refers to the particular styles of embodied, enacted logic or thinking in action that 
enable and condition particular kinds of truthful action. Austere thinking surfaces the 
logic of any style in order to meaningfully preserve and transform it. I introduce a 
Heideggerian framework of the key terms that together enable the characterisation of a 
particular style of disciplinary strategic thinking. These styles are ways of thinking that 
enable particular ways of life and carry their own particular deficiencies. Conceptually, 
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I also outline a theory of an austere kind of strategic thinking, which I call adaptive, 
that enables both the preservation of existential meaningfulness and its radical change. 
In the course of developing this adaptive strategy I develop conceptual resources drawn 
from Heideggerian thinking of the role of moods, the sacred and focal things in the 
preservation and transformation of any particular style and the truth that the style 
conditions. Analytically, I draw on this initial conceptual framework to analyse and 
illustrate the basic styles of strategic thinking at play in particular strategic management 
texts. I demonstrate two kinds of disciplinary strategic thinking, the modern and the 
agile, and an adaptive strategic thinking based on a focal thing. I illustrate the latter two 
with paradigmatic cases of strategic practice. This analytical contribution can serve as 
a start point to be elaborated on in further textual research into management texts, and 
as an empirical framework for the analysis and change of actual strategic management 
work practices. Methodologically, I propose a transformative disclosure strategy based 
on paradigmatic cases and affective literary reading method that further develops a 
style of research proposed as most appropriate to the human sciences. Finally, the 
purpose of the foregoing is to improve a field of human practice with which I am 
directly concerned, and so, based upon the theory of adaptive strategy that I outline, I 
propose ontological skills for strategists and pedagogical practices for their 
development in support of the practice of adaptive strategic management. 
This introduction to the lack of worthiness in agility and the life of the agile 
strategist begins to raise the question of a suitable access point to research our 
questions. I have introduced several concepts so far: being as a term for the 
intelligibility of things and situations, style as the background organisation of an 
intelligible world, the sacred as the external authority of the meaningfulness of a world, 
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the free relation as the human life best lived by owning one’s role as a finite maker of 
meaning, and the history of being as the history of different styles of intelligibility. 
As we saw, a Heideggerian history is not an account of who did what and what 
resulted. Instead, Heideggerians think of historicity as the basic feature of human being 
as a temporally shifting style. A Heideggerian history is a history of different regimes 
of “what counts as a thing, what counts as true/false, and what it makes sense to do” 
(Dreyfus, 1996, p.4). Building on his earlier genealogical history of management 
(Cummings, 1999, 2002; Cummings & Daellenbach, 2009), Cummings makes an 
overview of the historical transformation of the epistemic regimes of the strategic 
management field since the 1960s (2008). Cummings identifies twelve analytic 
categories to characterise each of two epistemic regimes and, after plotting the 
differences between the categories, identifies twelve movements that collectively move 
the field from a modernist style that resembles closely what I will call, the world-
picturing style of correctness and control, to a postmodern form, that resembles what I 
call the technological or agile style (Cummings, 2008; see also Cummings & 
Daellenbach, 2009). 
Strategy Was About… Will also be about… 
Practice   
1. Strategy is about… long-term plans and objectives intent and agility, orientation and 
animation 
2. Strategy comes from… rational analysis and top-down emergent activities and micro-
planning practices from anywhere 
3. Strategic choice is… generic, either/or, e.g., cost or 
individual paradox resolutions, 
differentiation, global or local 
“both/and” thinking 
4. Margins enhanced by… “best-practice” benchmarking 
developing organisational specific 
“next practice” 
Processes   
5. Organization should be… hierarchical, generic, depicted by 
distinctive, individualised standard 
organisation charts 
depicted by unique “organigraphs” 
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Strategy Was About… Will also be about… 
6. Value-added depicted… through generic value chain through fluid and flexible value 
webs 
7. Underlying assumption is… increasing efficiency promoting knowledge, which 
requires slack 
8. Vision and values are… about creating the future about remembering and utilising the 
past 
People   
9. Key personnel are… senior execs and consultant advisors a broader band including people at 
all levels 
10. Strategy makers are… increasingly professional increasingly amateur 
11. 
Employees/managers/students
… 
consume strategy produce strategy 
12. Strategy research is… increasingly empirical increasingly idealist or intuitive 
Source: Cummings, 2008, p. 185. 
Cummings’ work is suggestive and his framework offers good face value.  It 
opens the question of how basic styles of management thinking differ, of the 
fundamental limitations of current ways of thinking, and of how to preserve what is 
best and transform what is limiting in the future. However, Cummings’ framework 
begs several questions. For instance, one wonders how to justify the necessity and 
completeness of the twelve categories of Cummings’ framework. Why are there twelve 
categories? Are they the right ones? Are they all necessary? What work does each do 
to explain truth? In his history of being, Heidegger develops several ontotheological 
framework to set out the style of different epochs. Each style comprises an ontological 
essence that defines what an entity is, a theological existential whole of actual features 
in causal relation that structures how entities interact to determine that an entity is what 
it is, a paradigmatic entity and its signature mood that gathers and disposes the thinking, 
and a transformation in what counts as truth and the proper attitude for attaining truth 
in each regime (Wrathall, 2011a; 2013; Wrathall & Lambeth 2011). Similarly, the 
process and source of transformation from one regime to another is not discussed by 
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Cummings, whereas, as described above, Heidegger names Ereignis, as a gathering of 
volatile chaos into different temporally stable networks or epochs of meaning. 
Heidegger also describes the transformational process of truth reconfiguring itself, as 
the transformation of one regime of truth and meaning to another, each precipitated by 
a shift in grounding-mood. Thus, the analysis of mood will be central to the 
methodology of this thesis. 
Strategy scholars have been periodically interested in the phenomenon of mood 
and recognise well its fundamental role in setting meaningfulness in a situation. 
Brundin and Liu review research on the related topic of emotions in strategising 
(Brundin & Liu, 2015). However, their work concentrates on emotions as intentional 
states directed at objects rather than the Heideggerian thought of moods as that which 
“makes it possible first of all to direct oneself toward something” (Heidegger, 1962, 
p.167). A search on the term “mood” in leading strategy journal Long Range Planning 
returns 92 articles mentioning mood of which most mention it only once and then in 
telling ways. For instance, mood is seen as fundamental to the failure to respond to 
signs of failing strategy (Wissema, 2002), a change in a board’s support for a CEO 
(Roberts, 2002), the ascendancy of Margaret Thatcher's Conservative party in the UK 
(Rigg & Leach, 1990), prospects for firms’ profitable growth in particular industrial 
sectors (Darling, 1983; Delmas & Pekovic, 2015), intuitive management (Elbana, 
Child & Dayan, 2013) and a business’s innovatory capacities (Keegan & Turner, 2002). 
Following the spate of publications exploring behavioural economics in the wake of 
examination of the stock market bubbles and crashes of the last two decades, the idea 
that moods affect thinking has entered common parlance (Shiller, 2010). Yet to date, 
and with only a few exceptions (Hancocks, 2013; Holt & Cornelissen, 2014; Shotter & 
Tsoukas, 2014; Spinosa, Davis & Glennon, 2014), mood has received little attention 
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for its role in unifying or dispersing the meaningfulness or otherwise of a situation. 
Despite its essential role in philosophical accounts of how situations are meaningful to 
humans (e.g., Dreyfus, 1996, Spinosa, 2000), mood has been little conceptualised as a 
serious topic for strategising. Agile strategists are disposed by the kinds of moods in 
which the questions asked always have a similar technological kind of answer to do 
what is most productive. They are bound by the moods of agile business strategy, those 
moods of composed inventiveness and flexibility. They are never befuddled, desultory, 
or dilettante-ish, and they are never lost for an answer. In my experience of my own 
working moods and those of consulting colleagues and clients, agile strategists are 
generally cocksure, self-congratulatory, wilful, unblinking, and undismayed in the face 
of shocks; they may occasionally be playful, zany, curious, and excitable, always time 
pressured and obsessed with productivity. Every minute must be well used and every 
encounter must have a pay-off. Agile strategists are rarely startled, lost, or bewildered, 
and never grateful, restrained or awe-struck. The style of agile management never 
brings the strategists to the fundamental moods argued by Heidegger to bring 
awareness of one's thrown-openness and open possible new pathways to thinking 
(Capobianco, 2010; Sheehan, 2015). The agile manager’s understanding is always 
already disposed by a mood in which she is simply unable to observe the style of the 
world in which her business makes sense and is prevented thus from participating in 
history-making change. Her mood closes off the possibility. If agility emerged in 
response to the anomalies of instability and turbulence, the agile style itself is throwing 
up its own anomaly – its fundamental moods close off the most radical agility, that 
mood that first opens and makes sense of the currently lived-in world and that might 
open a new world. 
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Structure of the Thesis 
So far, I have introduced the problem of the loss of freely owned 
meaningfulness in agile strategic management and briefly set out a methodology for a 
disclosive “critique from the inside,” intended to contribute to an agile strategic 
management practice that is more freely historical, on its own terms. The remainder of 
the thesis proceeds as follows. 
Not including the Preface and Postscript, the thesis is composed of eight 
substantive chapters. The current Chapter 1 introduces agile strategic management as 
the object of this study and sets out the thesis’s research questions. Chapter 2 defends 
the methodology by which these questions can best be studied and lays out the thesis’s 
detailed method. It describes a textual reading method comprising two sub-methods. 
The first sub-method articulates the historical understanding of being discernible in 
influential strategic management texts, and the second sub-method returns to the text 
to pinpoint an anomaly left implicit or unthought in it. This unthought is held onto and 
named, elaborated and worked up into a new style of strategic management and 
strategic management practices that incorporate a free relation to essential spiritual 
practices. 
Chapter 3 sets out Heidegger’s distinction between propositional and 
ontological truth and its connection to freedom, meaningfulness and the spiritual. It 
goes on to set out the relevance of these relations for a worthy life in an age whose 
technological understanding of being puts everything, including human beings, on 
stand-by as options to be called on and driven on “to the maximum yield at the 
minimum expense” (Heidegger, 1993, p.321). This drive for productivity demands 
agility, not as a means to an end, but for its own sake, "everywhere everything is 
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ordered to stand by, to be immediately at hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may 
be on call for a further ordering" (ibid, p.322). The chapter describes how this agile 
understanding depletes the possibility for existential as opposed to merely instrumental 
worth and Heidegger’s approach for developing a free relation to technology as a way 
to have both. The chapter concludes by laying out Heidegger’s history of being as a 
matrixxiii of different historical understandings of truth. This matrix is then used to 
analyse strategic management texts and demonstrate the understanding of truth at work 
in canonical texts influential among practising managersxiv.  
Chapter 4 demonstrates how business strategy theorisation lines up with 
extraordinary closeness to Heidegger’s history of being. It describes the broad sweep 
of strategic management styles in the light of Heidegger’s historical styles and 
describes in detail how contemporary strategy making theory manifests two particular 
epochs in Heidegger's history: the modern, world-picturing age at work in Michael 
Porter and Jeanne Liedtka’s accounts of strategy making, and the agile age that is 
manifest in game theorists’ Pankaj Ghemawat and Don Sull’s dynamic or agile 
commitment-based strategic management.  
Chapter 5 reviews the attempts of those of a handful of theorists, both business 
and philosophical, who drew on Heidegger’s thinking of technology and have begun 
to theorise strategy in a new way.  The chapter describes three Heideggerian prototypes 
for a post-agile strategic management, two prototypes put forward by business theorists 
Robert Chia, Robin Holt and Haridimos Tsoukas, and the Heideggerian commitment-
based management prototype of philosophical theorists Fernando Flores and Charles 
Spinosa. Chapter 6 then closely reads the Heideggerian text that influenced these 
writers, Disclosing New Worlds (Spinosa, Flores & Dreyfus, 1997). The chapter reveals 
the spiritual as the unthought of the text and shows that both sets of prototypes fail 
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because they either fail to get Heidegger’s spirituality right, they think of spirits 
primarily as attuners, as opposed also to derangers, of truth and meaning, or because 
they do not get the spiritual appeal in today’s marketplace right or even at all.  
Chapter 7 returns to the beer industry to present and discuss the contrasting 
paradigmatic cases of AB-InBev and The Boston Beer Company. I show how the 
adaptive strategy of Jim Koch, Boston Beer’s founder, thinks in just the way Heidegger 
described, by blending contemporary agility with other meaningful practices 
marginalised by the agility that is exemplified by AB-InBev. Koch’s adaptive 
strategizing centred itself on a sacred focal thing, namely his family’s brewing heritage, 
connected it with the agile techniques learned as a consultant, and developed a 
sustainable advantage over the purely agile market leader AB-InBev, which explicitly 
concealed the sacred. As such, Koch’s is a company at which this study advocates 
strategic theorists should look, not to imitate its formulae for business success but to 
observe and develop its founder’s adaptive strategic thinking.  
Chapter 8 elaborates the suggestions of the Boston Beer Case to set out an 
adaptive strategic thinking practice that addresses the problem of the loss of freedom 
and meaningfulness and hence truth, and to suggest how to develop the strategic 
management skills and practices for which it calls. It concludes the thesis by 
summarising its argument and findings, capturing its contributions to the field, and 
noting its limitations and connections to other studies, with a view to suggesting further 
lines of research. 
Having thus introduced my overall research methodology and set out the 
structure of the thesis, in the following chapter I turn to a description and defence of 
my detailed methodology. I first distinguish the transformative disclosure method from 
its principal critical competitors and justify its viability as a form of critique. I further 
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distinguish transformative disclosure from two prominent alternative reading 
methodologies, those of deconstructive and cultural studies, before setting out and 
illustrating my reading techniques and ethics and quality principles.  
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2. Methodology: Reading for Difference 
The essence of language as saying is the realm. […] It names something singular, 
that wherein all things and beings extend to one another, reach over, and thus reach 
one another, and redound to the benefit and detriment of each other, fulfil and satisfy 
one another. 
 This realm alone is likewise home to the unattainable. The realm, now to be 
experienced as the essence of language, is the dominion of play, wherein all 
relationships of things and beings playfully solicit each other and mirror each other 
[…] The realm is the location in which thinking and being belong together. 
(Heidegger, 2012: p.158)   
I will use what I am beginning to see as my philosophical method (I did not know I 
had one): look to Heidegger’s and Merleau-Ponty’s distinctions for a clue to the 
phenomena in question and then to those phenomena to test and further develop 
Heidegger’s and Merleau-Ponty’s distinctions. 
(Dreyfus, 2000, p.314) 
Introduction: Transformative Disclosure and Its Principal 
Competitors  
Chapter 2 introduces and defends the Heideggerian historicising methodology 
by which my research questions can best be studied and lays out the thesis’s detailed 
method. It describes a textual reading method of three movements. The first movement 
articulates the historical understanding of being discernible in influential strategic 
management texts, and the second movement returns to the text to pinpoint an enigma 
left implicit or unthought in it. This unthought is then treated as an anomaly, the origin 
of a possible new truth. If held on to, put into words or named, and worked up into 
meaningful new practices, an anomaly can eventually transform the agile strategy-
making field itself and establish a new understanding of being and new strategic 
management practices.  
If mood is central to setting the style of a way of doing things in the world, it 
makes sense to look at the mood set by the strategists. Future studies could inquire into 
the moods of actual strategists working in their businesses, but I begin by studying the 
moods disposing theoretical writings teaching strategic practitioners different ways of 
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doing strategy. Accordingly, I conduct a literary reading for the mood of strategic 
management texts. This takes us to the question of a suitable method to study the mood 
of writings. Recall the primary role of mood in our earlier condensed account for setting 
the way that things make sense. This is as true of language as it is of any other aspect 
of our existence and consequently, we shall seek an affective discourse analysis. 
Paradigmatic Case Study 
I utilise a paradigmatic case methodology as a form of scientific explanation, 
understanding and prediction relevant to specific human actors in their local contexts 
(Dreyfus, 1986; Flyvbjerg, 2001, 2006; Kompridis, 2000, 2006; Flyvbjerg, Landman 
& Schram, 2012). My impetus for embarking on this project came from my practice as 
a strategic management consultant with over twenty years’ experience of both the 
dominant world-picturing and emerging agile styles of strategic management. As a 
strategy officer in a global logistics firm, I had had exposure early in my career to the 
world-picturing style when working as a junior client-side member of a McKinsey-led 
strategy team, and deepened my experience of this analytical, planning style as a senior 
consultant in a strategic operations consultancy. I had my first exposure to the agile 
style as a full-time member of a mixed client and consultant team led by Ernst & 
Young’s complexity science-informed business transformation practice. After setting 
up and running my own agile strategy consulting business, I encountered one firm of 
consultants who practised a well-known form of agile management called commitment 
or promise-based management, and subsequently worked closely over a period of more 
than ten years with another firm closely related to the inventor of the commitment-
based approach. These experiences first sensitised me to the loss of freedom and 
meaning of both planning and agile styles of strategic management as an anomaly of 
both styles that pointed to their unsatisfactory nature. This experience opened up the 
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questions that focus this study. The anomaly of meaninglessness and consequent loss 
of authenticity showed up everywhere to me but I could find no advice on how to 
address it within the literature or among my own and my colleagues’ practice. We were 
clever but our cleverness manifested as supremely quick inventive calculation. It didn’t 
much matter. Our work had major impacts but it was administered vigorously but 
somehow carelessly. All that seemed really to matter was to be productive.  
What methodology would lend itself to such contingent, situated inquiry and be 
credible both to myself and to my fellow philosophy-educated practitioners? It seems 
to me that, to be relevant to our community, the methodology must stay very close to 
its key practices and it must research those practices in a way that is consistent with the 
thinking inherent in them. I take the stance that, as a participant of a community whose 
practice takes its cue from this later Heideggerian focus on the phenomena of 
disclosure, my research methodology itself must be disclosive if it is to carry weight 
with my own community of practice. It must disclose and transform the kind of 
disclosure that is at work in the world of the strategy-making practice. Thus, I propose 
a transformative disclosure, or disclosive for short, research strategy for describing the 
thinking of agile strategic management practice and for identifying and addressing its 
shortcomings. In particular, I adopt a so-called paradigmatic approach (Dreyfus, 
1986). Dreyfus argues that the study of human being can never achieve the ideal of 
scientific theoretical predictability attained by the natural sciences because such a study 
will never be able to explicate the background understanding that pertains in social and 
historical practices and that is required of its researchers for expert performance. While 
simple rules may play a role in introducing and orienting novices to a domain of 
practice such as chess playing, those rules play no role in expert performance and there 
are no serious candidates for superseding expert rules that explain research 
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performance better than background practices. In the absence of a suitably expert-
relevant approach, research appears naive and of low credibility to practitioners 
(Dreyfus, 1986; Flyvbjerg, 2001). However, despite the impenetrability of the 
background practices, one way that a systematic account of human action is possible is 
by studying prototypes (Dreyfus, 1986, p.20). Dreyfus advocates that social science 
follow the examples of Geertz and Foucault, to set out thick descriptions of prototypes 
of everyday action which can serve as paradigmatic examples to organise more specific 
and diverse activities within a domain (ibid.). A prototype or, as I will henceforth refer 
to it, paradigmatic case, is a clear or perspicuous case of a style that serves to exemplify 
that style from within and can be drawn upon to improve that style in ways that are 
deemed relevant by its practitioners (Dreyfus, 1986; Borgmann, 1987, p.4; Spinosa, 
Flores & Dreyfus, 1997, p.31; Flyvbjerg, 2001; Topper, 2005). Since Dreyfus’ call for 
a paradigmatic case-based study, several scholars have proposed human science 
methodologies that aim for predictability within a situated context (Flyvbjerg, 2001, 
2006; Kompridis, 2000, 2006; Flyvbjerg, Landman & Schram, 2012; Topper 2005; 
Glynos & Howarth, 2007). These methodologies construct case studies that can serve, 
not only as a way of understanding phenomena more deeply or for generating 
hypothetical explanations, but also for wider predictive generalisation relevant to 
specific communities in specific contexts. Consistent with my research goal to make a 
contribution to the agile strategic management community’s own development of its 
practices, the purpose of realist social science is described as “contributing to society’s 
practical rationality in elucidating where we are, where we want to go, and what is 
desirable according to diverse sets of values and interests” (Flyvbjerg, 2001, p.167). 
The goal is described as “contributing to society’s capacity for value-rational 
deliberation and action” (ibid.). 
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Thus, the paradigmatic transformative disclosure methodology works as 
follows. Through my consulting experience, I have uncovered a persistent problem: the 
most successful forms of strategic business management also significantly deprive at 
least some of the lives of its practitioners of a feeling of exemplary lives of 
worth. Indeed, I will show how the lives of leading agile practitioners are, in fact, 
derided. Strategic thinking on its own does not have an effective way to take this 
weakness into account since winning in the market is the primary goal of strategy, and 
the loss of meaningfulness is seen, at best, as a secondary goal. Therefore, rather than 
look primarily to the strategic management literature for methodological guidance, I 
have approached the problem in the following way. I identify Heideggerian 
philosophers as the leading philosophical thinkers who have explored most thoroughly 
the loss of meaning in the world today, have worked out an account of why it is so hard 
to recover meaning, and have not embraced the loss of meaning as a new kind of 
positive good but, instead, have proposed remedies to recover it. I then draw on these 
Heideggerians’ key concepts to develop an interpretation that illuminates the way 
today’s most successful forms of strategic management fail to account for, and may 
even preclude, the possibility of an authentic life for its practitioners.  This part of the 
work deploys a classic hermeneutic methodology of revealing the way of making sense 
at play in a particular domain of human action. The proof of the value of this 
methodology will lie in the strategic management community’s own evaluation of the 
method’s success in describing the important details of contemporary strategy 
formation and execution, including its loss of meaninglessness and authenticity. Next, 
I draw on Heidegger’s, and Heidegger's followers’ including my own, attempts to re-
establish a free relation to meaningfulness. I describe how these practitioners work and 
what they achieve.  Here the method is pragmatic hermeneutics. Do these more 
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authentic approaches to agile strategic management succeed commercially and also 
provide their practitioners with a renewed sense of the worthiness of their lives? And 
does the interpretation of the formation and deployment of the strategy take account of 
the critical details that reveal how the practitioner's life showed renewed authenticity? 
I describe different paradigmatic cases of theoretical strategic management 
advice to elucidate their style or way of thinking, that which serves to “ground the 
meaning” of various more specific cases (Spinosa, Flores & Dreyfus, 1997, p.20). In 
this methodology, I first introduce Heidegger’s history of being as an array of various 
incommensurable styles that have held sway in different epochs over the course of 
2,500 years of Western thinking. I set out these styles and their regimes of 
meaningfulness, their understandings of what things and people are and what it makes 
sense to do, and demonstrate how each style, in its own way, is oblivious to the 
forgetting of the style as source of meaningfulness. Drawing on this history, I turn to 
strategic management practice and set out the “thought” styles of different forms of 
world-picturing and agile strategic management. I show the basic presuppositions of 
these strategic management styles, and demonstrate how each remains oblivious of the 
“unthought” forgetting of the appropriated clearing as the disclosure of meaning 
through humans, and hence does not recognise its own loss of freedom, or offer advice 
for freely historicising strategic management. Finally, I set out the “thought” style of a 
paradigmatic case of post-agile, proto-adaptive strategic management and read closely 
the mood and language of its foundational text Disclosing New Worlds (Spinosa, Flores 
& Dreyfus, 1997). This reading first sets out the thought of the text. I define the thought 
as that which is made explicit about what it is trying to do, how it is doing it and which 
language, in turn, enables the teaching and assessment of practical excellence. The first 
reading sets up a second reading for the text’s unthought, that which they were unable 
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to make explicit but which, nevertheless, is “in the text” and that enables me to go 
further and loosen the text’s authority, to locate how the existing style fails to fully 
support authentic agile strategic management, open up its style for new possible ways 
of making sense, new styles, and, eventually, to propose remedies for this omission. 
Having described and justified my paradigmatic case study methodology, I turn 
now briefly to distinguish my disclosive approach from broader critical theory. I do 
this to provide theoretical background for the detailed description of my disclosive 
reading method that I describe in the following chapter. 
Disclosure then Critique 
If my intention is to contribute to the agile strategic management community’s 
own development, and if my research question implies a critical project anchored as it 
is in a sense of something missing or broken in an ongoing agile management practice, 
then what form of critique would be credible to the agile practitioners themselves? For 
many of these practitioners, their own background is philosophically sophisticated. The 
articulators of our paradigmatic case, for instance, Charles Spinosa, Fernando Flores 
and Hubert Dreyfus are all experts in existential, hermeneutic, phenomenological and 
performative language philosophy. In Dreyfus’ case he is widely recognised as one of 
the world’s leading exponents of such philosophies. For them, to be human is to be a 
discloser of worlds–in their everyday practical coping, humans disclose inherently 
meaningful worlds of equipment, purposes and identities. To recapitulate, these worlds 
are meaningful by virtue of their being coordinated by a style–a way in which they 
hang together and make sense holistically. In order to understand and contribute to the 
world of the agile practitioners in ways that matter to those practitioners themselves, 
one must be a historical participant in it. And any critique, if it is to be deemed relevant, 
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must thus be an immanent critique, one that works from and makes sense from within 
the styled disclosure of that world of practice. From this disclosive self-understanding 
of the agile practitioners, the idea of an external, detached position from which to 
survey, assess and critique a field is inconsistent (Kompridis, pp.125-132). The style 
of a world only reveals itself to those in tune with it and, for those practitioners, the 
attempt to view the world, as it were, from the outside would appear banal and its 
insights paltry. Consequently, a critical methodology appropriate to such thinking must 
begin from within, that is, as a self-transformative disclosure of the style of the agile 
world by one of its own practitioners. As an account of the way the style makes only 
certain meanings apparent to (and conceals others from) those practitioners, the critical 
anomalies discovered thus make sense and matter to its practitioners as breakdowns in 
their smooth practical coping in that world. 
As described above, this transformative disclosure comprises two analytical 
movements. The first is an articulation of the thought of a style, those parts of its 
practical understanding that are made present by being thematised and expressed in 
language. The second movement is an articulation of the style’s unthought, those 
aspects of its understanding that are unexpressed in language but which, as 
attunements, still dispose its authors’ writings and which, if thematised or made 
explicitly present, open new possibilities for the style. In Seeing Things in Merleau-
Ponty, Kelly describes his methodology for reading a text’s unthought, 
It proposes a risky interpretive principle. The main feature of this principle is that 
the seminal aspects of a thinker’s work are so close to him that he is incapable of 
articulating them himself. Nevertheless, these aspects pervade the work; give it its 
style, its sense and its direction; and therefore belong to it essentially. 
(Kelly, 2005, p.74) 
Kelly goes on to argue that the main works of both philosophers and artists are 
identifiable as examples of their own familiar style. One can think of Charles Dickens’ 
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or Jane Austen’s novels, Turner’s, Pollock’s or Klee’s paintings, Henry Moore’s 
sculptures, and Heidegger’s poetic or Alain Badiou’s thetic writings. The style is clear 
to those who witness their works but is not thematised or made explicit in a rule or 
single feature. Instead, a style withdraws into the background and pervades the work 
exceeding its linguistically articulated meaning. Moreover, it is the author or artist who 
is least likely to recognise their own style. Often, it is the careful reader of a text who 
is best able to show an author what he or she is doing as she writes. My goal in this 
chapter is to bring out the unthought of the authentic post-agile, proto-adaptive style of 
Disclosing New Worlds, that truth which guided its authors’ efforts but which they fail 
to get right in their book. If the unthought of a prototypical style is its unarticulated 
issue, that which, if it were to be thought or made explicit, would raise the prospect of 
the death of that prototype as a general style or understanding of being. The 
acknowledgement of the possible death of a style would, if accepted, put the reader in 
the position of choice about how next to move, which way to go. It is an existential 
moment of disclosing that one is a discloser and that is claimed as an experience of life 
at its best (Spinosa, Flores & Dreyfus, 1997, pp.28-31). 
From my two part reading, I will contend that early articulators of the 
prototypical freely historicising agile style developed a largely communicative 
linguistic account of how reliably to flex and innovate practices to satisfy customers in 
a groundless and turbulent world, but that they completely missed the religious nature 
of revelatory language essential to history-making (Flores and Winograd, 1988; 
Spinosa, Flores & Dreyfus, 1997, p.206n2; see in particular, Wrathall, 2011a, Chapter 
7 for the distinction between communicative and revelatory views of language). 
Wrathall (2011a, pp.164-169) argues that Heidegger distinguishes communicative 
from revelatory views of language and that assenting to one or other relation to 
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language is transformative of one’s conduct in the world. Communicative language is 
in the game of coordinating action within a given meaningful world and for making 
assertions to give reasons to justify the actions that one takes. Assenting to the 
communicative view commits one to a life of finding proofs for the reason of one’s 
actions. But, drawing on Heidegger’s analysis described earlier of how the clearing, 
that which provides the space of meaning for such propositional claims, always seems 
to stay in the background and eludes the finality of indubitable, explicit reasons, one 
can always find reasons to cast doubt on the reasons given for an action. One meets the 
problem of infinite regress (Dreyfus, 1994, pp.55-66). However, assertions in 
revelatory or, simply, poetic language are in the game of naming new phenomena of 
interest, showing how they matter, and disposing our actions to thus disclose a new 
world or background.  
Language speaks by pointing, reaching out to every region of presencing, letting 
what is present in each case appear in such regions or vanish from them.  
(Heidegger, 2002, p.411) 
 
Thus, the poetic word names something new and makes that phenomenon 
present as an authority that can disposes action. Such a naming is, in Wrathall’s 
argument, a sacred act that does not lay itself open to being rationally justified but 
serves instead as an event that gathers and sets in train the disclosing of a new world, 
a world disclosed to the extent that one has faith (Wrathall, p.167). The naming can be 
either religiously observed, witnessed and dedicated to, in which case a new world is 
disclosed, or denied, in which case the new world collapses. In this respect, names are 
articles of faith and the willingness and courage to name new phenomena is intensely 
political, as it transforms relations of power, and transformationally disclosive. Naming 
is a special kind of assertion, one which authorises the realness of a phenomenon and 
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invites the listener to make further assertions as to its propositional truth. It also invites 
other speech acts, particularly requests and promises, that construct a new world and 
set up a new space of possibilities for propositional truth. 
The communicative view of language pervades the various later agile 
management texts that utilise the so-called OODA loops of speech acts. However, I 
also argue that although the authors identified the dangers inherent to a life of agility, 
that nothing in it mattered but that itself it was only one historical style, and recognition 
of this contingency could transform our experience of its meaninglessness. Failing to 
provide such a practical account of these dangers in business they inevitably also failed 
to address those shortcomings, by focusing on communicative and not revelatory 
language. If anything, their failed attempt made the problem worse. My methodology 
of reading for the thought and then unthought of this key text allows me to show how 
more effective remedies than those proposed were available to the founding authors, 
but that they were so “close” to (at least) some of the authors’ thinking that they were 
not able to articulate them. Their insights remained, so to speak, unthought. However, 
those remedies can nevertheless be sensed if one attends to the text’s unthought mood, 
that which remains to be articulated in language. As we shall see, the fundamental 
mood of these foundational texts is quite different to many of the later texts that it 
inspired or informed, which were disposed by the general productively moods of the 
agile age, but not in wonder at those moods and their effects to dispose sense making. 
For my transformative disclosure, I develop an affective literary method to read 
the mood and language of a foundational text of this paradigmatic case of post-
technological, proto-adaptive management, in order first to set out or disclose the style 
of adaptive strategic management, then to identify and make more explicit its 
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unthought, and propose remedies for the tensions and shortcomings that stem from its 
omission. 
My project intends to make a critical and constructive contribution to my own 
and my community’s strategic management practice. In this section, I argue for 
Kompridis’ account of transformative disclosure as the method that lends itself best to 
a project of “self-correction, self-reform and self-education” among a group of 
Heideggerian business theorists (Kompridis, 2000, 2006). I situate Kompridis’ 
transformative disclosure within the broader, historical context of critical theory and 
distinguish it more clearly from the dominant form of contemporary critique that has 
arisen: the so-called ironist form of unmasking critique. I begin by describing the 
original Cartesian form of sceptical critique and its problem of self-reference. The 
problem of self-reference stems from the impossibility of any view from nowhere, a 
value-neutral place from which a critic can launch a rational critique, which leaves 
scepticism weakened with respect to its own claims to rationality. Next, I show how 
critical theorists, working under a generalised “hermeneutics of suspicion”, dealt with 
the problem of self-reference by developing a refined version of unmasking critique, a 
perpetual auto-critique of the place and person of the critic him or herself. I show how 
ironist critical theory opened up a new problem of self-reassurance, a radical doubt and 
lack of confidence in one’s own ideals and agency, which crippled utopian or even 
ameliorative projects. I demonstrate how ironizing critique’s lack of any foundational 
meaningfulness undermines its own calls to action and renders it ineffective as a form 
of practical critique. Finally, I present and defend transformative disclosure as a 
credible method for self-correction, self-reform and self-education among 
Heideggerian philosophers. 
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Cartesian Scepticism 
Since at least the time of the classical Greeks, when Plato re-told Socrates’ 
accounts of the connections between the Good and Truth, truth has been essential to 
human lives lived well. Yet, the emergence of the Modern age in the West saw a 
transformation in the ideal attitude appropriate for living a life of truth. A 
transformation can be traced through the thinking of first Luther’s “good conscience”, 
then Descartes’ “right reasoning”, and finally Kant’s “critique of pure reason” out of 
the mediaeval Christian ideal of “being fit to receive God’s ideas” to the modern ideal 
of “ascertaining in advance the interactions that entities could have with each other” 
(Wrathall, 2011a, pp.220-221). The Kantian critical ideal renders open to rational 
improvement, any claim, practice or tradition that is considered contestable by 
community. In so doing, the individual’s claim, practice or tradition is rendered worthy 
of respect, at least to the kind of post-Kantian community that prevails in Western 
culture. However, as we shall see, the practice of critique opened up by this modernist 
transformation becomes itself contestable and this contestation has led to 
transformations in the form of critique considered valid, reliable and credible to post-
Kantian thinkers. 
The first practice of critique that emerged from the Luther-Descartes-Kant 
transformation is the classic, so-called Cartesian scepticism. On this account, one 
gained the indubitable truth of a thing or situation by detaching oneself from one’s 
emotions and from the ethical call of the situation in order to become a detached 
observer un-involved in the focal field of critique. 
For instance, in the strategic management literature, a well-known case of such 
sceptical critique would be the exchange between Porter and Rumelt over the 
importance to company profitability of industry structure (Rumelt, 1991; McGahan and 
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Porter, 1997). Rumelt criticises Porter for not recognising the importance of business 
model strategic design in explaining company profitability. For his part, Porter 
criticises Rumelt for under-playing the limitations placed on company profitability by 
the broader industry structure. In the exchange, both parties doubt the veracity and 
completeness of the other’s microeconomic view of strategy but neither questions the 
stand taken by each author on the situation or the different concerns that matter to each. 
They neglect to consider the self-referential perspective from which they are looking, 
assume the other author is writing from the same perspective in pursuit of the same 
goals, and also assume a neutrality and stability on their own part as observers. 
However, critics influenced by so-called postmodern streams of thought point 
out one is always already involved in a field of study and always has an existing 
intelligibility of that field that remains implicated throughout the observation and 
critique. Taking the position of a detached sceptic wholly external to the situation is 
not possible for reasons of self-reference. An infinite regress of questions immediately 
appears. Who gets to critique the observer? And who critiques the observer of the 
observer, and so on? 
Unmasking 
Taking up these questions, various forms of so-called unmasking critique 
emerged that recognise the problem of self-reference and became dominant in the field 
of critical theory (Kompridis, 2000). Kompridis defines the unmasking style as taking 
the form ‘phenomenon X is really explained by hidden or repressed underlying factor 
Y’. Kompridis goes on to illustrate how various forms of this unmasking style emerged 
in the twentieth century in the work of Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Foucault, Freud, Lacan 
and many others. For instance, Heidegger and Wittgenstein demonstrated how our truth 
conditions and future possibilities (phenomena X) are shaped by language (factor Y) 
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which is what speaks and thereby “really” determines in advance those conditions and 
possibilities. Foucault and Adorno showed how different configurations of history and 
power (Y) shape, in advance of our reason, what we see to be true and right (X). 
Nietzsche, Freud and Lacan respectively showed how the unconscious, desire and 
drives (Y) shape in advance our rationality and practices (X). In each case, to properly 
understand X, we must unmask and critique Y. 
Unmasking critique abounds in the strategy literature, for example, in the many 
inquiries into the ways that hidden identity and power structures shape its discourse. 
For instance, this unmasking stance is demonstrated by Carter et al.’s critique of the 
uncritical, conservative nature of the Strategy-as-Practice school (Carter, Clegg & 
Kornberger, 2008). Unmasking the efficient and managerial stance of the researchers, 
they write, 
Most publications in the strategy as practice area start from premises that share a 
more managerial perspective. For instance, Johnson et al. (2003: 12) argue that ‘the 
challenge for an activity based view will be to transform descriptive contributions 
into more helpful models of managing’. 
(Carter, Clegg & Kornberger, 2008, p.87) 
Valuable and insightful though such unmaskings are, they ultimately lead to a 
pervasive cynicism that suspects, and always finds, ulterior motives to all actions. This 
cynicism destroys the self-confidence necessary to act because it can always and does 
always doubt its own motives. The exemplary unmasker will always find another Y to 
unmask the real driver behind X and, in so doing, cripples the confidence to act. 
Unmasking risks disabling positive action. For instance, one can ask whether one is 
only engaging in altruistic acts for selfish reasons in order to build one’s social standing 
and for the sake of edifying one’s own self-esteem and ensuring the preservation of 
one’s genes in future generations (Kompridis, 2000). Such generalised unmasking 
eventually cripples action. 
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 While valuing the gains of the sceptical and unmasking critique, it is clear how 
they are inadequate to the task of a relevant, credible and effective critique of practice 
to practitioners themselves. Scepticism’s detachment does not stand up to the charge 
of self-reference and unmasking’s fatal lack of self-confidence finds nowhere stable to 
stand from which one can act. The transformative disclosure practitioners remain 
suspicious of their sense of a detached observer, assumed to stand outside of a situation, 
and identifying ultimate ontological causal properties that they, from a privileged 
position, unmask (for philosophical overviews of critique see Kompridis, 2000, 
Livingston, 2012; for reviews of critique in business studies see especially Weiskopf 
& Steyaert, 2009). 
Transformative Disclosure 
As we have seen, the consequences of the disclosive understanding of being 
sketched in the previous chapter for the commitment-based practitioners’ reception and 
re-conception of critique are profound. What are the goals of critique if not to create 
greater certainty about what is real and can be relied upon as a foundation for launching 
improvements? In the absence of certainty, the goal of transformative disclosure is to 
provide individuals and society with greater capacity for deliberation and action in the 
context of its own background understanding of what matters and what things mean, 
including the transformation of those understandings. Following Kompridis (2000, 
2006), I propose transformative disclosure as an alternative ethical, as much as, 
methodological orientation to sceptical and unmasking forms of critique. 
Transformative disclosure responds to the problems of critical theory by re-disclosing 
the style or understanding of being at work in a situation. Transformative disclosure 
un-conceals the text’s unthought style, its basic assumptions that, when thought 
through or articulated, reveal “new or previously unnoticed possibilities, possibilities 
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in the light of which agents can change their self-understanding and their practices, and 
change their orientation to the future and the past” (Kompridis, 2005). Transformative 
disclosure’s particular methods can be eclectic, but what these methods share is the 
disclosive stance and ethos from which those methods are put in to effect. The 
disclosive stance recognises the self-referential and self-reassurance hazards of the 
critical stances identified above, accepts them, and still finds a way to go on. It does so 
by adopting as a stance, the reflective disclosure of the style of a world and the 
researcher’s entry into and preservation and transformation of that style. 
Building on Kompridis’ insights, I propose a method of transformative 
disclosure that (i) declares the proper matter for thinking as style, (ii) delivers the 
shapes of the thinking at work in different historical styles of strategy-making theory 
i.e., their different regimes of meaning, their self-understandings, and their particular 
anomalies, (iii) helps the community of theorists to form a relationship to the shape of 
their contemporary style of strategy-making theory by (iv) finding the strongest place 
for contemporary thinkers’ resistance to seeing its shapes, (v) designing a thought 
experiment that makes captivating the thinking of the current epoch’s anomaly, and 
then (vi) helping thinkers to re-designate the past and re-design their current practice, 
on the basis of the newly emerging thinking that deals with the contemporary anomaly.  
Transformative disclosure assumes the sensibleness of the style of its 
theoretical world and discovers how it makes sense to its theoreticians before 
discovering, on its own terms, what the current style, overlooks and from which 
incompleteness it itself suffers. In this way, the disclosive logic of the strategy-making 
theory, the way it hangs together and works, is transformed from within its own logic. 
As I have already alluded to, transformative disclosure accomplishes this self-
transformation by means of an ethical rather than a particular methodical reorientation 
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and with the end of establishing “a practical critical dialogue that aims to preserve and 
renew trust and to facilitate commitment to ongoing processes of cooperative problem 
solving” (Kompridis, 2005, p.340). 
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A Method for Transformative Disclosure 
In the following section, I first make the case for the transformatively disclosive 
reading method that I adopt and then set out the particular reading techniques that I will 
use. 
I describe a single paradigmatic case for each of several historical styles of 
strategic management. Each case reveals the thought and unthought of a particular 
generic historical style of Western thinking. Each case reveals the basic structure of 
each strategic thinker’s thought and puts this revealed structure in a coherent form that 
helps the community of strategic practitioners to form a free relation to it. This textual 
analysis allows the community of strategic practitioners, as fellow dwellers in the world 
of strategic management, to orient to the shapes of their own thinking when practising 
it. These shapes are always there but are usually implicit and need pointing out and 
recognising if strategic thinkers are to form a free relationship to them. By free 
relationship to these forms of thought, I mean begin to form a personal stance towards 
and answers to normative questions such as how they work, what actions they make 
possible, and the nature of their limitations. It is language then that serves to point to 
the shapes. This language does not seek to describe those shapes exhaustively, only to 
point to them so that fellow strategic practitioners can see them and then, individually 
and as a community, do something about what they see.  In Chapter 3, I show how 
Western historical styles since the time of Plato, have been oriented to a single, though 
differently manifested, telos namely, the Machenschaft of controlling worldly events 
and eliminating surprises. In Chapter 4, drawing on the conceptual toolkit set out in 
Chapter 3, I briefly analyse the modern era’s world-picturing style of strategic 
management before describing in more detail the postmodern agile strategic 
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management style. I select a practically influential, theoretical text that acts to gather, 
orientate, and express each style’s thought and then, briefly, lay out its unthought. 
These texts describe paradigmatic cases of world-picturing and agile strategic 
management. I set out each style’s thought in terms of a conceptual and affective 
framework. A style’s thought comprises two material aspects, two attitudinal aspects, 
and a paradigmatic activity that together characterise what a thing is most truly. The 
material aspects are: (a) an ontology, the understanding of what is most basic and 
general to all entities in that style, and (b) a theology, the beingest being as an ultimate 
goal towards which all relationships between entities are organised. The two attitudinal 
aspects adopted by a self to apprehend the truth of a thing are: (c) a calling to an ideal 
of a life lived well and a corresponding (d) mood to which one is attuned. Finally, (e) 
a paradigmatic activity is what it makes sense to do to grasp the truth (Thomson, 2005; 
Wrathall, 2011; Wrathall & Lambeth, 2011, p.164). Having set out the basic kinds of 
strategic thinking at work in the world-picturing and agile styles, I move to demonstrate 
their shared unthought limitation in their oblivion to some aspect of the appropriated 
clearing as the source of meaning that is necessary to a worthy life. 
For each analysis, I use a materialist literary “reading for style” to analyse 
the mood and language of each thought and demonstrate how together they disclose a 
certain set of meanings and way of being – the style. Having laid out the thought of 
agile strategy-making theory, I identify its unthought limitations and explore the 
emergence of two early examples of a post-agile, proto-adaptive strategy-making in 
Chapter 5. 
In Chapter 6, I analyse the post-agile, proto-adaptive style through a detailed 
stylistic reading of its foundational text Disclosing New Worlds (Spinosa, Flores & 
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Dreyfus, 1997), which was intended to correct the limitations of the agile style that was 
emerging at the time it was written (Spinosa, personal communication). 
Materialist Methods for Disclosive Reading 
As has been explained in Chapter 1, in contrast to rationalistic ideas of humans 
as detached observers of external worlds, the Heideggerian disclosive understanding 
sees human being as a relationship of mutual opening of both a way of life and a world. 
If one is thoroughly absorbed in the game of football, one feels oneself being called 
and pushed by shifting forces or callings to pass, to move, to shoot. As these networks 
of forces shift, one’s identity is also re-shaped, for example, from a defender to an 
attacker. At any one time, the human and the world are a particular styled disclosure of 
a way of being in a world – a disclosure of being-there or Dasein. As described in 
Chapter 1, this stylised disclosure comprises three fundamental aspects – a practical 
understanding of the meaning of anything one comes across that makes sense as 
relevant (or irrelevant) to one’s particular practical engagements and projects, an 
attunement, disposition or mood, and a language. At the same time, as this disclosure 
is revealing or un-concealing a particular world and possible human existence, it is also 
always simultaneously concealing other styles and ways of being-in-the-world. It is the 
sensitivity of the practically-engaged, insider researcher to such intimations of the 
simultaneous un-concealing and concealing of meanings that allows this disclosive 
reading to be considered an immanent critique. Alternative ways of construing 
situations and their meaningful opportunities for action can only be glimpsed with 
respect to an existing style. In order to see new and relevant possibilities from within 
the current disclosive space, the reader must be familiar with and fluent in the meanings 
of the current space. In order to conduct a reading for the disclosure of being at work 
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in a text, I have developed a materialist literary form of reading for style through 
moodxv and languagexvi that together comprise a disclosive textual analysis. 
In their interaction with the reader, these two aspects of mood and language 
together evoke a particular style or understanding of being for that reader. My first 
reading for the thought of a text reveals what the book is doing to gather readers into 
the style of the historical context in which it was written. The reading for the thought 
of a text thus comprises three individual sub-analyses – the reading for mood, the 
reading for charmed distinctions, and the synthetic disclosive reading of the style’s 
thought. My second reading for the unthought explains why the book exceeds its 
stylistic context and hints at something about how we think about strategic 
management, business and so forth today. 
In the reading for the mood, I read the text for clues to the particular way in 
which the authors are disposed in the world – how the world matters to them. In the 
reading for charmed distinctions sub-analysis, I identify what Heideggerian 
philosopher Charles Spinosa, following Richard Rorty’s term charmed words (Spinosa, 
personal communication), calls charged distinctions, those terms that carry heavy 
significance in the text and that disclose what entities appear at all to the authors, and 
how those entities appear to them as significant for action and hence mutually gather a 
style in the reciprocal “reader response-author writing” interaction. Charged 
distinctions resonate strongly with the speaker and listener by pointing out phenomena 
that matter and gathering selves into certain ways of seeing things (Spinosa, personal 
communication). 
In the synthetic disclosive analysis I draw on the first two readings to articulate 
the thought of the style at work in the text. Only after articulating its disclosive 
structure, do I speculate as to the text’s unthought. 
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These reading methods set out how the material of a text discloses meaning in 
an un-mediated, direct way. Reading the materials of a writer, her words, grammar, 
structure, fonts and print, all of which work immediately upon the body of a reader, 
one hopes to apprehend the meanings the writer disposes, un-mediated by conscious 
thought. I select these literary methods over more common deconstructive and 
discourse analytic methods for similar reasons: both these latter methods deny, or are 
obscure about one’s access to, the real of matter. The reading for mood provides a 
bridge between the world of language and the reality outside of language. As explained 
earlier, a disclosive understanding of style accepts that it is things that attune style by 
way of setting a mood. Thus, by apprehending some intimation of a mood, one 
uncovers some insight into the basic understanding being disposed by the writer. In 
contrast, deconstructive methods inspired by Derrida, deny the possibility of access to 
any reality outside of language. In its starkest form, there is nothing outside of the text 
and everything is a text, thus “all modes of encountering texts, as ‘allegories of 
reading’, demonstrate how language does not refer to the world at all, ever” 
(Gumbrecht, 2012, p.2). Similarly, discourse analytic methods even in their latest 
versions (e.g., Fairclough, 2014), inspired to the extent that they are influenced by 
Foucault, deny the possibility of accessing truth beyond a social and historical 
discourse and, indeed, view the attempt to access such truths as symptoms of the social-
historical discourse that seeks transcendental truth rather than encounters with a reality 
outside of a discourse (Gumbrecht, 1998). 
In a reading for mood, one is first reading to attune oneself to another, to 
experience the text and its material affects, and to attempt to disclose in writing some 
of the truths hinted at in this attunement. It is an inverted non-technical form of reading 
that initially reads a text in the way that a non-technical reader would (Gumbrecht, 
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1998). Reflecting upon my own reading experiences and reactions to a text, it is 
obvious to me as a non-technical reader of literature that, at an early stage, either, I “get 
it” and am swept up in the book, or I am “left cold” by it and stop reading. And this 
response, irrespective of its subject matter, is primarily a matter of successfully or 
unsuccessfully tuning in to the book. Indeed, “getting it” is a colloquial way to express 
the reader’s successful attunement to the feel of the book. Similarly, when I consider 
why I like certain writers and return to their writing no matter how frequently or 
radically they switch subject matter, I reflect that it is a question of tone, atmosphere 
or style of their writing. Finally, as is often the case when watching a movie, one arrives 
at the end of the movie with a strong feel for what the movie was about but are left to 
figure out how the text and plot of the movie supported that conclusion. For instance, 
if one considers the films of Terrence Malick such as The Tree of Life or To the Wonder 
where plot-lines, narrative and dialogue are so thin as to be near to non-existent and 
yet the sense of a meaning is strong and one is left figuring out how Malick transported 
the viewer to this meaning. Reading for mood attends to the way the arrangements of 
the material elements of a text – its syntax and structure, its rhythm, rhyme, and its 
imagistic metaphors – work directly on a body, that is without meaningful mediation, 
to call forth certain attunements and open certain worlds of truth for a body, much more 
so than do their representation of an actual or desired external reality (Morton, 2007).  
As Gumbrecht writes, 
Consider Thomas Mann’s Death in Venice, I cannot imagine a reader familiar with 
this text who was at all surprised that Aschenbach and Tadzio never became a 
couple, or that Aschenbach’s existence-at the latest, from the time he reaches 
Venice-is a being-unto-death. Rather it is the evocation of a certain fin-de-siècle 
decadence in all its complexity – all the nuances, smells, colors, sounds, and, above 
all, dramatic changes of weather – that has made this work so celebrated. 
(Gumbrecht, 2012, p.6) 
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In the reading for mood of a text, I read the text for clues to the attunement or 
disposition that is at work in the authors’ text. I unpack this attunement by examining 
the text’s material form, shape and syntax; its sounds and texture; and its imagery, 
metaphors and metonymic chains. At this stage, I set out these observable inscriptions 
and signifiers and minimise the explicit interpretation that they are given. As 
Gumbrecht writes on the methodology of readings for mood, 
It is set in motion by ‘hunches.’ Often, we are alerted to a potential mood in a text 
by the irritation and fascination provoked by a single word or small detail – the hint 
of a different tone or rhythm. 
(Gumbrecht, 2012, p.17) 
 
If the first sub-analysis discloses the attuning moods of the text, the second 
addresses the question of the extent to which, for its readers, there is a signifying 
attuning structure at work at all to attune and disclose a material space of meaning. For 
an attuning signifying structure to work, a charmed distinction must act as a touchstone 
of meaningfulness shared between author and reader. The reader must catch the 
association that the writing is evoking with their use of the term. If the reader does not 
catch this association, then a shared signifying structure or discourse is not established 
at all. In part, my analysis of the success or failure of a text to gather and articulate a 
truth for its readers, is dependent upon the text’s charged distinctions being shared by 
its readership and recognised as articulating important elements of that truth. To the 
extent that this is not the case and those charged distinctions are unshared objects, fail 
to charm and are over-looked by its readers, the text is unable to do its work of 
articulating a truth. I identify those key words that signal the disclosure of how life can 
be lived at its best in a modern or postmodern world. By re-composing the signifying 
structure of these charmed distinctionsxvii, I extract what strikes me, as their involved 
reader, as its meaning: the expression and operationalisation of a stylised strategic life 
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at its best, whether world-picturing, agility, or post-agile adaptiveness. The question 
arises then from this analysis of the shared signifying structure, to what extent do the 
readers, especially those practising managers and consultants, of these strategic texts, 
particularly of the foundational text of proto-adaptive management Disclosing New 
Worlds, share with its authors the understanding that they are engaged in a subtle 
exercise of establishing the truth of a style? 
Taken together, this analysis of the thought of a text make explicit the already 
existing, implicit understanding of being or style of the text being read, that is of the 
paradigmatic texts of the planning, agile and post-agile strategic theorists. 
Having laid out the understanding of the being at work in each text, I move to 
consider their unthought. This sub-method is much more intuitive and driven by a 
hunch about the interaction between the mood of the text and its language. What is 
hinted at by the mood but does not get transformed into language and thereby is left 
unthought? We shall see that the pervasive mood of the world-picturing and agile 
approaches is one or other variant of a mood of control and the elimination of surprise. 
These moods are made explicit in the goal of eliminating surprise but the existence of 
a background meaningfulness is left hidden. However, the basic mood of the 
paradigmatic post-agile text Disclosing New Worlds is a radically open and receptive 
mood of wonder, whose pervasiveness and truth is left unnamed and unthought upon 
and hence is not available to be worked with by practitioners. 
Ethics and Quality of Research 
As briefly described above, in contrast to the detached and uncommitted 
observer of others that marks out respectively the sceptical and unmasking forms of 
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critique, a transformative disclosure researcher adopts the sense-making stance and 
ethical norms of an involved and embodied participant in a practice.  
Notwithstanding the abjuration of detailed methodological explication by 
pioneering exponents of the paradigmatic case methodology (Dreyfus, 1986; 
Borgmann, 1987, Foucault, 1995), it is possible to outline some guidelines for research. 
Thus, I propose a few norms for the methodology derived from the methodological 
guidelines of Flyvbjerg (Flyvbjerg, 2001, 2006; Flyvbjerg et al., 2012) and the ethical-
practical presuppositions of Kompridis (Kompridis, 2000). These norms lay out the 
responsibilities and obligations on the part of the disclosive researcher to assure the 
quality, validity, and impact of their research. Flyvbjerg describes nine such guidelines 
(Flyvbjerg, 2001, pp.129-140) and Kompridis, seven presuppositions. From these I 
distil five norms for ensuring the quality of realistic research. I have already described 
the first norm (1) of practical involvement in the field. Deep, open-ended, and 
committed practical involvementxviii is critical to developing the holistic understanding 
and rich distinctions of a situation that are necessary if one is to see what counts as a 
transformational issue for that situation (Dreyfus, 2008a, pp.41-46). On this basis, 
researchers must have developed high levels of practical expertise to be able to conduct 
transformative disclosure research if they are to reliably transform rather than simply 
understand everyday action. The remaining four norms are (2) attunement to 
community to ensure validity and avoid relativism and nihilism; (3) situated, expert 
orientation to issues; (4) little things, cases and context; (5) participation, public and 
polyphonous self-narration. I describe them in turn below. 
Community Attunement for Validity and Against Relativism and 
Nihilism 
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If one must develop practical understanding of the practice before researching 
it, one must also tackle questions of nihilism, relativism, and validity by attuning and 
orienting to the “common view among a specific reference group to which the 
researchers refer” and to the values shared by the members of that reference group.  
For the researcher with a disclosive orientation, there is no detached position 
that offers the sure footing from which a researcher can take a view of the situation. 
The understanding that a piece of research achieves rests upon the researcher and their 
researched community’s background of practices. Background practices foster 
successful ways of practically coping in the world, and their longevity provides surety 
of their realism and counters nihilism, the understanding that there is no foundation or 
reason for choosing one action over another. In the disclosive understanding of the 
primordiality of practice, anything does not go. Accordingly, it is required of a 
disclosive researcher that they immerse themselves in the community of practice being 
studied. 
To the extent that practices can be sensed, articulated, contested, and justified 
they provide a defence against relativism. One set of interpretations is not as good as 
another, we cannot simply abandon one way of making sense and adopt another. 
Instead, the social and historical practices of a community provide an ordering of 
concerns that, in specific situations, can be articulated and re-ordered but not jettisoned. 
It is this considered ordering and re-ordering that provides a defence against relativism 
(Spinosa, Flores & Dreyfus, 1997, Chapter 4).  
These defences against relativism and nihilism also ground the claims for a 
case’s validity. In the absence of the view from nowhere to definitively assess validity, 
a situation that shows no sign of changing, the gold standard for claims of validity is 
that it is for a reference community to assess the validity of a research project’s claim 
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that its interpretation is better than extant interpretations, and the community makes 
these assessments based upon its background understandings. 
Central then to this discussion of validity, relativity and nihilism is the 
identification of, and immersion in, a specific reference group whose values and 
common sense will frame these assessments. My reference group is twofold. In general, 
it is the community of practising strategists for whom the shift toward an agile strategic 
management practice is commonly accepted and, in particular, it is those advocates of 
CbM who first promoted the post-agile thinking of Heidegger as a viable alternative to 
capitalism. I have described above my immersion in this community and my involved 
practical engagement with its theorists and practitioners to manage strategic 
management projects. For me that meant, on the one hand, immersing myself through 
employment in the world of commitment-based strategic consulting and, on the other, 
immersing myself in the skills of disclosive thinking as developed by Hubert Dreyfus 
and his students and colleagues, and learning, developing, and testing a textual reading 
and writing methodology that those thinkers would assess as being appropriate. To this 
end, I have interacted intensively with Charles Spinosa, editing and co-authoring two 
academic papers with him and developing and adjusting my work following extensive 
speculation, advice, criticism and comment on this and earlier sketches and complete 
drafts over a period of ten years, from Spinosa as well as to Hubert Dreyfus, Mark 
Wrathall, and Sean Kelly.  
Does it Matter? Ensuring Relevance of the Orienting Issue in a Situation 
A researcher must avoid “idiosyncratic morality and personal preferences” 
when articulating their stance towards the situation. The identification of issues, 
anomalies and “tension points” (Flyvbjerg et al., 2012) must be done in such a way that 
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it is attuned to the common sense and valuations of the reference group. In other words, 
one might disagree with the values commonly held by actors in a situation, one might 
be answering a call of conscience experienced from within the situation, but one’s 
stance toward an issue must make sense to the reference group. It may not happen 
immediately but, whatever one declares as an issue must at some point be seen by an 
expert community as a relevant issue, even if only to oppose it. If not, one develops 
research with little or no impact.  
I justify the relevance of the orienting issue that I bring to this study by 
sketching a little more of the wider contextual concerns of the two groups. Within both 
reference groups, questions of the instrumentalism, absurdity and oppression of the 
agile style have already been raised, if currently only as marginal concerns.  
In the previous chapter, I referred to the recent writings of agile strategy gurus 
on meaningfulness, fulfilment, and performance stress in agile-style companies (e.g., 
Fleming, 2009; Christensen, 2012). However, concerns about the loss of existential 
meaning and oppression of the agile style of firm had begun much earlier among the 
CbM community. Indeed, one of the major publications of this new CbM community, 
Disclosing New Worlds, was originally written to address misgivings about the 
absurdity and oppression of an early version of Commitment-based Management, 
Tracy Goss’s The Last Word on Power (Goss, 1996; Spinosa, personal 
communication). Even so, in an extended response to Disclosing New Worlds’ first 
publication in essay form, Grant claimed that its entrepreneurial form of business 
transmutes “means into ends and vice versa” (Grant, 1995, p.126). In other words, 
entrepreneurs are fundamentally preoccupied with the pleasure of exercising their 
skilful way of acting (or form of life) to change human practices in a particular situation 
(with some product or other as a kind of by-product,) much more than they are seeking 
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to create a particular product or have a particular end in mind. Indeed, exercising their 
form of life becomes an end in itself, even as the outcomes tend toward absurdity or 
meaninglessness. This transposition, Grant argues, has profoundly negative 
consequences for entrepreneurship’s role in “producing large-scale cultural and 
historical changes”. He notes that entrepreneurs have indeed produced innovations that 
can be said to have significantly ‘reconfigured’ our ‘practices’ such as “the automobile, 
television, the jet airliner and the contraceptive pill” (Grant, 1995, p.125). However, he 
notes that entrepreneurial action has also produced many innovations that cannot be 
said to have brought about significant cultural change including “the safety pin, the 
press stud, the zip fastener (the last two being merely glorified buttons); disposable 
ballpoints, safety razors, lighters and diapers; paper handkerchiefs, and kitchen towels; 
even such a major labour-saver as the dish-washing machine” (ibid). Entrepreneurial 
action has also led to some innovations that might be considered to be undesirable, he 
suggests pornography. This list could be updated with consideration of the absurdity 
of a wide-ranging list of innovations such as, surrogate maternity factories, sub-prime 
mortgages, McHouses, Mega-project disasters like Wembley stadium, and $30 
hamburgers. If Grant emphasises the absurdity of agile management, Thrift sees the 
greatest danger in its co-opting of freedom to capitalist productivity. In an early 
description of the agile, commitment-based management style, he describes it as 
emblematic of the agile, performative cultures of late capitalism and doubts its 
sustainability because of the impossible demands to perform continuously that it places 
on actually existing human beings (Thrift, 2005, pp.151-152). However, as we shall 
see, these moralising complaints about the tendency toward meaninglessness may 
paradoxically be precisely the kind of examples of the phenomena needed to lead 
ultimately to an authentic form of such agile management due to the encounter with 
81 of 334 
meaninglessness that they foster, and the consequent spur to own one’s decisions 
authentically that this experience opens up. 
Realist social scientists advise getting close to the community and situation 
studied in order to ensure the relevance of their research project. By getting close to 
the group studied, the research becomes oriented to issues of consequence to a 
community of practice during data collection, analysis, feedback, and publication, and 
by probing deeply into its history. As I stated earlier, I have been a student and work 
colleague of Charles Spinosa and other inventors and practitioners of the CbM practice 
tradition for over 10 years. The commitment-based practice articulated in the writings 
of Spinosa, Flores and others, is also my own practice. However, I am an exponent who 
is prompted to question this practice. This questioning has derived in part from my own 
already-described experiences as a commitment-based practice consultant, and also 
from my conversations with other Heideggerians from different interpretive 
communities to the Berkeley Heideggerians. The Berkeley Heideggerians gather 
around the research and teaching of Hubert Dreyfus and include Charles Spinosa and 
Fernando Flores. This interpretive community, perhaps the dominant one in the English 
speaking world, has been identified as holding a pragmatic interpretation of 
Heideggerian philosophy that argues for a priori mindless coping through cultural 
practices and bodily endowments to consciousness or the mental (Levine, 2008). 
However, other Heideggerians argue that this emphasis on practical human being or 
Dasein was only a preliminary step to Heidegger’s larger project of working out the 
source of meaningfulness per se and the proper human relationship to this source. This 
project could only be achieved through the historical destruction of the history of 
meaning (Wrathall & Lambeth, 2011; Sheehan, 2013, 2015; Levine, 2008). This 
engagement with a broader Heideggerian community and the ensuing recognition of 
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Heidegger’s later historical work suggested the issue of CbM’s nihilism and the 
questions of truth, language, history and the sacred that I alluded to in the introduction 
to the thesis. Both Grant and Thrift’s concerns about absurdity and oppression were 
acknowledged to me in personal communications with the lead author of Disclosing 
New Worlds and in many conversations that I have had with other CbM practitioners 
(Spinosa, personal communication). Further, when I first suggested the issue of the loss 
of the sacred in the CbM approach, Spinosa described it as “extremely insightful and 
brilliant!” I take this to be adequate evidence that my issue and research questions are 
of, at least initial, relevance to the community of practitioners. 
Little things, cases and context  
Whereas theoretical inquiries answer big problems by determining covering 
law causal relations between dependent and independent variables abstracted from 
their context, paradigmatic human science relies on thick descriptions of single cases 
(Tsoukas & Knudsen, 2005) and the “near-documentary stance” of the researcher (Chia 
& Holt, 2009, p.152). These cases may, initially, seem limited in their explanatory 
reach but, if well selected, small questions asked of single cases can lead to big answers. 
Dreyfus himself argues for the single case approach in Disclosing New Worlds, and 
contends that further cases would add only marginal value by sharpening the original 
and providing variations on its theme (Spinosa, Flores & Dreyfus, 1997, p.31). The 
single case strategy has been elaborated by Flyvbjerg who recognises four kinds of case 
study: paradigmatic cases, critical cases, peripheral cases, and deviant cases (Flyvbjerg, 
2006; Glynos & Howarth, 2007). 
A paradigmatic case provides an infrastructure or prototype against which 
specific concrete cases can then be assessed for their family resemblance. Classic 
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paradigm cases include Geertz’s thick descriptions of the Balinese cockfight (1977) or 
Borgmann’s description of the central heating system as a paradigm case of the 
technological style of thinking that he called the device paradigm (1987). The paradigm 
case allows him to illustrate some of the basic features of the device. The features are 
the reduction of the goods that it provides from many goods (warmth, community, 
skilfulness, time awareness) to a single good (warmth), the device’s tendency toward 
making the good ubiquitous, available always and everywhere, its disburdenment of 
the need for skilfulness on the part of device users, and the device’s hidden and 
disconnected machinery for making the good available. A paradigmatic case must be 
sufficiently rich and sharp to enable diverse observers of particular cases of the agile 
strategic management style to adjudge similarity between their case and the paradigm 
and then identify the specific features that are relevant. Note that the relationship goes 
this way around from the particular to the general. Paradigm cases have family 
resemblance and do not generate complete, holistic and abstract rules, principles and 
features that can be used to identify a particular case (Dreyfus, 1986, p.21). So, for 
instance, one might add to Borgmann’s list of features on the basis of one’s 
appreciation of the paradigm by, for example, noting how the device diminishes the 
social identities required to attain warmth. In days gone by in traditional households in 
Europe, a wood fire would be laid by the woman of the house, the man of the house 
would chop the large logs and the children gather and prepare the kindling. 
 Critical cases can lead to the re-consideration of a commonly-held 
understanding by selecting a case that, if demonstrated, would lead to many other cases 
and the wider common sense being reframed. Flyvbjerg considers the selection of an 
industrial plant where cleanliness, air quality and other safety procedures are exemplary 
to consider whether handling organic solvents can lead to brain damage. If the link can 
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be demonstrated in this stringent case then it is more likely to exist as a problem at less 
carefully-run plants (Flyvbjerg, 2006, pp.229-230). Peripheral or maximum variation 
cases serve to delineate the scope of “travel” or range of application of a paradigmatic 
case. For instance, by inquiring into several cases that differ widely in their features, 
such as for different national locations, income brackets, genders, sexualities, and so 
forth, one can demonstrate the broad relevance of the paradigm (Flyvbjerg, 2006, 
pp.231-232). Finally, deviant cases, such as Foucault’s use of Bentham’s Panopticon 
to foreground the basic features of disciplinary society (1995), serve to sharpen the 
contrast with another set of practices, for instance contemporary surveillance and 
control practices (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p.229). 
So, if there are no such rules for ascertaining in advance that one has a 
paradigmatic case, how does one select one that can serve as a prototype for more 
specific cases and that sets the standard for other cases? In response to Flyvbjerg’s 
question, Dreyfus answered, 
“Heidegger says, you recognise a paradigm case because it shines, but I’m afraid 
that’s not much help. You just have to be intuitive. We all can tell what is a better or 
worse case – of a Cézanne painting, for instance. But I can’t think there could be 
any rules for deciding what makes Cézanne a paradigmatic modern painter… . It is 
a big problem in a democratic society where people are supposed to justify what 
their intuitions are. In fact, nobody really can justify what their intuition is. So you 
have to make up reasons, but it won’t be the real reasons.” 
(Personal communication to Flyvbjerg, 1988, cited in Flyvbjerg, 2006, p.232) 
 
While Flyvbjerg accepts the intuitive origins of such a selection, he disagrees 
with Dreyfus’ disavowal of public justification. For Flyvbjerg, the researcher must still 
use their experience and intuition to assess whether a case is a candidate to serve as a 
paradigm and provide collectively acceptable reasons for their choice. Hence, I justify 
my selection of commitment-based management as exemplary, in different versions, 
of agile and post-agile management for four reasons. Firstly, I cite my own practical 
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involvement in strategic management and the relevance and usefulness of CbM to 
corporations seeking to develop the agile style. Secondly, I note Thrift’s identification 
of CbM as emblematic of the agile performance culture of contemporary capitalism, 
what he called the fast company. Thirdly, I note the emergence of the contemporary 
representation and problematisation of the technological, agile style and its promise 
and mood management in contemporary literature (e.g., Shteyngart, 2010; Eggers, 
2013). Finally, as I described in the previous chapter, I note also the growing influence 
of CbM and its iterative OODA loop in the scholarly and popular strategic management 
literature, and its evident adoption, from examples cited in those literatures, by major 
corporations and consultancies. 
Polyphonic and Self-transforming Narration 
Transformative disclosure addresses the problem of confidence to act without 
close-minded certainty while also avoiding the problem of self-reference. The principal 
demand of the disclosive approach is on the sense-making orientation of the reader 
more than the methodical technique or theoretical structure adopted (Kompridis, 2000, 
p.38). I highlight three aspects of the disclosive stance: intersubjectivity, materiality, 
and receptivity. These aspects are derived in part from the fuller exploration of the 
ethics of disclosure in Kompridis (2000, 2006). In the context of a reading of a text, 
materiality means staying close to the material of the text i.e., to elucidate its style, 
signifiers and syntax, before leaping to their interpretation. Only after close attention 
has been paid to the material of the text is an interpretation worked out that aims to lay 
out the pre-reflective disclosure at work in the text. I assume the previously-laid out 
descriptions of the reading method are adequate for the purposes of demonstrating 
materiality. 
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Disclosive analysis demands polyphonic intersubjectivity on the part of the 
reader. Consistent with the Heideggerian Dasein, any individual’s being-in-the-world 
is always already social, a Mitsein or a being-in-the-world-with-others. Our already-
existing, pre-reflective disclosure of a world enables our practical and skilful 
involvement in a world. In the current instance, we do not enter the world of business 
consulting through classroom education into thematised present-at-hand ways of 
making sense of the world. We simply get on with ready-to-hand coping in situations, 
supplemented by thematised present-at-hand learning in the encounter of specific 
breakdowns, and with any rudimentary classroom understandings pushed to one side 
(Tsoukas, 2010b). This pre-reflective disclosure also sets up the possibility for specific 
breakdowns in intelligibility, such as the one that instigated this research project – the 
dissonance experienced by the author between the revolutionary claims for 
commitment-based practice and its oppressive technological reality in actual situations. 
Receptivity denotes the openness of the reader, both to receive their historically 
and community-grounded disclosure of a self and a world and, at the same time, to 
listen to the particular call to act of the situation. Disclosive thinkers and the community 
of commitment-based management practitioners place great store in responding to the 
call of conscience, as the making sense of and appropriation of oneself and one’s 
situation, and see this as always already in a relationship of sense-making with one’s 
tradition, one’s future possibilities, one’s language, one’s multiple communities, and 
one’s others. For the disclosive understanding, the image of a private observer making 
sense of data according to objective or external standards is a fallacy. Whatever sense 
a reader makes of a text is also a connection to and a scission with these other 
intersubjective relationships, and the reader’s interpretations are never final and 
complete. The appropriately receptive and intersubjective sense-making stance for the 
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disclosive reader is that of Entschlossenheit, which in Kompridis’ interpretation is 
much better translated as ‘un-closedness’ rather than the more typical but misleading 
‘resoluteness,’ with its connotations of decisiveness and steadfastness. This translation 
also brings Entschlossenheit into close proximity to Erschlossenheit or disclosure with 
their opposite being ‘foreclosure’ of possibilities and interpretations. Adopting a stance 
of Entschlossenheit requires organising one’s sense-making around what Heidegger 
terms the ‘call of conscience’, a demand from the social situation to unify and 
appropriate one’s own understanding of the situation in order to become free and 
intelligible to oneself and others. 
Again, this response to the call of conscience is not an individual, isolated 
response to the call but occurs within the already existing social and temporal space of 
relatedness. A particular relationship to a so-called ‘friend’ is vital to this un-
closedness. According to Stanley Cavell, a friend is, 
“The figure, let us say, whose conviction in one’s moral intelligibility draws one to 
discover it. To find words and deeds in which to express it.” 
(Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome, p. xxxii, cited in Kompridis, 2006, 
p.56)  
 
In addition to my supervisory relationship, I have such a community of friends. 
Throughout my reading, I have been in regular and frequent conversations and written 
communications with Charles Spinosa (see above) and other of the leading 
commitment-based theorists and practitioners both informally as part of my ongoing 
consulting work and formally in extended visits, exchanges of emails, and seminars 
presenting my work to the philosophical and business community. These exchanges 
shape my own sense-making more continuously and in more ways than I am able to 
document, although I make reference to thousands of pages of personal records, 
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journals, and communications where relevant, significant, and traceable. This may be 
a limitation of the method although I argue that any demand for traceability of influence 
would be an inappropriately private-mind and scientistic stance of just the kind that the 
disclosive inter-subjectivity criticises.   
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3. Heidegger’s Argument for a Better Way of Life 
In Chapter 1, I argued that the loss of meaningfulness in agile businesses has 
become a central concern for scholars and practitioners concerned about the worthiness 
of current business life. Heideggerian philosophers see the loss of meaningfulness in 
contemporary life as the result of a growing tendency in Western thinking to optionalise 
everything to the extent that there is nothing that cannot be treated as an option and 
hence nothing that can exert existential or sacred meaning for Western humans. In 
Chapter 2, I set out the appropriate methodology that I would use to answer my research 
questions and the ethical guidelines that would inform the study. In Chapter 3, I 
elaborate on the account given in Chapter 1 of the Heidegger’s thinking about truth and 
of the truthful life as the life worth living.  There is a rather straightforward and 
attractive core to Heidegger’s philosophy of a life well-lived that has profound 
implications for contemporary strategic management and commercial life in general. 
That core consists of understanding reality as what is meaningful to oneself and one’s 
generation but then, from that start-point, owning the material, historical and cultural 
contingency of whatever understanding of reality one’s generation has, and then 
liberating oneself into a thinking that both preserves and transforms this understanding. 
This thinking though is not easily accomplished and I provide Heideggerian 
suggestions for how it can be developed among strategists. My argument has four parts 
and draws on both early and later Heidegger’s thinking. 
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The Basic Picture of Propositional Truth from Early Heidegger 
(1920-1931).   
We can begin tracing Heidegger’s inquiries in to truth with his statement in a 
lecture course in 1931 regarding the generally accepted philosophical understanding of 
truth as correctness, the correspondence between a proposition and a thing. 
What is the ‘essence’ of truth? We know particular truths; e.g., that 2+1=3, that the 
earth revolves around the sun, that autumn is followed by winter, that the World War 
began in early August 1914, that Kant is a philosopher, that it is noisy in the street 
outside, that this lecture room is heated, that there is a light on here, and so on. These 
are ‘particular truths’; we call them this because they contain ‘something true’. And 
wherein is the true ‘contained’? What is it which so to speak ‘bears’ this truth? It is 
the propositions we have just enunciated. Each particular proposition is true, is 
‘something true’, ‘a truth’. We now ask: what is truth as such and in general? What 
makes each of these propositions true? Just this: that what they say corresponds with 
the facts about which they say something. Therefore, the being-true of the 
proposition means such correspondence. What then is truth? Truth is 
correspondence. Such correspondence obtains because the proposition is directed to 
the facts and states of affairs about which it says something. Truth is correctness. So 
truth is correspondence, grounded in correctness, between proposition and thing. 
(Heidegger, 2013, p.2) 
 
However, Heidegger’s inquiry was not about truth as correctness itself but 
about the existential conditions of possibility of that correctness. For Heidegger, an 
enquiry into the ground of truth as correct propositions about entities leads to a further 
enquiry into their ontological truth, a progressively deeper inquiry into the way entities 
themselves are disclosed or unconcealed by human practices such that truth-claims are 
possible (Wrathall, 2011, pp. 11-39). These practices provide a background 
understanding or, to use Heidegger’s specialised term, clearing, in which one’s self, 
other people, things, and actions are familiar and intelligible as real. Heidegger’s 
inquiry first demonstrates the way that propositional truth is dependent upon the 
uncoveredness of entities, such that they show up as relevant or irrelevant to the 
situation, that Heidegger calls the ontic truth of beings, 
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Propositional truth is rooted in a more originary truth (unconcealment), in the pre-
predicative manifestness of beings, which may be called ontic truth. 
(Heidegger, 1998a, p.103) 
 
Ontic truth is gained by being socialised into the practices of a local historical 
and cultural world. For example, asking his students, in 1919, what it is that they have 
direct contact with in their everyday lives, Heidegger illustrates with the structure of 
his own experience of standing before them lecturing and advised that: 
In the experience of seeing the lectern something is given to me from out of an 
immediate environment (Umwelt). This environmental milieu (lectern, book, 
blackboard, notebook, fountain pen, caretaker, student fraternity, tram-car, motor-
car, etc.) does not consist just of things, objects, which are then conceived as 
meaning this and this; rather, the meaningful is primary and immediately given to 
me without any mental detours across thing-oriented apprehension. Living in an 
environment, it signifies to me everywhere and always, everything has the character 
of world.  
(Heidegger, 2008, p.58)xix  
 
Thus, a thing becomes meaningfully present to a human because of the practices 
that condition the world within which the human always already finds herself. One 
always finds oneself already coping in the midst of entities experienced as 
instrumentally relevant to a practical world: the chalk, the lectern, and so forth, or 
irrelevant to or in discord with this world and hence marginalised: the traffic noise, the 
interior decoration. However, things show up as instrumentally meaningful or not 
because the world itself hangs together as fundamentally intelligible. Thus, the truth of 
beings in the world depends upon the ontological truth of being of the world per se – 
how the world hangs together and makes sense. 
Ontic manifestation, [the ontic truth of beings], however, occurs in our finding 
ourselves, in accordance with our attunement and drives, in the midst of beings and 
in those ways of comporting ourselves toward beings in accordance with our striving 
and willing that are also grounded therein. 
(Heidegger, 1998a, p.103)  
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Most times, one is smoothly, unthinkingly dealing with the ontological truth of 
being in an automatic, absorbed mode of coping with entities’ instrumental meaning, 
that Heidegger calls the ready-to-hand. The instrumental meaning of a thing is not laid 
on in a cognitive move after the objective perception of those things by a human being. 
Rather, everything present to a human comes already meaningful and the objective 
perception of aspects and properties of a thing become salient only when the thing has 
stopped serving its purpose within the practical context, for instance, when too-dry 
chalk continually breaks against the chalkboard, the lecturer may stop and examine its 
properties. Such an objectifying way of being of an entity Heidegger terms the present-
at-hand mode and the transitional state in which the chalk is breaking, the unready-to-
hand (Heidegger, 1962, pp. 91-145). 
As we saw in Chapter 1, when one is smoothly coping in the world, the self’s 
way of being comprises a stable way that relationships between entities hang together 
as meaningful in a the three-fold structure of care:  understanding, mood, and language 
or discourse. 
The ways of doing things that make up the truth of being of the clearing are not, 
however, rigid habits. Instead the make-up of the world is volatile and, in response to 
local conditions, practices can be refined, modified, broken down, disconnected one 
from another and re-connected in particular and novel ways within the free space of 
the clearingxx. In such situated modifications from among a finite range of possibilities, 
one develops and takes a stand on one’s own individualised way of being. On the basis 
of this stand, one’s own particular sense of selfhood arises. This sense of oneself gains 
its resonance from the intimation that one’s way of being could become meaningless. 
In short, it could die. As a flipside, life is existentially meaningful or authentic to the 
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extent that one is taking a stand on and expressing one’s own rather than the general 
way of being. In Heidegger’s language, our way of being is for being to be an issue for 
us and existential meaning or authenticity is a matter of being true to that insight, being 
open to beings and to ourselves as they change while, at the same time, holding on to 
our past for the sake of the coherence of ourselves and our world. 
Dasein is an entity which does not just occur among other entities. Rather it is 
ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue for 
it. 
(Heidegger, 1962, p.32) 
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Heidegger’s Later Thinking of Epochal Truths (Early 1930s 
to early 1950s).  
Veritas est adequatio intellectus ad rem.  The entire thinking of the Occident from 
Plato to Nietzsche thinks in terms of this delimitation of the essence of truth as 
correctness. This delimitation of the essence of truth is the metaphysical concept of 
truth; more precisely, metaphysics receives its essence from the essence of truth thus 
determined. 
(Heidegger, 1998, p.50) 
 
As described in Chapter 1, propositional claims to truth make sense only against 
the background clearing of practices. In his later thinking of the 1930s to the mid-
1950s. Heidegger developed an account of the way truth and truth-making practices 
stabilised and changed over the course of human history in the West.  On this basis, 
Heidegger described a hidden history of being in the West tracing a number of holistic 
transformations in the prevailing style of the clearing. A style is the way the practices 
for dealing with selves, others, things, institutions, actions, and so forth hang together 
to bring out truth. Each transformation reveals a different kind of truthful life and a 
different way of making correct propositional statements. This gathering and fitting of 
one entity to another, Heidegger calls the gentle law of Ereignis (Wrathall, 2011, p. 
206; 2013). Heidegger saw Ereignis as a tendency for styles to gather into different 
configurations of meaningfulness rather than to disintegrate into meaninglessness. In 
this gathering, entities, including selves, mutually fit to each other and assemble a 
relatively stable configuration. Hence, the adaptation connotes a happy or apt fit of one 
entity to (ad-) another (King, 2009, pp.50-52; Wrathall, 2013 and personal 
communication, Wrathall & Lambeth, 2011, p. 177).  
Each style gathers and conditions truth, the truth of beyng or of the clearing, by 
determining the truest material that comprises all entities, the truest attitudes and 
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actions for attaining truth by skilfully coping with the way things really are, and the 
truest kind of self to be, if one is to be in step with the way truth is construed in one’s 
world and time (Wrathall, 2011a, pp.212-242; 2013). In language common to business 
practice, each style conditions its own way of doing the right thing and doing things 
right.  
Heidegger reconstructed several ways in which Western people had conceived 
of truth and of truthful action. For instance, for the philosophical Greeks, nothing made 
more sense than that things, like shields and vases, were craftworks that approached 
the look of the truest matter, the eternally stable and perfect ideas, that served as 
paradigms or models. While the craftworks of a craftsperson may or may not instantiate 
the idea more or less closely, the idea itself would remain as an ideal: 
Being as idea is now promoted to the status of what really is, and beings themselves, 
which previously held sway, sink to the level of what Plato calls mē on–that which 
really should not be and really is not either–because beings always deform the idea, 
the pure look, by actualizing it, insofar as they incorporate it into matter. On the 
other hand, the idea becomes the paradeigma, the model. 
(Heidegger, 2014a, p.196) 
 
If the truth is to be found in the idea then the truthful life for a craftsperson 
could be attained by adopting an attitude of conformity to the ideas, the careful 
adjustment of one’s senses, thoughts and works to the ideal forms that serve as the 
prototypes of a truthful work.  
Because the idea is what really is, and the idea is the prototype, all opening up of 
beings must be directed toward equalling the prototype, resembling the archetype, 
directing itself according to the idea. The truth […] now becomes homoiōsis and 
mimesis: resemblance, directedness, the correctness of seeing, the correctness of 
apprehending as representing. 
(Heidegger, 2014a, p.197) 
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Finally, the paradigmatic activity for the philosophical Greek craftsperson is 
one of theôria or theoretically-guided activity, learning to see the world through the 
theoretical lens of the ideas that are shaping the world’s structures and developments 
and making propositional claims about the fitness or otherwise of an actualised 
craftwork to the ideal. 
In the Christian Middle Ages, while the material truth of entities continued to 
be ideas, these ideas no longer established themselves from some unknown other place 
but sprang from the mind of God. The truest entities for the mediæval Christian are the 
ens creatum and things – like the stone of the cathedral – showed God’s light and order. 
The Christian theological belief that, with respect to what it is and whether it is, a 
matter, as created (ens creatum), is only insofar as it corresponds to the idea 
preconceived in the intellectus divinus i.e., in the mind of God, and thus measures 
up to the idea (is correct) and in this sense is “true.” 
(Heidegger, 1998, p.138) 
 
In the Christian age, nothing made more sense than that people were either 
saints – those who used their God-given intellect to bring their thoughts into 
correspondence with their deeds and both into accord with God’s idea and divine plan 
– or they were sinners. Thus, the appropriate attitude for the saint to take was one of 
adequation or measuring up to God’s ideas and the paradigmatic activity were 
cognitive ones of having faith in the revealed word and piously reading and adhering 
to the scriptures and church doctrine, and making propositional claims about the 
correspondence or otherwise of an act to the scripture.   
The intellectus humanus too is an ens creatum. As a capacity bestowed upon human 
beings by God, it must satisfy its idea. But the understanding measures up to the 
idea only by accomplishing in its propositions the correspondence of what is thought 
to the matter, which in its turn must be in conformity with the idea. 
(Heidegger, 1998, p.138) 
If human knowledge wants to experience the truth about entities, then the only 
reliable way for it remains to diligently compile and preserve the doctrine of the 
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revelation and its transmission through the church teachers. Authentic truth is only 
mediated through the doctrina of the doctores. 
(Heidegger, 1991b, p.88) 
 
Thus, from epoch to epoch, people were quite different. A saint from the Middle 
Ages would be seen simply as a peculiar slave in the ancient world. An Athenian 
philosopher would be at best a virtuous pagan in mediaeval times. Then, in the 
Enlightenment, we in the West saw people as free, autonomous subjects reaching after 
certainty and calculating cause and effects so as to order the world as a system of 
objects. For the Enlightenment moderns, just as for the classical Greeks and the 
mediaeval Christians, the truest entity is the idea. However, these ideas are no longer 
self-standing entities in a perfect, eternal other realm as they were for the Greeks nor 
ideas created in the mind of God, rather the ideas become representations, literally the 
re-presentation of the objects (res) presented as a world-picture to the ratio mind of the 
human subject. Rather than the ens creatum, the truest entity becomes the ens certum, 
the most stable, certain representation that can be discerned when one’s 
representational apparatus is working correctly and can be relied upon to calculate the 
future effects in the world of actions in the past and present. In order to represent 
securely the ens certum, the truest attitude for the modern thinker to adopt is that which 
can ascertain certainty. 
Ratio is not just one power among others but is the basic power of man. That to 
which man is empowered by this power is decisive with regard to his relation to the 
verum [true as veridical] and falsum [false]. In order to obtain the true as what is 
right and correct, man must be assured and be certain of the correct is of his basic 
power. The essence of truth is determined on the basis of this assurance and 
certitude. The true becomes the assured and certain. The verum becomes the certum. 
The question of truth becomes the question of whether and how man can be certain 
and assured about the being he himself is as well as about the beings he himself is 
not. 
(Heidegger, 1998, p.51) 
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Thus a line of thinking can be traced from Luther’s obsessions with the purity 
of his own thoughts, through Descartes’ inquiry into the correct use of reason, to Kant’s 
critique of pure reason to provide guidance as to the correct use of the cognitive 
faculties to represent nature and calculate its future movements formulated in 
propositional statements. 
Luther asks how man could be a “true” Christian […] the striving for correctness 
[…] the basic stirring of the disposition of faith. […] The essence of truth in the 
modern period is determined on the basis of certainty, correctness […] the question 
of truth becomes the question of the secure, assured, and self-assuring use of ratio. 
Descartes inquires into the usus rectus rationis, i.e., falcutatis iudicandi, the correct 
use of reason i.e., the faculty of judgment. […] The untrue is the false in the sense 
of the erroneous i.e., in the sense of the wrong use of reason. […] In Kant’s Critique 
of Pure Reason, the question of the “correct use” treats of the will to secure the 
certainty which man, on his own, standing amidst beings, must attain and wishes to 
attain. 
(Heidegger, 1998, p.51) 
 
During the twentieth century, Western selves began to see both people and 
things alike as being without stable essence other than as options to be ordered at will 
to get the most out of their possibilities for the sake of further ordering. On the basis of 
this radical acceptance of a chaotic and fluid reality, the truest entity of all can only be 
a temporary stabilisation, a value relative to the practical purposes of a particular stance 
or way of life. For instance, in his dialogue with Nietzsche, seen as the exemplary 
philosopher of the emerging agile epoch, Heidegger writes, 
To the question “What is truth?” Nietzsche answers, “Truth is the kind of error 
without which a certain kind of living being could not live. The value for life 
ultimately decides.”  
(Quoting from Nietzsche, Will to Power, Heidegger, 1991a, p.29) 
 
And the truest attitude for living a truthful life is one of the artist who accepts 
chaotic reality and learns wilfully to posit her own values and stances and see all 
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entities as resources, people or things that could be made productively available or 
unproductive.  
The truth, which is conceived [by Nietzsche] as error, was defined as what has been 
made secure, the stable. But what is thought to be error in this way necessarily thinks 
truth in the sense of being attuned to the real, that is, with becoming chaos. Truth as 
error is a missing the truth. Truth is a missing the truth. In the unambiguous essential 
determination of truth as error, truth is necessarily thought twice and each time 
differently, thus ambiguously: once as making secure what is stable, and the other 
time as being attuned with what is real. Only on the basis of the essence of truth as 
being attuned can truth as stability be an error. The essence of truth taken here as the 
basis of the concept of error is what has been determined since ancient times in 
metaphysical thinking as conformity to the real and as being attuned with it, as 
homoiôsis. 
(Heidegger, 1991a, translation modified in Wrathall, 2011a, pp.226–27) 
 
And, in this technological thinking, nature shows up first and foremost as 
something to be ordered and mathematised for the precise calculation of effect. In a 
lengthy passage on mathematics and physics, Heidegger concludes that the currently 
dominant mathematical physics will never be able to renounce that “nature reports itself 
in some way or other that is identifiable through calculation and that it remains 
orderable as a system of information” (Heidegger, 1977, p. 23).   
Consistent with early Heidegger’s thinking of mood, Ereignis’ configuring is 
most fundamentally affective rather than cognitive, set in play by a general mood rather 
than by imaginative rationality. The mood attunes or sets the tone for the style and 
disposes a language considered in a very broad sense, not as a collection and grammar 
of terms but, as the expression of a stylised world, that is, as the clearing. As Heidegger 
wrote in 1941/42,  
What is the word? The soundless voice/ tune of beyng. What is called voice here? 
Not ‘sound’ but the tuning, that is letting ex-perience.  
(Heidegger, Das Ereignis, p. 283, quoted and translated by Ziarek, 2013, p. 102.  
See also Mitchell, 2015, pp. 204-210; Wrathall, 2011, pp.119-155) 
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Of course, moods can be relatively minor and superficial, such as the mood of 
jealousy towards all other’s successes, but, in the context of Ereignis, Heidegger is 
primarily interested in much more fundamental, grounding-moods that set the tone for 
the configuration of all the practices of a culture at a historical moment in time. These 
grounding-moods set the tone of the style that, in turn, conditions a particular kind of 
everyday self, a particular interpretation of the world and its entities, and the particular 
skilful actions appropriate for the style. The particular thinking of a style is first carried 
and set by a disposition, attunement, or simply mood. As Haar writes when introducing 
Heidegger’s work on historical moods, “Thought is the accomplishment in language of 
a giving of being [style] to man, who is first attuned in the silence of mood” (Haar, 
1992, p.160).  Heidegger identifies how the style of the philosophical Greeks was set 
by a mood of astonishment,  
In astonishment we restrain ourselves. We step back, as it were, from being, from 
the fact that it is as it is and not otherwise. And astonishment is not used up in this 
retreating from the Being of being, but, as this retreating and self-restraining, it is at 
the same time forcibly drawn to and as it were, held fast by that from which it 
retreats. Thus, astonishment is the disposition in which and for which the Being 
[style] of being unfolds. Astonishment is the tuning within which the Greek 
philosophers were granted the correspondence to the Being of being.  
(Heidegger, 2003, p.85)  
 
Similarly, the fundamental mood attuning the truth of the mediaeval Christian 
age was one of faith in one’s future salvation (Heidegger, 1998, p.51), and the mood 
of the modern epoch is one of doubt and certainty, 
For [Descartes] doubt becomes that tuning in which the attunement [structure of 
determination] vibrates to the ens certum, i.e., being in certainty. Certitudo becomes 
a fixing of the ens qua ens which results from the unquestionability of the cogito 
(ergo) sum for man’s ego. Thereby, the ego becomes the distinctive sub-jectum and 
thus the nature of man for the first time enters the realm of subjectivity in the sense 
of ego. Out of the attunement to this certitudo the language of Descartes obtains the 
determination of a clare et distinctive percipere. The tuning of doubt is the positive 
acquiescence in certainty. Henceforth, certainty becomes the determining form of 
truth. The tuning of confidence to the absolute certainty of knowledge which is 
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attainable at all times is pathos and thus the archè, the beginning of modern 
philosophy.  
(Heidegger, 2003, pp.88-89) 
 
What fundamental mood tunes this contemporary technological or agile epoch? 
Writing in the 1950s, Heidegger is rather speculative, naming several moods in a 
complex hopeful anxiety tuning Western people in to a world where reality is chaotic 
and any truth only temporary,  
Into what kind of tuning does this put contemporary thinking? The question can 
scarcely be answered unequivocally. Presumably a fundamental tuning prevails. It 
is however, still hidden from us. This would indicate that our contemporary thinking 
has not yet found its unequivocal path. What we come across is only this–various 
tunings of thinking. Doubt and despair, on the one hand, blind obsession by untested 
principles, on the other, conflict with one another. Fear and anxiety are mixed with 
hope and confidence. 
(Heidegger, 2003, pp.89-91) 
 
However, by 1961 he settles on boredom as the basic mood that grounds the 
truth of the West in the late twentieth century, 
The man of today has no more time for anything, and yet, when he has free time, it 
immediately becomes too long. He must kill long periods of time by whiling them 
away through pastimes.... In this “ennui” nothing appeals to us anymore, everything 
has as much or as little value as everything else, because a deep boredom penetrates 
our existence to the core. 
(Heidegger, “Messkirch’s Seventh Centennial,” Listening, 8 (1973), pp.50-51 
(translation emended). Quoted in Thiele, 1997, p.507) 
  
Following his interpretations of pre-Socratic philosophical and poetic texts, 
Heidegger came to see the moods as the divinities, messengers of the gods. As he wrote 
in the early 1940s,  
We are thinking the essence of the Greek gods more originarily if we call them the 
attuning ones. 
(Heidegger, 1998, p.111)  
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And the divinities, as messengers of gods, point toward divinity or Godhood 
per se, that is, toward a sacred authority beyond human comprehension or wilful 
control, namely, the clearing, which counters human will and desire and attunes their 
meaningful lives. The gods, in Heidegger’s account, are the keepers of the spirit or 
ethos of a community’s style in a particular epoch. Historically, it has been the gods 
that inspire humans, by charisma rather than force, to live lives in accordance with the 
ethos of the origins and destiny of that community. Until the contemporary epoch, gods 
played the chief role in determining each unifying style. For Heidegger, a god is that 
which, in some way, determines the taken-for-granted relationships that constitute what 
entities most basically are and the meaning of events, in other words, its style. The 
history of Western thinking or metaphysics is thus the history of different gods that 
order those different ways of thinking (Wrathall & Lambeth, 2011, p.163). As Wrathall 
and Lambeth write, each of the different gods, “called on us to constitute the world 
differently” (ibid). They play this role by being the ones who counter us, that is to say, 
they attune us with a counter-mood to the mood of the prevailing style and one that 
calls us out of our current desires and settled way of being into another. 
Attunement does not represent something or set it before us: rather it transports our 
Dasein [existence] out into an attuned relation to the gods in their being thus and 
thus.  
(Heidegger, 2014b, p.123)  
The gods accomplish this countering by: 
1. Resisting our ability to stay in the current world 
2. Revealing a new order or meaning to the world 
3. Calling us to the service of that order  
4. Bestowing on us a new attunement to the world 
(Wrathall & Lambeth, 2011, p.165) 
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Thus, each new epoch is instigated by a new god who deranges the prevailing 
style, forcing people out of a current world and casting a different light upon it such 
that the world, and the affordances it offers for a good life, appears quite differently. If 
it is a god that sends a style, it is a divinity that gathers and focuses the mood for human 
experience, such that, as we are oriented by the divinity, we are attuned to the god of 
the world and its practical affordances. 
If it is a god that sends a style, it is a divinity that gathers and focuses the mood 
for human experience, such that, as we are oriented by the divinity, we are attuned to 
the god of the world and its practical affordances. Divinities are material entities 
(including artworks and cultural figures) or practices that serve to remind us of, and 
orient us to, the ineffable sending of a style upon which all our practical existence 
depends. The style of each epoch was each attuned by a mood carried by a divinity in 
the guise of sacred monuments or the works of thinkers considered sacred. Such sacred 
monuments and thinkers attuned selves to a style and brought “the God closer” 
(Wrathall & Lambeth, 2011, p.169). Thus, the temples and Sophocles’ Oresteia 
disposed the classical Greeks to astonishment at the gathering of beings into a 
meaningful political whole, Athens. Cathedrals, the Bible, and the rituals of the 
sacrament attuned mediaeval Christians to pious observation of the word of God. And, 
Descartes’ Meditations, Kant’s Critiques, and the institution of science attuned modern 
subjects to the sceptical reaching for certainty. In Heideggerian terms, all three of these 
epochal styles belong to a mega-epoch that he characterised as the Machenschaft, or 
epoch of planning (Wrathall & Lambeth, 2011, p.175). The epoch of planning arose 
out of the Platonic Greeks’ experience of the polytheistic Homeric Greeks’ world “full 
of evil forces, unpredictable change, difficult conditions, and inevitable death and 
defeat” (Lefkowitz, 2005, p.239). Philosophical thinking, since its Platonic inception 
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and subsequently, has been concerned with dealing with the Homeric world’s anomaly 
of instability. Thus, in the age of planning, everything becomes calculable and reliable, 
whether the Platonic ideas¸ God’s designs, or Descartes and Kant’s representations, 
and everyone is disposed by different variations of the foundational mood of calculative 
control that was a response to the dismay experienced at the dangerously unstable and 
pluralistic world of the Homeric Greeks (Wrathall & Lambeth, 2011, p.175). Heidegger 
argued that the epoch of planning has culminated in a technological or agile style. The 
agile style represents the “greatest danger” to our human essence because, uniquely, it 
has come about, not from a direct experience of countering by a god, but from an 
inward turning away from the gods and towards the self. It marks the beginning of a 
time when God no longer plays the role either of an ultimate arranger or deranger of 
human affairs, the so-called “death of God” (Nietzsche, 2001). In Western political 
economies (Thrift, 2005; Sennett, 2006), notwithstanding their material achievements, 
Western selves are oblivious to their distinctively agile style and while there may be 
suggestions for an ultimate God that authorises their style, perhaps the market or the 
Internet (Dreyfus, 2009, pp.1-2), all suggestions can themselves be co-opted as a 
flexible resource that only “asymptotically approach perfect flexibility and efficiency” 
(Wrathall & Lambeth, 2011, p. 171). This turning away from the gods eventually 
dissolves any authority, even of the self, as a stable determinant of truth: 
Addiction to control, to power, then to flexibility, and finally to the provision of an 
unlimited supply of options for the pursuit of self-realization. Eventually, the 
provision of options became an end in itself, unhooked from any ideal of self-
realization. 
(Wrathall & Lambeth, 2011, p.170).  
 
The machine [technology] does not at all merely step into the place of equipment 
and tools. The machine is just as little an object. It stands only insofar as it goes. It 
goes insofar as it runs. It runs in the drive of industry. The drive drives as the bustle 
of the requisitioning of the orderable. If the machine stands, then its standstill is a 
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condition of the drive, of its cessation or disturbance. Machines are within a 
machinery. But this is no piling up of machines. The machinery runs from the 
plundering of the drive, as which positionality orders the standing reserve. 
(Heidegger, 2012a, p.33) 
 
In the nihilistic technological age, it seems there is no god to counter this 
nihilism, only a series of technical challenges to accomplish greater flexibility, and the 
contemporary Western self loses a sense of itself as a being that undergoes and 
participates in historical transformations in its style of life. Heidegger argued that we 
should not, indeed cannot, reject the agile understanding of being but he did argue that 
we can develop a free relation to it by recognising it, simply, as a style (Heidegger, 
1977, pp.3-49). However, if Western selves experience how the currently dominant 
agile style is treated as complete and the only feasible truth of being and truthful life, 
and how it understands people and things alike only as enhanced or enhanceable 
resources, then they can sense their own lost freedom and meaningfulness. 
As we have seen, in the agile age anything that might be proposed as a sacred 
paradigm unifying and authorising the style, will not be revered as sacred but, instead, 
be co-opted as an imperfectly frictionless and flexible resource. And any actual feature 
of that thing that resists pure flexibility will be treated as a technical challenge to be 
reduced or eliminated to “asymptotically approach perfect flexibility and efficiency” 
(Wrathall & Lambeth, 2011, p. 171). Any breakdowns in the smooth functioning of a 
tool of liquidity, such as a hedge fund’s financial investment instrument or the Internet, 
are not seen as the “experience of resistance and refusal” in the name of something that 
matters ultimately, but instead are requisitioned as resources for innovation in the 
direction of greater volatility or liquidity (ibid., p. 178). Those sensitive to this 
narrowing of meaningful difference may come to sense themselves as trapped in a 
single understanding of truth: the co-opting of resources for the sake of flexibility. This 
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experience of the resistance and refusal of one’s clearing to any one style both throws 
into relief the agile style, with its thin sense of mattering, and also reveals that, as a 
consequence of one’s history and culture, one already has some marginalised things 
and practices that matter and that focus the meaningfulness of one’s existence. During 
this middle period of Heidegger’s thinking, he referred to this disruptive glimpse of the 
technological clearing as a background that enables this pluralistic truth but that must 
conceal itself in order to work, as an experience of the last god (Wrathall & Lambeth, 
2011; Polt, 2013, pp.203-213; Sheehan, 2015, p.268). 
The essence of Da-sein, …, is the sheltering of the truth of being, of the last god, in 
beings. 
(Heidegger, 2012b, p.244) 
 
So far, our account of lesser, more specific gods describes how they counter an 
existing style and set a new style that guides appropriate action and truth. In contrast, 
the last god is later Heidegger’s first attempt to describe a sense of an absent or 
“absconding” holiness, sacred, godliness or Godhood – a never-present, ultimate end 
that opens a space of existential and instrumental meaning, action and truth. While still 
ambiguous among Heidegger scholars, on my reading, the last god disrupts the totality 
of the prevailing agile clearing, and all previous clearings, oriented as they are towards 
human mastery and wilful planning and control. The last god works by revealing the 
clearing, as a self-concealing background meaningfulness, and by refusing to come to 
presence to institute a new clearing. Instead, in the event of the last god, the human 
responds to a situation, not by imposing human plans and treating all entities as 
interchangeable, but by drawing a self to attend and respond to the mysterious 
particularities of a thing in the world. Early Heidegger had already identified the 
importance of the “tiniest spheres” of humble things to a true and worthy life 
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(Heidegger, 1988, p.304). In contrast to Latin-origin terms for entity, such as res, ens, 
or object, which denote an entity that can be made fully present to human inquiry but 
which, in their drive for presence, destroy richer remote or liminal meanings, later 
Heidegger uses an archaic Germanic term dinc (for gathering to negotiate an affair) 
that points towards the way that a humble thing brings near, gathers or focuses a 
worldly context of subtle meanings and conditions worthy human action (Heidegger, 
2012a, pp.12-16). When a thing is working, it brings near and unifies meaningfulness 
(Ereignis) from four regions called the fourfold. The thing gathers the tension between 
the presentable clarity of practice of the focal thing itself in a particular time and place 
(Heidegger calls this region: sky) and the ever-mysterious, absent potentiality of the 
material and tradition that support the practice as worthy and appropriate (earth).  
Similarly, the things gathers the tension between the historical way of being of the 
community of human beings engaged in the practice (mortals) and the futural sense of 
an ultimate end that can never be made present (divinities). It is by engaging with a 
thing in a way conditioned by the fourfold of sky, earth, mortals and divinities, that an 
individual can generate the kind of sensibility of, what Charles Taylor calls, one’s 
“focal awareness” that reveals it is in an interplay with a background style of the world 
as a moral context (Taylor, 2016, p.93-98). It is this interplay between focal thing and 
contextualising world that allows the thing to be neither economically nor morally 
commoditised because, while it is being made fully present for propositional truth it is 
also not cut off from its meaningful, historical or material context (Borgmann, 2010, p. 
29). Adopting the stance of dwelling allows both the thing to be “the locus of the full 
corona of liminal meanings” conditioned by the fourfold and the focal practitioner to 
sense that their “zone of focal awareness is surrounded by a corona of potentially 
articulable meanings, corridors that I might explore” (Taylor, 2016, p.94). In this way, 
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which Heidegger calls dwelling, the human preserves the richness of the thing and 
allows it to flourish.  
When we think the thing as thing, then we protect the essence of the thing in the 
region from where it essences. Thinging is the nearing of the world. Nearing is the 
essence of nearness. Insofar as we protect the thing as thing, we dwell in nearness. 
The nearing of nearness is the authentic and sole dimension of the mirror-play of the 
world. 
(Heidegger, 2012a, p. 19) 
Heidegger sees these particular and plural callings as the sacred demands of 
things.  Heidegger saw an encounter with the last god as setting contemporary selves 
on the path to escaping entrapment by any style, including the trap of agility, by 
engaging with entities and other people in a way appropriate to the local meaningful 
situation rather than simply as a means to productivity (Wrathall & Lambeth, 2011, p. 
177). Thus, the Heidegger of the 1930s and 1940s is beginning to see how dwelling 
with focal things and practices both preserves and meaningfully transforms truth and 
freedom by allowing the practitioner to think in a different way than representing or 
calculating, 
When and how do the things come as things? They do not come through the 
machinations of humans. But they also do not come without the vigilance of the 
mortals. The first step to such vigilance is the step back from merely 
representational, i.e., explanatory thinking into commemorative thinking. 
(Heidegger, 2012a, p. 19) 
 
Heidegger writes of the experience of the last god as a thinking conditioned by 
three moods: shock at the a priori nature of the clearing, in this case of agility, restraint 
to acknowledge but also refuse this clearing, and diffidence or awe at the mysterious 
potentiality retained by the existing focal thing in the face of the agile style.  While 
Heideggerians disagree on the extent to which we just feel ourselves trapped thus by 
modernity and technology or have to develop a sense of our historical epochs or of the 
last god before we can experience this trappedness, all accept the domination of a single 
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understanding of truth as a threat to the essence of the human way of being as a 
discloser of different styles. 
The approaching tide of technological revolution in the atomic age could so 
captivate, bewitch, dazzle, and beguile man that calculative thinking may someday 
come to be accepted and practiced as the only way of thinking.  
(Heidegger, 1966, p.56) 
Heidegger’s Last Thinking of Thinking and Mystery (1950s 
onwards). 
The question remains of how we can inculcate the essence of the human as a 
discloser of different styles, different kinds of truth, and different disciplinary ways of 
living truthful lives. Heidegger provides a clue as to how humans in the West might 
retain their human essence as a discloser of different styles in his call to provide people 
with “an education in thinking”. In a dense but optimistic passage from Basic 
Principles of Thinking regarding thinking in a fundamental mode that he calls “the 
event of appropriation”, Heidegger speculates that thinking could transform our 
relationship with technology from one of domination by technology to being served by 
it, 
One such conversion of positionality [technology] from the event of appropriation–
something never accomplishable by humans alone–would result in the appropriative 
retraction of the technological world from its position of mastery into one of 
servitude within a realm where the human more authentically reaches into the event 
of appropriation. 
(Heidegger, 2012a, pp.117-18) 
 
Building on this speculation, Heidegger later goes on to propose educating 
people in a form of thinking that is more basic even than the scientific and agile 
thinking that pursues correctness and is capable of loosening the grip that both have in 
shaping current selves.  
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Perhaps there is a thinking which is more austere than the irresistible race of 
rationalisation and the sweeping character of cybernetics. Presumably it is precisely 
this sweeping quality which is extremely irrational.  
Perhaps there is a thinking outside of the distinction of rational and irrational still 
more austere than scientific technology, more austere and thus removed, without 
effect and yet having its own necessity. When we ask about the task of this thinking, 
then not only this thinking but also the question about it is first made questionable. 
In view of the whole philosophical tradition, this means:  
We all still need an education in thinking, and before that first a knowledge of what 
being educated and uneducated in thinking. In this respect, Aristotle gives us a hint 
in Book IV of his Metaphysics (1006a ff.). It reads: esti gar apaeideusia to me 
gignoskeing tinon dei zetein apodeixin kai tinon ou deit. ‘For it is uneducated not to 
have an eye for when it is necessary to look for a proof, and when it is not necessary’.  
(Heidegger, 1972, p.72) 
 
Heidegger’s early thinking of the human as a practical coper within an existing 
clearing suggests a thinking of education as the practice through which a self develops 
her understanding or mastery of the truth of being of a domain. Domains are wide and 
varied and could include mathematics, sports, law, the arts like painting, music or 
sculpture, the different trades such as plumbing or carpentry, and even cultural taste 
like fine dining. While the curricula for each domain will vary widely, we can identify 
certain common functions for an education in practical mastery of a domain (Wrathall, 
2011b). Firstly, education enables an individual to make “discriminations” or meanings 
within the domain that they were unable to make prior to education. Secondly, they 
shape an individual’s “disposition” towards what they perceive when practising the 
domain. Thus, education shapes an individual’s repertoire of appropriate and 
inappropriate actions – what to do and when and what not to do. When one is educated, 
a situation calls for certain responses and effectively closes off others. Thirdly, an 
education shapes the normative categories or sense of what is better or worse in a 
domain. Following Wrathall, we can call this third capacity “taste”. Thus, education 
brings an individual into accordxxi with what is essential in a domain – education 
disciplines the learning practitioner.   
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Now, as we have seen, the particular domain is governed by the paradigmatic 
style of its clearing, education brings our discriminations, dispositions, and taste into 
accord with the spirit or mood that governs that paradigm. Education, thus construed, 
is an education of one’s spirit to master a discipline in a particular style. We will call 
such an education that cultivates practical mastery of a discipline in a style – 
disciplinary education. For successful initial education, the teacher reproduces his own 
way of responding (or spirit) in the student. It is a way for the student to “grasp the 
prevailing paradigm” (Wrathall, 2011b, p.5). Thus, given the pervasiveness of 
calculative thinking to different disciples across Western life, education becomes the 
cultivation of the calculative spirit and skills within a domain – it is an education in 
calculative thinking. 
However, deeper than a disciplinary education in calculative thinking, 
Heidegger proposes another education that he names as an education in “austere 
thinking” or sometimes “meditative thinking”. In an education in such thinking, the 
student comes into accord, not with any one style but, with our essential human 
condition–our essential openness to different styles and our lack of any single style or 
“homelessness” – the existential fact that there is no “true me” or one way for the world 
to be but rather we are open to plural different ways of being in the world. Thus, 
Heidegger argues that there is a way out of agile thinking to the extent that all, and we 
can begin with enough of this generation, “receive an education in thinking”, directly 
or indirectly, that enables us to twist free of any single dominant style (Wrathall, 
2011b).  
Following Wrathall (2011b), I elaborate on Heidegger’s suggestions for an 
austere thinking that both constrains and liberates, rather than simply confines, in order 
both to provide some positive characterisations of such a thinking and proposals for its 
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education. I begin with the characterisations that will allow us to recognise austere 
thinking when we see it. 
Firstly, we have said we are educated in the ordinary or disciplinary model of 
education when we have been educated in the skills, the discriminatory capacities and 
the taste to know what to do in a situation in a particular style. Thus, if we have been 
educated in modern brewing we might know how to practice kräusening, dry hopping, 
or decoction mashing, how to distinguish liquid pressures, the speed of heat diffusion 
in a brew kettle, the extent of sugar caramelisation, and so forth and, finally, how to 
configure all such factors to make a brew that fits with the evolving tastes of beer 
drinkers. However, this disciplinary knowing is not the same as thinking. One does not 
think when one simply knows what to doxxii. When one is thinking, no clear course of 
action presents itself for an automatic response, in other words, something is question-
worthy. 
We learn to think by giving our mind to what there is to think about. 
What is essential in a friend, for example, is what we call ‘friendly.’ In the same 
sense we now call ‘thought-provoking’ what in itself is to be thought about. 
Everything thought-provoking gives us to think. 
(Heidegger, 2004, p.4) 
In general, thinking is provoked, literally called forth, not by our force of will 
but by something missing in the situation itself. This might, say, when the temperature 
of the brewing container fails to reach optimum, be a case of the transition from ready-
to-hand to present-at-hand. In such a case, it is appropriate simply to cast about for a 
reason for the failure, such as having left the thermostat control at too low a setting, 
and then correcting it. In such situations, it is appropriate to think instrumentally, 
calculatedly, to correct what is missing or awry and return the system to smooth 
functioning.  
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However, a more profound provocation comes about when two existing styles 
conflict, no single course of action offers itself, and, indeed, any ground, that might 
justify either one of the two styles over the other, is absent. Consider a process 
consultant who is also a devotee of traditional beers. As a consultant, he is passionate 
about bringing agile forms of process and marketing efficiency to every domain. 
However, as a craft beer-drinker he abhors mass-production and ironic marketing. For 
such a consultant, bringing current brewing techniques to his favourite beer could 
destroy it but adhering to expensive craft methods could leave it vulnerable to the same 
fate as cheaper beers take its market. The consultant must think deeply about how to 
brew in a way that is neither simply efficient nor nostalgic. He is called to think. In 
such austere thinking, Heidegger describes how a sense of “openness to mystery” 
reigns, a sense that is driven out of agile thinking that would treat the absence of craft 
as a call for further agile thinking. 
There is then in all technical processes a meaning, not invented or made by us, which 
lays claim to what man does and leaves undone. We do not know the significance of 
the uncanny increasing dominance of atomic technology. The meaning pervading 
technology hides itself.  But if we explicitly and continuously heed the fact that such 
hidden meaning touches us everywhere in the world of technology, we stand at once 
within the realm of that which hides itself from us, and hides itself just in 
approaching us. That which shows itself and at the same time withdraws is the 
essential trait of what we call the mystery. I call the comportment which enables us 
to keep open to the meaning hidden in technology, openness to the mystery. 
(Heidegger, 1966, p.55) 
  
As I argued earlier, human activities in particular disciplines (brewing, 
accounting, teaching) make sense against the pervasive background of the current 
historical clearing. Thus, contemporary business people are in tune with their agile 
times to the extent that they are called to break down their operational process and its 
component ingredients so as to maximise optionality and productivity. That is what the 
truth of the agile world calls them to do to be leading any kind of truthful life. But 
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Heidegger is drawing attention to the question that lurks in this certainty, why do we 
do that? From where does the agile sense get its authority? How does it condition and 
constrain what is possible? Is another style possible? How might it be accomplished? 
In asking such questions the thinker is confronted by mystery. And an education in 
thinking would educate the thinker with the discrimination to recognise such mystery 
and the taste and skill to explore it fruitfully. In this it liberates and allows human 
beings to live most truthfully by disclosing and at the same time questioning truth. 
Heidegger makes two suggestions for what characterises such thinking that 
preserves a sense of mystery and yet is not disabled by it. First, he describes a mood of 
composure or Gelassenheit that changes how the thing matters to us. Instead of the 
modern mood of certainty that would drive scientific investigation or of agile fright 
that would drive manic action to fix the problem, the composed mood of thinking will 
foster more intense involvement with the situation and allow for an entanglement of 
one’s thinking with what is missing from the situation. Instead of being driven to fix 
what is missing from within the productivity and optionalisation logic of the current 
world, the thinker engages with the situation in such a way that it comes into its own 
more fully than simply as one possible style, what we referred to above as the “event 
of appropriation.” Heidegger describes this composed engagement as a kind of 
simultaneous affirmation and denial of what is there, 
Meditative thinking demands if us not to cling one-sidedly to a single idea, nor to 
run down a one-track course of ideas. Meditative thinking demands of us that we 
engage ourselves with what at first sight does not go together at all. […] We can 
affirm the unavoidable use of technical devices, and also deny them the right to 
dominate us, and so to warp, confuse, and lay waste our nature. […] Our relation to 
technology will become wonderfully simple and relaxed.  We let technical devices 
enter our daily life, and at the same time leave them outside, that is, let them alone, 
as things which are nothing absolute but remain dependent upon something higher. 
I would call this comportment toward technology which expresses “yes” and at the 
same time “no,” by an old word, Gelassenheit, releasement toward things. 
(Heidegger, 1966, pp.53–54) 
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Thus the thinker is able to make sense of things in a way that fits with the 
prevailing pervasive style of our world thus retaining relevance for those others with 
whom they live. At the same time, they are not confined to think only in this way but, 
somehow, to sense it for what it is in a deeper sense, just one way to make sense of 
things. Clearly, in order to accomplish this ambivalent composure, we must be open to 
the way that we make sense of things in this world and this re-connects the education 
in austere thinking to disciplinary education via the second key Heideggerian term of 
sensibilityxxiii. 
To follow a direction that is the way that something has, of itself, already taken is 
called, in our language, sinnan, sinnen [to sense]. To venture after sense of meaning 
[Sinn] is the essence of sensibility [Besinnen]. This means more than a mere making 
conscious of something. We do not yet have sensibility when we have only 
consciousness. Sensibility is more. It is calm, self-possessed surrender to that which 
is worthy of questioning. 
(Heidegger, 1977, p.180. (Translated modified)) 
 
To be educated in thinking is not simply to learn the sense of the pre-established 
set of possibilities and impossibilities for recognising and manipulating a thing in order 
to bring it correctly into line with a model. An education in such disciplinary thinking 
develops the sense of mastery of the prevailing clearing. A disciplinary education 
develops an experience of the proper purpose for a thing within a style, the different 
possible ways of doing something, of the equipmental whole that the things fits into 
and works with, and the skilful and appropriate actions for a self who uses a thing. Thus 
one learns how to drink beer, on what occasions, and from what vessels, and so forth. 
A disciplinary education can also condition a sense of what one does not or cannot do 
with a thing. For instance, one does not drink beer ordinarily before going to work or 
use a bottle of beer to name a ship.  
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However, an education in austere or meditative thinking develops a sensibility 
or attunement to the clearing in itself and thus reveals that the current space of 
possibilities is just that, one possible space that remains in place only if current 
practices and dispositions for using a thing are continued, and consequently, as 
contingent, opens up the possibility that other spaces could be different. Such a 
sensibility becomes a prerequisite for composure, given that that mood is a 
simultaneous affirmation and denial of the current style, and for the openness to the 
mystery of the lack of a grounding justification for the current style.  
In sensibility we approach the place from which first opens up the space that our 
actions and omissions traverse in any particular case. 
(Heidegger, Science and Reflection, Cited and Translated by Wrathall, M (2011b))   
 
So, sensibility and composure enable thinking inasmuch as they keep open the 
possibility of both preserving and transforming the prevailing style and maintaining the 
essence of the good life for a human as the discloser of different, rather than just one, 
styles or regimes of truth. How then might such an education in thinking be 
accomplished? Heidegger makes two proposals for such an education in thinking. First 
one must stay close to, that is to say, fully and bodily commit to practising a particular 
thing, what as we have seen, Heideggerian philosopher Albert Borgmann calls a focal 
thing (Borgmann, 1987, pp. 196-210; Wrathall & Lambeth, 2011, p. 178). It is only in 
such closeness to a thing and commitment to those true practices that reveal its realness, 
that the truth of the overall style that coordinates those particular practices is revealed, 
[Speaking in the context of shoemaking] It is only in the tiniest spheres of the beings 
with which we are acquainted that we are so well versed as to have at our command 
the specific way of dealing with equipment which uncovers this equipment as such. 
The entire range of intraworldly beings accessible to us at any time is not suitably 
accessible to us in an equally original way. 
(Heidegger, 1988, p.304) 
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Thus, disciplinary education in a particular discipline of a narrow domain 
reveals how to make practical sense of a domain – enabling truthful action – by 
inculcating particular distinctions, dispositions and skills, and taste for dealing with the 
reality of the thing. However, if that disciplinary education were to take the form of 
disciplining a learner to adhere to a set of decontextualized rules, applicable in every 
circumstance, rather than usher the learner into a world of practices and dispositions, 
then it will close off the possibility of sensibility. 
So I studied with this man. He teaching me how to sharpening. But he didn’t teach 
at all. I looked at what he does. I saw how to do it many times. My teacher, he don’t 
teach you anything. Sometimes I clean up the floor for a couple of years. He says, 
“Clean up the sawdust.” So I go and clean up the sawdust. 
Master carpenter, Hiroshi Sakaguchi, Being in the World, 33m47s. 
 
If the disciplinary education takes the form of an apprenticing to a master 
craftsman, in which the teacher inculcates a sensibility to a style in a learner, and then 
“gets out of the way” encouraging the learner to learn from a diverse set of craftspeople 
each with their own style, then the sensibility to style per se, the composure that affirms 
and also denies the prevalence of any one style, and the openness to the mysterious 
grounding of each style, that are required for thinking can be inculcated.  In order to 
think, a learner must develop a historical or, perhaps, spatial sensitivity to different 
styles of the disciplinary practice of the domain and both their incommensurability, that 
they require profound transformations of disciplinary practice for each style to make 
sense at all, and their contingency, that they need not be this way or any other way. 
Eventually, the learner becomes mindful of the styles governing the worlds of practice 
in which she dwells, and develops her own unique style as a kind of continual 
integration of the past of different styles and the emerging future of a unique style. This 
sensibility is experienced as the awe felt in the presence of the sacred, 
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Sensibility is like gasping in awe before the expected miracle. The genuine search is 
a constant hesitation. Not the hesitation of those who are merely perplexed and 
undecided, but the hesitation of the one who tarries for a long time, who looks ahead 
and looks back because he is searching and tarrying in the transition. The finding 
and appropriating of what is fitted is one with the hesitating transition. 
(Heidegger, 2000, p.124) 
 
Having set out Heidegger’s account of the history of various, holistic styles that 
shape the most general way that Western selves understand things, themselves and how 
to act, I turn in Chapter 4 to how contemporary strategic management is shaped by the 
two latest styles: the world-picturing and the agile.   
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4. Two Orthodox Styles of Strategic Management 
Introduction 
So far I have developed an account of how since the pre-Socratic Greeks, 
Western human beings have understood themselves and their world quite differently 
over the course of their cultural history. I have also described how this history of being 
can be seen as an ongoing strengthening of the skills necessary for dealing with things 
in ways that reliably explain and predict what happens in the everyday world set by 
that style while, at the same time, losing our essential skill for establishing new styles 
of meaning per se and of different ways to be. This loss of our essential skill strips life 
of its meaningfulness and freedom because it leaves only a life in which the roles we 
can take and the meanings we can make in a world are pre-ordained and closed. In such 
a life, we are deprived of the role in the disclosure of truth, of different worlds and of 
different ways to be in a world. It is this truth-making role, as the discloser of worlds, 
that marks the essence of the human way of being – life at its best.  
Using the account of the conceptual and affective aspects of the truth of 
different historical styles developed in Chapter 3, in this chapter I analyse and 
demonstrate the modern, world-picturing style and the agile, commitment-based style 
at work respectively in Michael Porter’s and Donald Sull’s strategic thinkingsxxiv. Both 
authors are identified as paradigmatic cases due to their acceptance as leading 
exponents of each style in the English-speaking business culture. This acceptance is 
indicated by publication of multiple books by prestigious publishers, frequent 
publication in Harvard Business Review as the most popular business practitioner 
journal, and appearance in Thinkers50 business guru lists. If my choices strike the 
reader as particularly obscure or perverse then my selection should be adjudged faulty. 
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I draw on the conceptual and affective framework set out in Chapter 2 and 3 to 
analyse Porter’s and Sull’s work. I first analyse the thought and unthought of the world-
picturing style exemplified by Michael Porter’s calculative thinking of how to create 
competitive advantage by increasing bargaining power. I then similarly analyse the 
agile style exemplified by the Donald Sull’s agile, commitment-based thinking. In each 
case, I read the texts against the matrix of the previous chapter that sets out how the 
style works to orient the strategic thinking at play in the text. Having analysed the 
world-picturing and agile approaches, in Chapter 5, I sketch an emerging post-agile 
proto-adaptive style before, in Chapter 6, developing a close reading for difference of 
its foundational text Disclosing New Worlds (Spinosa, Flores & Dreyfus, 1997). 
As I argued in the previous chapter, a style is a unified and shared understanding 
of “what things are, how the world should be arranged, what it makes sense to aspire 
to, and so on” (Wrathall & Lambeth 2011, p164). A style then is a way in which a 
particular truthful life is organised. In each style, one lives well by being in tune with 
the unifying style of one’s time and a life well-lived in one time is quite different to 
one in another. Adapting the previous chapter’s conceptual and affective framework to 
set out a style’s thought, a style can be seen as comprising two material aspects, two 
attitudinal aspects, and a paradigmatic activity that characterise what a thing is most 
truly. The material aspects are: (a) an ontology, the understanding of what is most basic 
and general to all entities in that style, and (b) a theology, the beingest being as an 
ultimate goal towards which all relationships between entities are organised. The two 
attitudinal aspects adopted by a self to apprehend the truth of a thing are: (c) a calling 
to an ideal of a life lived well and a corresponding (d) mood to which one is attuned. 
Finally, (e) a paradigmatic activity is what it makes sense to do to grasp the truth 
(Thomson, 2005; Wrathall, 2011; Wrathall & Lambeth, 2011, p.164). Rather than 
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developing another broad survey of the styles of strategic management (e.g., 
Cummings, 1999; Seidl, 2007; Mintzberg, Ahlstrand & Lampel, 2009; Clegg, Carter, 
Kornberger & Schweitzer, 2012), I concentrate on the two latest Heideggerian styles 
as they manifest themselves in contemporary strategic management: the modern world-
picturing and postmodern agile styles. 
I begin by reviewing the texts exemplifying the detached, rational style of 
modern, world-picturing strategic management that seeks sustainable competitive 
advantages in a more or less stable world.  
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The Modern World-Picturing Style of Strategic Management 
Strategic business management, since the 1960s through the 1990s, has been 
grounded in assumptions of a stable world, economic equilibrium, and sustainable 
competitive advantage (D’Aveni, 2010; McGrath, 2013). These assumptions have 
encouraged the development of several popular frameworks and tools for analysing 
and attaining sustainable competitive advantage in a stable, predictable world. 
Decade Tool Proponent 
1960s SWOT framework Ansoff (1965) 
1970s Matrix analyses • Growth-Share Matrix (Henderson, 1979) 
• GE/ McKinsey Market Attractiveness-Business Strength Matrix (Sudharshan, 1995) 
 Scenario analysis Wack (1985) 
1980s Industry Structural 
Analysis 
• Five-Forces Industry Structural Analysis (Porter, 1979, 1980) 
• Generic Competitive Strategies (Porter, 1985) 
• Value Chain Analysis (Porter, 1985) 
 Strategic Systems 
Analysis 
7-S Framework (Peters and Waterman, 2004 (first published 1982) 
1990s Value-based 
Management 
Value-based planning (Rappaport, 1986) 
EVA-management (Stern et al., 1995) 
 Resource-based 
Management 
Stalk et al. (1992) 
Barney (1996) 
 
Despite the diversity of these various strategic management frameworks and 
tools, a common style and set of characteristics shared by the different frameworks can 
be discerned. That style is the one described in the previous chapter as the modern 
world-picturing style. Using the conceptual and affective framework summarised 
above into five key aspects of a style (two material aspects that characterise what a 
thing is most truly: theologic, ontologic; two attitudinal that condition apprehending 
the truth of a thing: calling and mood, and a paradigmatic activity of what it makes 
sense to do), I set out the modern world-picturing style’s way of making sense and 
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illustrate the thought of this style in passages taken from texts of its paradigmatic 
strategist Michael Porter. 
The culture figure who exemplifies the modern, world-picturing approach is 
Michael E. Porter, the Bishop William Lawrence University Professor at the Institute 
for Strategy and Competitiveness at Harvard Business School. Porter was acclaimed in 
2004 as “by far the world’s most influential strategy writer” (e.g., Ramos-Rodriguez & 
Ruiz-Navarro (2004), cited in Clegg et al., 2012, p.11). Prior to his professorial and 
consulting career, Porter was a Phi Beta Kappa and Tau Beta Pi scholar at Princeton, 
graduating with highest honours in aerospace and mechanical engineering, before he 
switched to economics and business at Harvard where he obtained his PhD. He was a 
founding Director and active consultant at renowned strategic consultancy Monitor 
Group, leads Harvard’s programme for newly appointed CEOs, and is author of best-
selling strategy textbooks Competitive Strategy and Competitive Advantage (Porter, 
1980, 1985). 
The Thought of the World-Picturing Style 
In these two influential textbooks and a series of papers, Porter sets out over 
900 pages of detailed theoretical and practical instruction for strategists (Porter, 1980, 
1985, 1991, 1996, 2008; Porter & Kramer, 2011; Porter & Driver, 2012). 
Firstly, all modern approaches share a theologic, a way in which they arrange 
all their entities and activities toward a highest goal. The modern theologic draws the 
human to construct a “world-picture” or objective representation of the performance of 
the business in its context as a systemic world, a network of material, natural entities 
and causal interrelationships between those entities that produce an outcome. In other 
words, they organise their strategic management activities to do away with subjectivity 
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and strive for objective, materialistic, scientific understandings of nature. Porter’s 
modern theologic is clear: construct an objective representation of the performance of 
the business in its context with the explicit intention to establish those fundamental 
factors that drive above-average sustainable profitability. Thus, Porter declares that 
strategy is aimed at developing superior long term return on investment in order to 
generate real economic value, 
First, [strategic positioning] must start with the right goal: superior long-term return 
on investment. Only by grounding strategy in sustained profitability will real 
economic value be generated. Economic value is created when customers are willing 
to pay a price for a product or service that exceeds the cost of producing it. 
(Porter, 2001, p. 71) 
 
On Porter’s modern view, strategists succeed by establishing a position within 
an industry that maximises the firm’s bargaining power when it comes to winning a 
share of the industry’s economic value,   
Competitive strategy is the search for a favourable competitive position in an 
industry, the fundamental arena in which competition occurs. Competitive strategy 
aims to establish a profitable and sustainable position against the forces that 
determine industry competition. 
(Porter, 1998, p. 1) 
 
All the modern frameworks also share an ontologic, “a particular understanding 
of what makes entities the entities they are” (Wrathall & Lambeth, 2011) comprising 
the ens certum, the features that are the most basic or essential to all and any beings 
and the substance that supports properties and causal interactions. In the modern style 
of strategic management, the ens certum, are the numbers that render an object 
calculable, verifiable and predictable and value is the substance that supports properties 
and causal interactions. In Porter’s modern strategic management, all that counts as 
real are those stable features that allow us to ascertain universal cause-effect 
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relationships and then manipulate those features in order to calculate, reliably predict 
and verify the effects of our manipulations in all situations. Porter identifies several 
such candidates including bargaining power in the industry structural analysis and 
economic value in his work on generic strategies. The modern ontologic is also clear 
in Porter’s use of multivariate regression analysis to identify just those stable and 
universal features that are most basic or essential to the creation of economic value. 
Porter’s works develop systemic frameworks integrating multiple factors that allow the 
strategists rationally to ascertain their organisation’s position in its environment, 
manipulate his organisation and its environment in calculable ways, and predict the 
effects of their actions on performance. 
Informed by industrial economic theories of structure-conduct-performance, 
Porter defines an industry as having five stable kinds or entities: direct rival firms, 
buyers of the firm’s offerings, suppliers who contribute goods and services to the 
offering, possible new rivals in the shape of new entrants, and organizations whose 
offerings could substitute for those of the firm. He also identifies five forces that 
interact to determine the bargaining power of a particular firm as it competes for a share 
of the economic value of its industry. Porter recommends that strategists only plan their 
company’s conduct within an industry after first analysing its position amidst these five 
universal structural forces that collectively determine how the industry’s economic 
value will be shared out among its actors. 
The first fundamental determinant of a firm’s profitability is industry attractiveness. 
Competitive strategy must grow out of a sophisticated understanding of the rules of 
competition that determine an industry’s attractiveness. The ultimate aim of 
competitive strategy is to cope with and, ideally, to change those rules in the firm’s 
favour. In any industry, […], the rules of competition are embodied in five 
competitive forces: the entry of new competitors, the threat of substitutes, the 
bargaining power of buyers, the bargaining power of suppliers, and the rivalry 
among the existing competitors.  
(Porter, 1998, p.4) 
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Porter recommends that strategists develop a systemic picture of how all five 
forces work together,  
By considering all five forces, a strategist keeps the overall structure in mind instead 
of gravitating toward any one element. In addition, the strategist’s attention remains 
focused on structural conditions rather than on fleeting factors”  
(Porter, 2008, p. 86) 
 
An attractive industry would be one where a particular firm’s bargaining power 
is high because there is low rivalry between direct rivals providing a similar offering, 
potential new rivals face high barriers to entry, there is low pricing and cost pressure 
from fragmented customers and suppliers, and little opportunity for customers to 
address their needs by turning to a firm’s indirect competitors (Porter, 1985). 
In order to assess internal direct competition between similar firms, one would 
quantitatively assess multiple sub-factors including the concentration and balance 
amongst competitors, the growth of the industry, competitors’ fixed costs, 
differentiation of their offerings, their ability to scale capacity up or down cheaply and 
quickly, the costs to buyers of switching among alternative suppliers, and the cultural 
and other kinds of coupling between a buyer and its supplier. In order to assess the 
bargaining power of customers, the strategist would analyse their number and 
concentration, the availability of substitute offerings and indirect competitors, their 
buyer’s switching costs, the mutual threat from one actor taking over the other’s own 
activities (vertical integration), the contribution to the buyer’s quality made the firm, 
the share of the buyer’s cost base taken by the firm and its industry, and the profitability 
of the buyer. Similarly, complicated and detailed assessments would be constructed for 
the other three forces: the bargaining power of suppliers, availability of substitute 
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offerings from indirect competition, and the threat of entry from new direct competitors 
(Porter, 1985, Ch. 1, Appendix B; 1998, p.6). 
Having determined the favourable fundamental structure of an industry, the 
second question a strategist must answer, according to Porter, is how to compete to 
ensure sustainable competitive advantage by deciding upon a value proposition that 
delivers different economic value to competing offerings. Such an ascertainment will 
primarily be based upon establishing value based on having either the lowest cost 
operations, a differentiated offering, or a focused niche position. 
Finally, the strategist configures and maintains the firm’s activities or value 
chain so that they fit together and reinforce the delivery of the value proposition and 
create economic value. Ultimately, economic value is defined as benefits minus costs 
and getting a handle on economic value usually comes down to ascertaining and 
measuring financial revenues and costs. As time has passed, Porter has expanded and 
deepened his appreciation of how economic value is created, 
Firm success is manifested in attaining a competitive position or series of 
competitive positions that lead to superior and sustainable financial performance. 
(Porter, 1991, p. 96) 
Companies must take the lead in bringing business and society back together. […] 
Yet we still lack an overall framework for guiding these efforts, and most companies 
remain stuck in a “social responsibility” mind-set in which societal issues are at the 
periphery, not the core. 
The solution lies in the principle of share value, which involves creating economic 
value in a way that also creates value for society by addressing its needs and 
challenges. 
(Porter & Kramer, 2011, p.64) 
Companies can create shared value by creating social value. […] The concept of 
shared value resets the boundaries of capitalism. 
(Porter & Kramer, 2011, p.67) 
 There is nothing soft about the concept of shared value. These proposed changes in 
business school curricula are not qualitative and do not depart from economic value 
creation. Instead, they represent the next stage in our understanding of markets, 
competition and business management.  
(Porter and Kramer, 2011, p.77)  
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The whole emphasis on shareholder value over the past couple of decades has 
focused managers on the wrong thing when they should really be focusing on 
creating economic value sustainably over the long term. 
(Magretta, 2012, p. 192) 
 
In any particular epoch, the ontologic and theologic combine together to form 
an essential unifying style that determines what any thing is and what is the appropriate 
action to take with it. For Porter, this style is the natural scientific style in which things 
show up to us as their essence rather than in their particularity, as buyers for selling to 
or as value for maximising, and as such are regular, machine-like and predictable in 
their interactions 
My frameworks provide a set of logical relationships that are really fundamental. 
They’re like physics – if you’re going to have higher profitability, you’ve got to 
have a higher price or a lower cost. That industry competition is driven by the five 
forces. That the firm is a collection of activities. These frameworks provide basic, 
fundamental, and I believe unchangeable relationships about the ‘matter’ of 
competition. 
(M.E. Porter, N. Argyres & A.M. McGahan, (2002). An interview with Michael 
Porter, Academy of Management Executive, 16(2), quoted in Magretta, 2011, p. 7) 
 
This style calls individuals to an ideal of human being as a detached, rational 
and autonomous observer of both ourselves and the world. The paradigmatic activity 
of such a masterful human is act of bending both others and the world to our will. Porter 
himself is explicit about this calling, 
[Competitive Advantage] is written for practitioners who are responsible for a firm’s 
strategy and must decide how to gain competitive advantage, as well as those who 
seek to understand firms and their performance better. 
(Porter, 1985, p. xvi) 
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That a large number of thoughtful practitioners have embraced [Competitive 
Strategy] as a powerful tool has fulfilled a career-long desire to influence what 
happens in the real world. 
(Porter, 1998, p. ix-x) 
 
The paradigmatic activity of world-picturing is to accomplish a stable, certain 
and rational representation of ourselves and the world, a world-picture, and calculate a 
failsafe position from which to put into effect our will upon the world. This call for the 
detached, rational and autonomous master strategist is evident throughout Porter’s 
writings with their comprehensive descriptions of the methods of strategic analysis.  
These are the paradigmatic actions the modern master strategist must take to attain a 
certain representation of their organisation in its context and calculate the optimum 
position of power within that context. Indeed, in a recent interview, Porter described 
his greatest gift as, 
The ability to take an extraordinarily complex, integrated, multidimensional 
problem and get my arms around it conceptually in a way that helps, that informs 
and empowers practitioners to actually do things. 
(Kiechel, 2010, p.122)  
 
In the modern epoch, Heidegger claimed we are attuned by the twin moods of 
doubt and certainty, those anxious and suspicious moods “proper to the exactitude of 
rationality” (Haar, 1992, p161). The characteristic mood of Porter’s work fluctuates 
between certainty over his research and his findings and doubt that reaches for ever-
greater certainty. These twin moods of doubt and certainty are in clear evidence in 
Porter’s engineer’s reaching to calculate what will happen in future through 
mathematics. In several passages offering practical advice to strategists who might 
undertake an industry analysis, Porter is clear that the strategist must reach for ever-
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greater certainty, continually doubt her own objectivity, and strive for numbers as an 
offer of such certainty: 
A competitor’s assumptions may well be subtly influenced by, as well as reflected 
in, its current strategy. It may see new industry events through filters defined by its 
past and present circumstances, and this may not lead to objectivity. 
(Porter, 1980, p. 60) 
Yet discounting for legitimate uncertainty about the future, there seems to be a 
failure in some companies to look objectively at the prospects of decline, either 
because of long identification with the industry or overly narrow perception of 
substitute products […] From my examination of many declining industries, the 
firms that seem to be the most objective about managing the decline process are 
those that also participate in the substitute industry. They have a clearer perception 
concerning the prospects of the substitute product and the threat of decline. 
(Porter 1980, p.273) 
The company position/ industry attractiveness screen is less precisely quantifiable 
than the growth/ share approach, requiring inherently subjective judgments about 
where a particular business unit should be plotted. It is often criticised for being 
open to manipulation. As a result, sometimes quantitative weighting schemes, 
using criteria determined to lead to industry attractiveness or company position in 
the particular industry, are employed to make the analysis more “objective.” The 
screening technique reflects the assumption that every business unit is different 
and requires its own analysis of competitive position and industry attractiveness. 
As noted above, actually constructing the growth/share portfolio in practice 
involves the same type of particularistic analysis of each business unit. Hence, its 
actual “objectivity” may really not be far from that of the company 
position/industry attractiveness screen. 
(Porter 1980, p. 366) 
Although it is important to get some basic understanding of the industry to 
maximize the value of field interviews, the researcher should not exhaust all 
published sources before getting into the field. On the contrary, clinical and library 
research should proceed simultaneously. They tend to feed on each other, 
especially if the researcher is aggressive in asking every field source to suggest 
published material about the industry. Field sources tend to be more efficient 
because they get to the issues, without the wasted time of reading useless 
documents. Interviews also sometimes help the researcher identify the issues. This 
help may come, to some extent, at the expense of objectivity. 
(Porter 1980, p. 371) 
Good industry analysis looks rigorously at the structural underpinnings of 
profitability. […] 
As much as possible, analysts should look at industry structure quantitatively, rather 
than be satisfied with lists of qualitative factors. […] 
Many elements of the five forces can be quantified: the percentage of the buyer’s 
total cost accounted for by the industry’s product (to understand buyer price 
sensitivity); the percentage of industry sales required to fill a plant or operate a 
logistical network of efficient scale (to help assess barriers to entry); the buyer’s 
switching cost (determining the inducement an entrant or rival must offer 
customers). […] 
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The strength of the competitive forces affects prices, costs, and the investment 
required to compete; thus the forces are directly tied to the income statements and 
balance sheets of industry participants. Industry structure defines the gap between 
revenues and costs. […] 
For example, intense rivalry drives down prices or elevates the costs of marketing, 
R&D, or customer service, reducing margins. How much? Strong suppliers drive up 
input costs. How much? Buyer power lowers prices or elevates the costs of meeting 
buyers’ demands, such as the requirement to hold more inventory or provide 
financing. How much? Low barriers to entry or close substitutes limit the level of 
sustainable prices. How much? It is these economic relationships that sharpen the 
strategist’s understanding of industry competition. […] 
Finally, good industry analysis does not just list pluses and minuses but sees an 
industry in overall, systemic terms. Which forces are underpinning (or constraining) 
today’s profitability? How might shifts in one competitive force trigger reactions in 
others? Answering such questions is often the source of true strategic insights. […] 
(Porter, 2008, pp. 79-93; my emphases) 
 
Porter’s work exemplifies the modern style of strategic management and is 
commonplace in most popular teaching texts in strategic management (see e.g., Hax & 
Maljuf, 1996; Johnson & Scholes, 1999). These texts continue to place emphasis not 
only on Porter’s frameworks, tools and techniques but also on his world-picturing, 
scientific style. However, the modern style can also be seen in less obviously scientific 
texts such as the business design approach (e.g. Martin, 2009a, 2009b; Osterwalder & 
Pigneur, 2010; Liedtka & Ogilvie, 2011; Lafley & Martin, 2013). In common with 
Porter’s foundational scientific inventions, all such design approaches assume it is 
possible to identify, design and realise a more or less stable business model whose 
means and ends can be identified, quantified, and specified in a blueprint organisational 
design, a world-picture, that then serves as the basis for implementation. These design 
theories were developed from idealisations of empirical observations made of the 
design work of independent and corporate entrepreneurs and specialist design agencies 
such as IDEO. The theories propose normative, idealised, and creative processes and 
recommendations for practice. In common with Porter’s approach, design theories 
assume that they have discovered stable processes that know in advance (Heidegger, 
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2002, p.59) how reliably to create business model innovations and that can be 
represented and emulated by process designers, whether organisational consultants or 
leaders. The design process involves individual or group subjects observing and 
representing an external reality using an over-arching representational activity they call 
visualisation and a range of representational tools including various kinds of timeline 
and mind mapping, value chain analyses, business concept analyses, risk and 
assumption registers, and empathic customer and other stakeholder interaction systems 
(Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3: Liedtka & Ogilvie, 2011. 
 
The world-picturing style of strategic management, in its various guises, 
whether Porter’s competitive strategy or Liedtka’s design, has dominated the strategy 
discourse for at least three decades and remains highly influential. According to 
management consultancy, Bain & Co.’s annual management tools survey, strategic 
planning remains the most or second most popular management tool used by large 
corporations in each survey undertaken from 2000 to 2013. In 2013, Michael Porter 
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has remained as the Number 7 most influential management guru in the Thinkers50 
business thinkers ranking.  
The Unthought of the World-Picturing Style 
The world-picturing style cultivates strategic managers marked by certainty 
about their facts, their analyses of causal relations, about the consequences of their 
proposals for action, about themselves as masterly strategic thinkers and, finally, about 
the imperative to be certain, an imperative which always throws up further doubt that 
could only be assuaged by more careful, more patient analyses. However, what is at 
work in world-picturing and yet goes without question, is the very reaching after 
certainty itself that characterises the style. Instead, the emergence and consolidation of 
the modern style itself is taken as a given rather than as a historical style. Consistent 
with its self-certain style, its partiality, incompleteness, and historical contingency are 
themselves overlooked. 
The unthought hiddenness of the world-picturing style itself and its certainty 
about the need for certainty in analysis and prediction eventually also throws up its 
own anomaly; while one must commit to succeed, one’s commitments will eventually 
prove wrong. Agile strategists have latched on to the, perhaps literally, infinite number 
of uncertainties and the impossibility of creating complete certainty of representation 
of them across time. While one must have an understanding, in order not to be 
paralysed, one’s understanding will be wrong. Notwithstanding recent moves by Porter 
himself to make his approach more dynamic (Porter, 2008), the world-picturing style 
leaves unthought assumptions about the material existence and long-term stability of 
the industry’s boundaries, features and structural forces, and the calculable 
predictability of strategic moves, all assumptions that have been widely called into 
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question. For instance, D’Aveni et al., point out that in the US mobile phone industry 
in 2010 it is vexing to identify the business model of incumbents such as AT&T, 
Verizon, Apple, Google, and Comcast, or to allot them a stable role in the industry as 
buyer, seller, or competitor, or, indeed, to predict the above-average performers 
(D’Aveni et al., 2010). 
This unthought of the conflicting need to commit and the inescapability of 
uncertainty confounds business analysts who aspire to ascertain future developments 
for all possible relevant aspects of a business model and its context, and to business 
designers hoping to design-in longevity to any particular finite and stable business 
model in the face of such uncertainty. Faced with irreducible uncertainty, business 
strategists began to invent a new agile style of strategic management that accepted 
uncertainty as basic and, instead of attempting to eliminate it, embraced it and learned 
to prosper from it. However, in doing so, strategists opened up a completely new way 
of being that was incommensurable with the modern style. It is to this agile style that 
we turn in the next section.  
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The Turn towards Agile Strategic Management 
While Porter’s world-picturing remains the dominant strategy style, the most 
influential strategy gurus of the past ten years are those who have proclaimed the end 
of the age of stability and sustainable advantage and the dawn of the new age of 
temporary advantage (D’Aveni, 1994; Christensen, 1997; Markides, 1999; Hamel, 
2000; Sull, 2009; McGrath, 2013)xxv. These authors argue that the long-term pursuit of 
sustainable competitive advantage by the dominant firms in an industry always opens 
new possibilities for any competitor prepared to move faster and to attack the weak 
spots of the incumbent. To coin Tom Peters’ phrase (1991), where world-picturing 
strategy pursued certainty, agile strategy “thrived on chaos”. 
Decade Framework Proponent 
1980s Performativity Language-action (Winograd & Flores, 1987) 
1990s Complexity and chaos • Simple rules (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1998) 
• Dynamic capabilities (Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997)  
• Thriving on chaos (Peters, 1991 first published 1989) 
 Breakthrough strategies • Disruptive Innovation (Christensen, 1997) 
• Revolution (Hamel, 2000) 
• Fast (Markides, 1999) 
 Hypercompetition • D’Aveni (1994) 
2000s Real options • MacMillan & McGrath (2000) 
 Non-predictivity, agility 
& OODA loops 
• Sarasvathy 
• Sull (2005b; 2009) 
• Zook & Allen (2012) 
• McGrath (2013) 
 
As the table above demonstrates, these new strategists developed strategic 
management tools and frameworks that could cope with uncertainty. Their tools 
reflected and supported an agile style that Heidegger identified as technological. 
Instead of attempting to stabilise every uncertainty until it was ‘calculable, verifiable, 
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and predictable” as a material and natural fact, agility favoured transforming everything 
into a controllable option or resource (Wrathall & Lambeth, 2011). In disclosing the 
agile style, the strategists crossed an invisible line. The world-picturing strategist is a 
rational, consistent and objective decision-maker, choosing soberly and seriously from 
among already existing, pre-formed options while, at the same time, keeping 
themselves detached and inviolable. In contrast, the agile strategist is a post-rational, 
selfless re-inventor trying an option on for size, testing it out, playing with it, feeling 
its effects on herself and her world, and retaining or dropping it to the extent that its 
effects are pleasing or displeasing. For the modern strategist, choices are serious and 
mistakes are made. For the agile strategist, the volatilised world affords burgeoning 
alternatives and options can be taken up or dropped on a whim. Even mistakes can be 
re-used and re-purposed. In this sense, these theories are non-teleological since they do 
not assume, and are not oriented toward goals, other than the positing and re-positing 
of values and the optimisation of options in new artistic and propagandistic inventions, 
and then, when those inventions die, starting the reinvention process over again. 
Our paradigmatic case of agile strategic management will be the approach 
described by Donald Sull, former Professor of Strategy at the London Business School 
and current Senior Lecturer at MIT Sloan School of Management. Sull teaches 
executive courses in strategy for volatile markets. In contrast to the natural science 
education of Michael Porter, Sull was primarily a humanities student. His tertiary 
education began with an AB in Government from Harvard, an interdisciplinary 
political science course that combines history, law, economics, sociology, philosophy, 
and ethics. Subsequent to his AB, Sull attained an MBA and DBA in Business Policy 
from Harvard. Prior to academic life, Sull worked as a strategy consultant with 
McKinsey and Co. and a management-investor at a leveraged buyout firm. In a series 
137 of 334 
of books and papers, Sull has developed an agile approach to strategic management 
that assumes turbulence rather than stability (Sull, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2009, 2015; Sull 
& Escobari, 2005; Sull & Houlder, 2005; Sull & Spinosa, 2005, 2007; Sull & Turconi, 
2008; Sull & Eisenhardt, 2015). In this chapter, I will focus on Sull’s most recent and 
detailed description of the approach to set out its thought and unthought and 
demonstrate the way that it exemplifies the technological style identified by Heidegger. 
I will also briefly allude to variants of its approach.  
The Thought of the Agile Style 
The agile style of strategic management can also be analysed using the 
conceptual and affective framework: the theologic, the ontologic, paradigmatic 
activity, the calling, ideal human being, and mood. 
All agile approaches share a theologic. In the agile style, the beingest being or 
paradigmatic entity that orders an experience of the world is the option or resource and 
all entities are ordered so as to be optionalised that is, experienced so as to maximise 
one’s options and minimise the constraints past actions can exert on future decisions. 
In the case of Sull’s agile strategic management, whether one encounters an 
environmental feature such as the structure of a consumer’s day, an element of an 
offering such as its packaging, the selfhood of the organisation’s customers, or even 
the different aspects of oneself as a business executive, all are experienced as options, 
flexible resources to be brought under control in pursuit of opportunity. 
Firstly, Sull frees managers from a past commitment to a long-term vision in a 
stable world in favour of simply succeeding in an ongoing game in a fundamentally 
volatile world with no stable meanings and minimal commitments to any particular 
identity: 
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Based on the evidence, we come to a simple yet controversial position: managers 
have always faced the fog of the future, and they always will. In fact, the essence of 
management is effective action in an unpredictable world. 
(Sull, 2005, p.36) 
Although leadership gurus have extolled the benefits of a long-term vision, they have 
downplayed the risks, which can be quite substantial in an unpredictable world. The 
siren song of a long-term vision can distract employees and managers from 
opportunities and threats emerging in the present […] tempt managers to bet too 
much, too early, […] lull employees into a false sense of security that the future is 
clear, when in fact it is anything but […] a long-term vision can paralyze managers. 
[…] Rather than blindly following a preconceived long-term vision, managers in 
unpredictable markets should sense the situation in all its complexity and anticipate 
emerging threats and opportunities in the short to medium term. Corporate priorities, 
and hence action, should grow out of the situation rather than being pushed by a pre-
existing vision of what should work. […] In an unpredictable market, managers 
should adopt a fuzzy vision, such as “we aspire to be a global leader in our industry.” 
[…] Executives should not, however, mistake these visions for incantations 
endowed with the magical properties as management gurus suggest. Fuzzy visions 
do tell employees what industry the company is in and where it competes globally. 
One hopes, however, that they already get these points. Fuzzy visions do raise 
aspirations, but in practice, no one can distinguish such statements from competitors’ 
versions, and so they provide no competitive advantage. 
(Sull, 2005, pp.194-196) 
 
There is no single “right” configuration, but rather many possible combinations of 
existing pieces.  
(Sull, 2009, p.114) 
 
Having established optionalisation as the ordering principle for understanding 
the world, Sull places the optionalised entity or resource as its beingest being: 
Turbulent markets create opportunities in three distinct ways: turbulence 
introduces new resources into the economy, enables innovative combinations of 
existing resources, and stimulates novel consumers demand. 
(Sull, 2009, p.18) 
Resources include both hard assets (oil reserves or real estate, for example) and 
intangible assets (brand, technology, or expertise).  […] Newly privatized plants 
were not the only resource that created opportunity for Mittal. In Trinidad, the 
government was paying $20 million a year for a team of sixty German technicians 
to manage the factory. Mittal replaced the consultants with Indian managers and 
technical experts who earned one-tenth what the European advisors made, Mittal 
was among the first executives to tap emerging markets for labor. 
(Sull, 2009, pp.18-19) 
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The true measure of an opportunity, however, is whether it creates economic value, 
which is the difference between what a customer is willing to pay for something 
and the cost of all resources (including capital) to produce it. 
(Sull, 2009, p.37) 
 
The basic features of the agile ontologic are the commitment, which enables the 
strategist to identify and harness a resource as an option, and the iterative strategic 
management loop, which coordinates commitments in a productive circuit balancing 
“commitment and revision, stability and flexibility” (Sull, 2009, p.66). Ontologically, 
the agile strategist understands entities as lacking any nature of their own other than 
the minimal essence of being an optionalisable resource for maximizing productivity. 
Nothing is valued simply as what it is as a particular thing with essential properties. 
Instead, what something is, its being, is optional until committed to and brought into a 
cycle of productivity and, even then, its meaning – what it is – can be revised. The agile 
strategist experiences all entities as inviting the strategist to turn them into an option, 
harness and change them. An entity’s properties are regarded as purely contingent 
rather than the way they must or should be. An entity and its properties are broken 
down, reconfigured, switched about, re-combined and re-purposed in any way that 
continues the strategist’s pursuit of opportunities and economic value. Resources are 
committed to and re-configured by “reconceptualising the strategic process as an 
iterative loop rather than sequential series of activities” (Sull, 2008). In a strategy loop, 
strategies are ongoing achievements that are always “subject to revision or rejection in 
light of new knowledge that might arise in the future” (Sull 2009, p.62). The iterative 
loop can be adopted to improve the timing of corporate portfolio decisions of entry and 
exit into product, market, technological and geographical spaces and exit (Sull, 2009, 
Chapter 10). It can also be adopted to accumulate competitive-level strategic 
operational advantages and build corporate-level strategic resilience (ibid, Chapters 9 
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and 11). While, on this view, the formal strategic management processes of an agile 
firm would be run on iterative rather than linear lines, the agile capacity of a firm would 
be seen in the loop pervading the general style of an agile company, shaping and 
connecting interaction at all of its managerial levels and in its most everyday actions. 
The ontologic and theologic combine to form an essential unifying style, that 
determines what any thing is and what is the appropriate action to take with it. For 
Sull’s agile style this involves extending the economy by co-opting ever more resources 
to be reconfigured and harnessed for human needs in an endless cycle of making and 
unmaking commitments: 
A commitment refers to any action people take in the present that binds them (or 
their organization) to a future course of action.  
(ibid., p.70) 
More precisely, a commitment is an action taken by a person in a time period that 
increases the probability that she, or the organization she represents, will behave in 
a specified way in subsequent time periods. Commitments operate by increasing the 
costs of deviating from the specified behaviour in the future, up to the limit of 
excluding the possibility of alternative courses of action altogether.  
(ibid., p.248, n.8) 
People crave certainty about the future before making long-term commitments. […] 
Turbulence, however, clouds visibility into the future and can sap confidence to 
commit. […] The absence of certainty, however, does not eliminate the need to 
commit.  
(ibid, p.70) 
Five types of commitments – to frames, resources, processes, relationships, and 
values – reinforce mental maps with particular force.  
(ibid, p.76) 
Piling reinforcing commitments one atop another makes it harder to change the 
underlying map. […] The dense interrelationships among established commitments 
further complicates the difficulty of unpicking one without disrupting others. 
Eliminating a single route of service for FedEx reverberates throughout the entire 
system. 
Decision makers are also reluctant to admit – to themselves and to others – that 
earlier commitments were wrong. This reluctance to reverse commitments, 
especially those made with much public fanfare, can lead people to escalate 
commitment to a flawed map even as evidence piles up that things are getting 
steadily worse. 
Finally, when mental maps go unchallenged for extended periods of time, they slip 
into the background of taken-for-granted assumptions that people no longer 
consciously notice. Maps are most likely to become invisible when they have been 
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held for a long time, have worked well at some point in the past, or are shared by 
many people.  
(ibid, p.80) 
The ritual of predict, plan, and implement may allay anxiety about the future, but it 
is a crummy way to advance into an unknowable future. […] Linear planning is a 
siren’s song that lures leaders to disaster with a seductive promise of control. In a 
turbulent world, it is better to bend the line into a loop, and proceed through 
iterations that allow adjustments to changing circumstances.  
(ibid, pp.145-148) 
 
This agile style calls individuals to an ideal of human being as a joyful master 
of paradox and Sull provides several examples: the lucky master seaman coping with 
stormy seas, the improvisational actor weaving convincing stories from unpromising 
resources and accidental happenings, and, finally, F. Scott Fitzgerald’s paradoxical 
genius – the one able to “hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time”. Sull 
himself is explicit about this calling. 
Individuals can take practical steps to seize the upside of turbulence. […] The 
greatest lesson I learned from studying and working with dozens of successful and 
failed companies in those heady days was this: entrepreneurs and managers 
succeed not because of who they are but because of what they do. […] The skills 
[…] can be mastered by anyone. 
(ibid, pp.22-23) 
Whether they find themselves in the right place at the right time to encounter 
specific opportunities is largely a matter of luck. […] Machiavelli offered three 
images of fortune, and each conveys an important insight about snatching 
opportunities out of turbulence. The wheel of fortune implies nurturing hope […] 
and avoiding hubris. […] Machiavelli also likened fortune to a fickle woman who 
yields her attention to the bold suitor over the timid advances of the tentative beau 
[implying one should] strike boldly when an opportunity presents itself. 
Machiavelli wrote that fortune “resembles one of those violent rivers that, when 
they become enraged, flood the plains, tear down trees and buildings” [implying 
one should] limit its damage by constructing embankments. […] mitigating 
identifiable risks. […] I propose a different image of fortune, […] before engines, 
[…] a sailing ship depended on elements beyond its control. The best seaman – 
think Captain Jack Aubrey in Master and Commander, could still master the sea, 
not […] by bending the beast to his will, but rather by harnessing favourable winds 
when they gust, riding out the inevitable storms, and remaining ever alert to the 
shifts in the weather that demand a change in tack.   
(ibid, pp.42-45) 
Improvisation is the art of making it up as you go along. It differs fundamentally 
from traditional theatre, where the script dictates what happens, directors guide the 
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action, and rehearsal ensures that actors know what is expected from one another 
(ibid, pp.113-114). 
Improvisation necessitates the reuse of existing pieces in new ways, since 
important pieces of the puzzle, such as an established brand or long-standing 
customer relationships, cannot be discarded whenever circumstances change (ibid, 
p.115). 
Closely related to improvisation is the notion of bricolage, a French term that 
describes the process of solving a problem by tinkering with the materials at hand 
(ibid, pp.116-117). 
I am not arguing for execution of small improvements instead of a strategy of 
seizing golden opportunities when they arise. In turbulent markets, execution is 
strategic. […]  
(ibid, pp.32-37) 
[…] Every mental map [or paradigm], from a start-up business plan to a presidential 
policy agenda, is both a flawed representation of reality and a tool to secure long-
term commitments. These two roles work at cross-purposes. To represent a turbulent 
world, the ideal map is complex enough to encompass a multifaceted reality, fluid 
enough to adapt as circumstances change, and loosely held enough to be discarded 
when proven wrong. To secure commitments, however, a map should be simple 
enough to communicate widely, sufficiently stable to induce long-term commitment, 
and firmly held enough to inspire confidence. The two roles tug a map in different 
directions – turbulence calls for constant change, while commitment demands 
stability. […] 
The conflicting roles played by mental maps produce what I call the map paradox: 
in a turbulent world, people must make long-term commitments based on a mental 
map they know to be flawed. The paradox arises in any situation where progress 
requires both long-term commitments from many people and adaptation to changing 
circumstances. In other words, the map paradox arises when grappling with most 
important issues, including health care reform in the United States, repairing the 
global financial system, reversing climate change, and negotiating peace in war-torn 
regions, as well as the personal concerns of running a company or raising a family. 
There are exceptions, of course-mutual-fund managers face turbulence but can easily 
reverse their positions. By and large, however, anything worth doing in a turbulent 
world requires people to act as if their map is right, know that it is wrong, and retain 
the ability to function. 
(ibid, pp.63-64) 
The map paradox cannot be eliminated but it can be successfully managed. Indeed, 
seizing the upside of turbulence demands it. […] The paradox of the map demands 
a delicate balance between commitment and revision, stability and flexibility. 
Striking the balance is difficult, but possible, and chapters 5 through 11 of this book 
suggest practical steps to help strike this balance. 
(ibid, p.65) 
 
The paradigmatic activity of such a masterful human is the act of artistic 
creation through conversation. Sull elaborates on the ideal role for the strategists as a 
commercial propagandist and artistic creator orchestrating commitments to express 
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newly willed possible realities through language. Conversation is the paradigmatic 
activity for accomplishing strategy in a turbulent situation.  
Leadership, at its heart, consists of getting things done through discussions with 
other people.  
(ibid, p.151) 
 
Sull’s advice consists of embedding an idealised four-step strategic agility loop 
modelled on an OODA loop. The Observe-Orientate-Decide-Act or OODA loop moves 
through cycles from observing the situation, orientating oneself by making sense of 
those of its most salient features that must be addressed, deciding on a course of action 
and then acting and then returning to observe the consequences of one’s action and 
future events. The loop allows for the making and keeping of performance 
commitments in a turbulent world. In Sull’s agility loop, the four steps are first, to make 
sense of a situation, second, to make choices about what to do and not do, third, to 
make those choices happen, and fourth, to make revisions according to the new 
information that emerges. In the strategy loop, an organisation is re-conceived as a 
dynamic network of promises (Sull & Spinosa, 2007, Ford & Ford, 2008). Promise-
based management builds on the foundations of contract law tradition in the Roman 
Empire to argue that promises are the “fundamental units of interaction in businesses” 
(Sull & Spinosa, 2007). The promise-based view of the firm is argued to allow firms 
to concentrate on their core business while increasing coordination and collaboration 
across a network of partners, increasing agility and capitalising on opportunities 
outside their core competencies, and increasing employee engagement (Haeckel, 1999; 
Sull & Spinosa, 2005, 2007). 
Sull argues that the loop “mitigates” the limitations of the linear strategic 
management style in three ways. Firstly, it tightens the link and shortens the delay 
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between strategy formulation and implementation. Secondly, the strategy loop reduces 
the risk of escalating commitment to a failing strategy by building in radical revisions 
as part of its process. Thirdly, the iterative approach increases the capacity of a firm to 
seize opportunities before competitors.  
Step One: Make Sense. During this free-form and creative step a diverse team 
aims to produce a shared mental map that captures the essence of the situation. Sull 
encourages the practitioner designing such a practice to think of an improvisational 
comedy troupe or a jazz ensemble. Essential to this step is raw, up-to-the-minute 
holistic data and an empathetic leadership style that is said to be open to any point of 
view. Team members are encouraged to think around preconceptions and to avoid 
prematurely anchoring on a single perspective and to eschew personal criticism. No 
action is even considered until a mental map of the competitive landscape is achieved. 
Step Two: Make Choices. The team must agree on small set of clear priorities 
for actions that it will pursue and investments it will make. In contrast to the 
improvisational comedy of the making sense practice, Sull describes the feel of the 
“making choices” meeting as being more like a venture capital business’ investment 
portfolio meeting. Team members have an overview of the entire portfolio of 
opportunities. They take an impersonal and enterprise, rather than impassioned and 
personal, perspective, and have the authority to make important calls. The team may 
use simple rules, such as “biggest return soonest” or “drop an initiative before adding 
one” to make trade-off decisions. 
Step Three: Make Things Happen. Shifting out of the prioritisation practice, 
agile strategists must then mobilise actions that will put these priorities into effect. In 
a further shift, Sull describes such strategic action meetings as feeling like agile 
programming SCRUM team meetings. In this step, the team makes requests and elicits 
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promises from its members. Building on a body of philosophical work on the nature 
and practice of language-action, good promises are deemed most effective when they 
are public, active, voluntary, explicit, and motivated. Customers and performers, those 
making requests and those making promises, thrash out what both sides want, and the 
conversation takes place in a climate of discipline, accountability and support. This is 
the one step that does not celebrate optionality and selflessness, indeed personal 
reliability is essential. In this practice, commitments are made and those commitments 
are taken seriously as anchors. 
Step Four: Make Revisions. Finally, the team discovers and addresses 
discrepancies between expectations and the actual outcomes. These rigorously 
reflective conversations feel like military after-action reviews; they don’t just re-
negotiate promises but also actively encourage the revision of mental maps and of a 
company and its people’s identities. Agility is at its most radical here. In valuing their 
intellectual humility, agile leaders pride themselves on identifying escalating 
commitment to failing courses of action and cutting the actions. Such conversations 
balance renegotiated perseverance with the creativity of exploring new opportunities 
in every shortcoming. Everything is up for grabs. Emblematic of this stage, Sull 
recommends considering venture capital firm ONSET Ventures, which refuses to grant 
additional funding for an idea until the original business model has changed at least 
once. Similarly, Boston snack manufacturer Stacy’s Pita Chips went through multiple 
iterations from its original idea of serving hot dogs through to abandoning hot dogs in 
favour of the pita chips they gave customers waiting in line for the hot dogs (Read et 
al., 2011). 1-800 AUTOPSY was set up by a recently redundant deputy coroner who 
sought to provide personal autopsy services for grieving relatives. Reflecting upon the 
low take-up of their medical and legal service he spun out CoffinCouches.com turning 
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coffins into novelty furniture and MorguePropertyRentals.com to sell death-related 
props like embalming tables and crypts to the TV and movie industry (ibid). The 
highest profile examples of these map-changing revisions are TESCO and its recent 
admission that it had lost its food retailing heart by diversifying beyond food retailing 
to become a gold trader, a bank, and a secondhand car dealer. One might also consider, 
GE, whose simple rule of exiting a business if it fails to be No 1 or No 2 in its market 
meant it constantly shifted its maps of the market and sense of itself, or NOKIA, which 
went from being a timber company with a four hundred-year old history to a mobile 
telecoms supplier. 
Sull’s work is imbued with optimism and positivity. He believes people can 
learn to love uncertainty, become free from authority and narrow choices. For Sull, 
positive moods give people options whereas negative moods shut them down: 
Turbulence, for many, equals risk, and risk equals bad news. […] Framing change 
in negative terms gives rise to a response known as “threat rigidity,” that entails a 
contraction of authority, reduce experimentation, and focus on existing resources. 
(Sull, 2009, p.15) 
An uncertain future cloaks unseen risks but also holds unanticipated opportunities.  
(Sull, 2009, p.18) 
A recent study found that nearly half of large companies surveyed has a chief risk 
officer, but how many employ a chief opportunity officer? 
(Sull, 2009, p.17) 
 
We have already read how hope, humility, boldness, prudence, and equanimity 
characterised Machiavelli and Sull’s lucky leaders. He also names four moods for each 
of the stages: openness and empathy for making sense, respectful argumentation for 
making choices, discipline and support for making promises, and dispassionate 
analysis for making revisions. However, the characteristic light and joyful mood of 
technology, which Heidegger reads in Nietzsche and that covers over boredom, is also 
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the mark of Sull’s endlessly agile re-styling and self-affirming (Heidegger, 2004, 
p.109) in which everything we encounter is an option, to be added, removed enhanced 
or concealed, in the “steadily rotating recurrence of the same” (Heidegger, 2004, 
p.109). As Nietzsche writes in The Gay Science, 
One thing is needful – to “give style” to one’s character – a great and rare art!... Here 
a large mass of second nature has been added; there a piece of original nature has 
been removed – both times through long practice and daily work at it. Here the ugly 
that could not be removed is concealed; there it has been reinterpreted and made 
sublime. 
(Nietzsche, 2001, p.163) 
 
No matter the nature of the contingencies, the dependable firm takes care of the 
satisfaction of the commitments it has made to stakeholders, and it does so by purifying 
those commitments into propositions that can be more easily communicated and 
declared as satisfied. In the face of ineliminable turbulence, Sull recommends the 
development of the agile firm as a vehicle for “joyful nihilism”, that goes wherever the 
contingencies require and still turns out a profit. Such an approach needs no past 
foundations or future certainties, and few if any commitments to the identity and 
character of the firm beyond its agility. For those who succeed for the lengths of their 
mortal lives, it is joyful, brilliant and awesome. For those who fail dramatically, who 
lose everything or nearly everything, like Brazilian tycoon Eike Batista or hedge fund 
manager Philip Falcone, the sheer joy of pursuing such a creative life is enoughxxvi. 
Variations on the Theme 
Other agile gurus make similar claims. For instance, leading thinker of 
corporate governance and one of the primary inventors of stock options, Michael C. 
Jensen, Jesse Isidor Strauss Professor of Business Administration, Emeritus, at Harvard 
Business School, has collaborated with personal transformation guru Werner Erhard to 
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develop and deliver an agile promise-based leadership programme. He proposes that 
outstanding leaders and organisations are known for: 
“keeping our word, and on time as promised; or […], as soon as we know that we 
won’t keep our word, we inform all parties involved and clean up any mess that 
we’ve caused in their lives.” 
(Jensen, 2009) 
 
He calls this state being “in integrity” and claims that it is necessary for 
maximum performance in organisations that are “up to anything important in life”, that 
is, those leaders of organisations who attempt some task so difficult they will not 
always be able to keep their word. However, Jensen’s and Erhard’s approaches say 
little about what is considered worthy of a promise, only that leaders develop the 
capacity to manage ambitious promises. Sull’s descriptions also bear a family 
resemblance to strategy as simple rules, complex responsive processes, sense-making 
and high-reliability organizations, transient competitive advantage strategy, 
repeatability, and non-predictive strategic management or effectuation (Brown & 
Eisenhardt, 1998; Wiltbank et al., 2006; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015; Stacey 2010; 
McGrath 2013; Zook & Allen, 2012). In all these approaches, a boot-strapping loop of 
commitment-making continually volatilises and transforms the economy of resource 
bases and demand spaces. 
The Unthought of the Agile Style 
The agile style attempts to address world-picturing’s paradox of integrating 
commitment and flexibility in the face of turbulence. However, it comes down on the 
side of flexibility rather than commitment. Sull’s hints at the historical meaningfulness 
and identity-defining commitments of economic life in the industrial cities of Ohio and 
Pennsylvania (Sull, 2003, 2009). However, he fails to develop this theme of 
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meaningfulness. Instead, he leaves it unthought and instead thematises endless 
economic reinvention and the iteration of commitments. In doing so, we see what 
agility misses. Sull’s work clearly identifies the role of luck rather than Porter’s 
analytical brilliance and willpower but, in his account of luck, it is possible to glimpse 
what remains unthought for a worthy life. With his examples of “Lucky” Jack Aubrey 
and multiple billionaire entrepreneurs seizing opportunities thrown by blind fortune, 
we discover the echoes of a Stoic understanding of luck that leads to nihilism because 
of its omission of a sacred dimension (Dreyfus & Kelly, 2009, p.65). Roman Stoic 
thinking recognised the importance of luck but personified it in the form of the blind 
goddess Fortuna. For the Romans, because fortune was blind and did not direct her 
effect at particular individuals, the proper response to luck is, like that of Captain Jack 
Aubrey, a kind of stoic reticence and resolve to withstand life’s contingencies. One 
prospers where one can and barely survives where one must, rather than maintains a 
gratitude to a god, outside of one’s control, who had us in mind in bestowing or 
authorising a space of meaningful opportunity. In the next chapter, I turn to other 
accounts of a post-agile management that hint at but, do not develop, this unthought 
sacred dimension and its necessity for meaningful lives of truth and meaning. 
In Chapter 4, I have demonstrated how Porter’s world-picturing strategic 
management theory and Sull’s agile, commitment-based theory of strategy line up 
respectively with Heidegger’s modern and agile styles that were described in Chapter 
3.  I turn in the next chapter to exploring a post-agile, proto-adaptive style emerging 
from the work of three sets of writers influenced by Heidegger and working in the 
Strategy-as-Practice field.   
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5. Post-Agile Strategic Management 
The agile form of strategic management analysed in Chapter 4 is highly 
successful. Firms that have adopted it, like AB-InBev, Apple, and Haier, answer the 
turbulence of the times by creating even more disruptive turbulence. Instead of seeking 
to avoid turbulence, they embrace it. In these examples, one begins to see the 
limitations to the agile life. In the agile business, there is nothing that is sacred in itself. 
Everything can be co-opted into a productive resource, de-constructed and its parts 
made available for the sake of further optionalisation. The agile life promises exciting 
novelty every day and freedom from constraints. But, it is a freedom only to perform 
ever more intensely and to co-opt ever more entities. From a Heideggerian perspective, 
the problem for this understanding is that, this novelty and freedom comes at the 
expense of any other possible ways of living that may be more committed and more 
personally meaningful. Every other way of living is only another option. Propositional 
truth reigns but at the expense of ontological truth. 
Agile strategic management is successful in terms of helping firms achieve 
market-leading share and profitability. It has become an established style of strategy-
making alongside Porter’s world-picturing management. However, an alternative to its 
relentless and narrow performance focus and ceaseless change is taking shape in the 
form of inquiries into what actual strategists do in practice and the ways that they seek 
to receive and adapt meaningfulness in the face of historical events. While these 
inquiries question both world-picturing and agile styles, they have not yet fully 
described an alternative adaptive way of strategising. Thus, it is to these post-agile but 
only proto-adaptive Strategy-as-Practice approaches that I now turn. In this chapter, I 
consider the attempts of those of a handful of theorists, both business and philosophical 
theorists, who have responded to what they see as the overly normative strategy 
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research of the two previously described styles and have tried to think strategy in a new 
way. Chapter 5 analyses three contributions to a Heideggerian, proto-adaptive strategic 
management, two contributions put forward by Strategy-as-Practice theorists Tsoukas, 
Chia, and Holt and the commitment-based management prototype of philosophical 
theorists Flores and Spinosa. I begin by introducing the Strategy-as-Practice school of 
strategic management. 
SAP as Post-Agile Strategic Management 
There is another approach to strategic management that also assumes the world 
as fundamentally volatile but that emphasises rather more its meaning-making aspects. 
Since its first explorations of strategy making in the early 1990s, the Strategy-as-
Practice approach (SAP) has grown in size and impact to reach the stage where it is an 
established approach to understanding strategic management (Carter et al., 2008; 
Jarzabkowski & Whittington, 2008; Golsorkhi, Rouleau, Seidl & Vaara, 2010; Vaara 
& Whittington, 2012). SAP broadens strategy research away from what it considers to 
be narrow issues of business performance control, micro-economics, and statistical 
prediction, and intensifies the focus on micro-processes of strategic action. This wider 
focus brings ethnographic, discursive, social research methodologies to the study of a 
strategic agency situated within already operative communicative, affective, and 
embodied practices (Golsorkhi et al., 2010, pp.2-3). In the Strategy-as-Practice style, 
strategists are seen to be working within existing horizons of meaning that always 
already constrain their possibilities for action. Opportunities for inventions are not 
generic, random, or posited as if from nowhere, but are instead constrained by the 
particular anomalies that show up to situated practitioners working within their local 
horizons of meaning and existing business strategies. 
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Whittington (2006) is widely accepted as being the first to formalise a research 
agenda for Strategy-as-Practice (Whittington, 2006; Jarzabkowski, Balogun & Seidl, 
2007; Golsorkhi et al., 2010). In the 3P framework, Whittington proposed that 
researchers study strategic practitioners engaging in specific strategising activities 
collectively called praxis, which in turn draw upon the wider cultural practices that 
exist as the background of all practitioners. Practitioners include those managers, 
consultants and internal change specialists working in multiple hierarchical levels and 
domains and engaged in strategising “as a socially accomplished situated activity 
arising from the actions and interactions of multiple level actors” (Jarzabkowski, 2005, 
p.6). Praxis is the specific, concrete strategizing activity that practitioners engage in in 
a specific business context, such as deciding how or whether to operate in a particular 
industry or market, managing the acquisition or divestment of a business, or designing 
an organisation to excel at those activities necessary to achieve competitive advantage. 
Finally, practice refers to the diverse methods, techniques, tools, and procedures that 
underlie strategy work in different situations. For instance, these practices might 
include using PEST and 5-forces industry structure tools to analyse a market for both 
positioning and acquisitions praxes, core competencies may be used to analyse a firm’s 
own business model or that of a potential competitor, and the practices of running 
strategy workshops and writing strategy documents could be used in multiple particular 
tasks. Over time, these practices become routinised to form strategy practitioners’ 
background understanding of shared norms and traditions for how to proceed (Paroutis, 
Heracleous & Angwin, 2013, p.11) 
From these three perspectives, several prescriptions for strategic management 
can be derived. Firstly, to spread the role of strategist in complex organisations across 
multiple roles, domains and levels. Looking inside a firm, one can see at least three 
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such levels. Top Management Teams ratify, direct and recognise deliberate 
strategizing, whereas middle managers champion strategic alternatives, synthesise 
information, facilitate adaptability of their units, and implement deliberate strategy 
directives, and operational managers experiment with different approaches, conform 
and reinforce norms and routines and respond to middle manager requests. Secondly, 
it is also still commonplace that one senior executive takes the role, even if only 
informally, of Chief Strategy Officer. However, from a Strategy-as-Practice 
perspective that officer does far more hands-on, embodied and intuitive work than was 
hitherto recognised by the world-picturing style. The Chief Strategy Officer is a close 
confidante of the CEO. She will have an internal social network that is deeply rooted 
inside the firm. While she has a wide knowledge and experience of using strategy 
models, she shows little attachment to the purist execution of those models, and 
maintains a fluid, intensely practical focus on their use in tackling strategic contingent 
issues. The CSO is often supported by a strategy team comprising analysts who run the 
various research tools and managers who coordinate and support strategic planning 
cycles and engage in executing, reflecting, initiating, coordinating, supporting, 
collaborating, and context shaping in flexible ad-hoc loops of activity. Finally, strategy 
consultants play a particular role in solving specific client problems. They adapt 
proprietorial technical tools and problem-solving methodologies to analyse the 
business situation, develop and assess strategic options, make recommendations and 
engage with the political forces for and against recommendations (Paroutis et al., 
2013). 
Thus, the emerging SAP perspective on strategic management accommodates 
the world-picturing and agile styles of the contemporary strategist. For instance, the 
agile strategist turns herself to the tasks that appear in the hurly-burly of everyday 
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business life, she configures and reconfigures her social networks as appropriate to the 
challenge presented, and draws upon an eclectic mix of specific practices according to 
the contingencies of the situation. For example, over 250 strategy methods, models and 
theories are listed on the popular 12Manage strategy web site. Many of these models 
are those developed in both the modern and agile styles of strategic management 
including for example Porter’s Five-Forces Structural Analysis and the agile OODA 
loop. However, beyond these specific tools, the SAP approach also draws attention to 
the way that strategists engage habitually with language to shape and influence the 
space of meaning or discourse that is an organisation. SAP recognises that strategists 
are engaged in shaping organisations by changing the discourse of the organisation 
(e.g., Ford & Ford, 1995; Paroutis et al., 2013, pp.65-89). 
The Strategy-as-Practice approach includes several Heideggerians among their 
number (Spinosa, 2001; Chia & Rasche, 2010; Chia & Holt, 2006, 2009; Tsoukas, 
2010a, 2010b). Given that, as we have seen, Heidegger’s project was centrally 
concerned with the question of the meaning of being (Dreyfus & Wrathall 2005, p.9; 
Sheehan, 2015), perhaps those forms of strategic management informed by his project 
can address the meaninglessness of the agile strategic management style. I divide these 
mutually influencing Heideggerian Strategy-as-Practice scholars into two groups: 
those primarily gathered around the work of Robert Chia and Haridimos Tsoukas, 
which I will name the dwelling approach (Chia, 2004; Chia & Holt, 2006, 2009; Chia 
& Mackay, 2007; Chia & Rasche, 2009; Tsoukas, 2010a, 2010b; Sandberg & Tsoukas, 
2011; Zundel & Kokkalis, 2010; Holt & Cornelissen, 2014; Shotter & Tsoukas 2014), 
and those associated with Fernando Flores and Charles Spinosa, which I will refer to 
as the commitment-based approach (Flores, 1993; Spinosa, Flores & Dreyfus, 1997; 
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Spinosa, 2001; Heil, 2011; Shaw, Dun-Hou Tsai, Yu-Chung Liu & Amjadi, 2011; 
Denning and Dunham, 2010; Spinosa, Davis & Glennon, 2014). 
The Thought of the Commitment-based Approach 
At roughly the same time that Ghemawat and Sull were beginning their work 
on commitment and strategy, Heideggerian philosophers were proposing a form of 
business practice that addressed some of the shortcomings of the modern and agile 
ways of conducting business (Winograd & Flores, 1987; Spinosa, Flores & Dreyfus, 
1997). Their early grand intent to revolutionise the political economy with what they 
called, commitment-based management (see Dreyfus, 2000), while not yet successful, 
has been justified to some extent given their direct involvement in significant political 
and technological changes. Either side of being a business entrepreneur, Fernando 
Flores served as the finance minister in Salvador Allende’s socialist government of the 
1970s and, for a recent extended period, as a senator in Chile. He recently authored a 
major research report into innovation for the Chilean government. Flores’ co-author 
and collaborator Terry Winograd, informed in part by Dreyfus’ early work on Artificial 
Intelligence, was doctoral supervisor to the founders of both Google and LinkedIn and 
continues to be an advisor to Google. Both Winograd and Flores and others among 
their adaptive agile design network invented early stage examples of email and 
groupware software. Both Spinosa and Flores continue to be active management 
consultants and influential, if not prolific, scholars. 
Flores and Spinosa have been identified as an influential part of the cultural 
circuit of capitalism (Thrift, 2005, 2008). Since its initial publication in book-length 
form in 1997, their main collaborative publication, Disclosing New Worlds (henceforth 
DNW), has become well-established in the academic study and practice of 
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entrepreneurship (Hjorth & Steyaert, 2003, 2009; Thrift, 2005, 2008; Steyaert, 2007; 
Denning & Dunham, 2010). In his review of academic processual theories of 
entrepreneuring, Steyaert (2007) identified the book as one of his illustrative examples 
of the phenomenological strand of processual research and suggested that, in tandem 
with the work of another ex-Berkeley Heideggerian, Theodore Schatzki (Schatzki, 
Knorr Cetina & von Savigny, 2001; Schatzki, 2003, 2005), DNW could be developed 
into a “fully-fledged practice theory” of entrepreneuring (Steyaert, 2007, p.467).  
In his account of the cultural circuit of capitalism that formed and was formed 
by late-stage capitalism of the 1990s and 2000s, Nigel Thrift (2005) used the 
commitment-based work of the consultancy firm Business Design Associates (BDA) 
to illustrate the pervasive ‘soft capitalist’ style of the era. BDA was founded in 
California by one of DNW’s authors, Fernando Flores and the book’s lead author 
Charles Spinosa was Vice-President at the firm. The firm’s adaptive agile consulting 
practice expressed these leaders hermeneutic-existential-phenomenological 
philosophical education under professors Hubert Dreyfus and John Searle at the 
University of Berkeley. By the time of Thrift’s later book Non-representational Theory 
(2008), the mild criticism and ambiguity of the earlier book had disappeared and Thrift 
gave DNW an even more influential role as an emblem of the contemporary ‘soft 
capitalist’ political economy. As an example of the continuing practical influence of 
DNW, in 2013, ex-NASA scientist and professor at MIT and Princeton, Peter J. 
Denning co-authored a book on social practice innovation The Innovation Way, that 
claimed DNW laid out “the primary pattern of innovation” and relied upon this pattern 
to structure a pedagogic account of adaptive agile entrepreneurial and innovation skills 
(Denning & Dunham, 2010). 
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In contrast to the limited first-hand accounts of practice and relatively light 
prescriptions for practice that we will see in the next section’s account of the dwelling 
approach, Flores and Spinosa have written about and participated in several significant 
innovations in practice in the last two decades. These practice-informed innovations 
include new ways of managing very large engineering projects, inventing group 
collaboration software, introducing e-banking services, and creating less formalised, 
more human customer contact centres. The question of the extent of the changes that 
have been brought about through their adaptive agile practice is contestable. None can 
be said to have resulted in fundamental change to the parameters of contemporary 
business practice and all were justified in essentially orthodox capitalist terms i.e., 
extending the reach of capitalist practices such as the availability of credit, opening up 
marketplaces, creating faster, better and cheaper offerings e.g., Patrimonio Hoy, 
CEMEX, Grameen Bank (Flores Letelier, Flores & Spinosa, 2003; Flores Letelier, 
Spinosa & Calder, 2000) and cement manufacture and distribution, mobile telecoms, 
and credit card processors (Spinosa, Glennon, & Sota, 2008). However, as argued 
earlier, this should also be seen as consistent with the practice-based approach that sees 
innovations as gathering around anomalies in an existing world rather than positing and 
constructing utopian visions of new worlds as if from nowhere. 
Indeed, early in their book Disclosing New Worlds, Spinosa, Flores and Dreyfus 
state: 
We write in support of entrepreneurial practices within capitalist market economies, 
of citizens' action groups in modern representative democracies, and of the culture 
figures who cultivate solidarity among diverse peoples in modern nations. Indeed, 
we think that these practices are so important to human life that most of the everyday, 
conventional aspects of capitalist market economies and modern democratic 
republics necessary to support them must be preserved. 
(Spinosa, Flores & Dreyfus, 1997, p.1) 
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Beyond the work of these original commitment-based managers, a search on 
the title Disclosing New Worlds on Google Scholar in November 2016 returned 564 
citations for the book (see Fig. 2). 
 
 
Figure 2 Citations of Disclosing New Worlds, Source: Google Scholar. 
Many of the writers of the Strategy-as-Practice approach frequently cite DNW 
(e.g., Chia & Holt, 2006; Tsoukas, 2005, 2010b). However, it is notable that there is 
very little reference to Dreyfus and Spinosa’s earlier philosophical papers that set out 
and justify their central commitments to realism and to developing the free relation to 
technology. 
While the book is influential in the field of strategy-making, it has been 
particularly influential in the field of entrepreneurship studies. Many of the 
entrepreneurial texts that draw on DNW do so in order to reinforce their claim for the 
good of entrepreneuring beyond simple economic benefit: the claim that 
entrepreneuring is indeed a form of life lived at its best. Johannisson (2008) draws in 
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part on DNW to bolster his claim for entrepreneuring as liberating and creating new 
ways of living. Shaw et al. (2011) propose entrepreneurship as ontological, and thus 
valuable in itself because it opens spaces for the development of distinctions of value, 
rather than primarily as a for-profit activity. Clarke and Holt (2010) draw on DNW’s 
example of King Gillette’s invention of the safety razor as an example of the 
unprejudiced thought necessary for Kantian maturity. Hjorth and Johannisson (2009) 
draw on DNW to promote the cultivation of openness to events of sense as a way of 
increasing one’s possibilities and enhancing one’s life. Sørensen (2008) uses DNW 
approvingly to illustrate the Gnostic flavour of contemporary accounts of entrepreneurs 
as saviour figures and Weiskopf and Steyaert (2009) also make the case for 
entrepreneurs as being apart from this world, straddling or existing in between an old 
and a new one. Lindgren and Packendorff (2006) draw on DNW to bolster their claim 
that entrepreneuring, as a kind of dynamic becoming rather than static being, is 
pluralist, liberating and creates new ways of life. Finally, several make claims for DNW 
promoting the idea of tactical local action to work with contingent opportunities 
(Johannisson & Olaison, 2007; Hjorth 2004, 2005, 2007; Gawell, 2006).  
As ex-scholars turned management practitioners, Flores and Spinosa write quite 
differently to the more scholastic Chia and Tsoukas and other Strategy-as-Practice 
theorists. Whereas the SAP writers do not move far beyond using language as an 
ontological infrastructure and writing as a descriptive tool, Spinosa and Flores’ work, 
from its beginnings, has been performative. As can be seen in the passage quoted 
above, many of their papers are strongly assertive and declarative. Where they do 
describe, they describe their own consulting work. In a series of published papers and 
books they provide detailed examples of practices that can stimulate commitment-
based management and cultural innovation. For example, Flores (1993) and Flores 
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Letelier et al. (2000, 2003) provide detailed accounts of their listening or articulative 
interviewing skills to identify orienting values and value conflicts set up by the current 
situation. In a series of papers referred to in the previous chapter, the use of speech acts 
or language action to coordinate action is illustrated (Sull & Spinosa, 2005, 2007). 
Similarly, Spinosa, Glennon and Sota (2008) introduce the leadership skills of taking 
a stand on one’s existence and listening to pick up and inflect personal and structural 
moods and identify the stand taken by another. Finally, Spinosa, Glennon and Davis 
write up four cases of their consulting work inflecting negative moods to shift 
destructive company politics (2014). 
While commitment-based management consultants have hundreds of pages of 
unpublished and proprietary methodologies, a relatively comprehensive commitment-
based management methodology has been published that proposes immersion into a 
world to develop sensitivity to its meanings coupled with the development of expertise 
in eight conversational practices to transform existing settled practices in the domain 
(Denning & Dunham, 2010).  
This immersive inquiry into a domain of practice (for example, energy 
engineering, brewing, temporary recruitment) is intended as a long-term process to 
attain the highest levels of skilful expertise in a domain. At these levels of expertise, 
the intelligibility of the situation and the practitioner is transformed to make wholly 
new and relative actions possible. Innovations come from immersion in a world of 
meanings rather than by imposition from outside. Hence, the innovation preserves and 
transforms meanings. To attain this level of mastery, one would dedicate oneself to 
engage, not as an observer but as an active practitioner, in a cluster of excellence. Thus, 
one would devote oneself to becoming a recruitment consultant in London, an 
entrepreneur in Silicon Valley, a high-performance motor engineer in the F1 motor 
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sport cluster in Oxfordshire in the UK, or a bioengineer in the Biovalley cluster in 
France, Germany and Switzerland. It is this immersion in a field of practice that 
develops the ethical expertise necessary to promote meaningful innovation rather than 
the kind of rootless innovation promoted by a purely agile innovation described by 
Sullxxvii. 
Local practical immersion in a domain’s community of practice develops 
practitioners’ ethical expertise – their affective disposition to what matters in the 
domain, and the linguistic distinctions of meaning and motor skills to act and 
coordinate action with others in that domain. One must do the hard miles and long 
hours and experience the emotions, the moods, failures and successes that only come 
from actually doing the work of the community (Denning & Dunham, 2010, p.371).  
Bodily engagement with practice over time transforms what a situation means 
to a practitioner and opens new possibilities for reliable performance to a masterful 
performer. These possibilities were hitherto unavailable, indeed unintelligible, to a 
novice practitioner (Dreyfus, 2008a, 2008b; Dreyfus & Kelly, 2011). Dreyfus describes 
a seven-stage phenomenology of increasing skilfulness and intelligibility of a domain 
that culminates in the rare kind of authentic meaning-making that is capable of the 
disclosure of new worlds.  
In the earliest stages, a Stage 1 novice practitioner develops from following 
abstract instructions and rules for behaving within a particular domain of action to 
being a Stage 4 proficient performer. A proficient performer puts their identity at risk 
and spontaneously discriminates among a variety of situations and decides how to 
respond appropriately and without guidance from a teacher. As Stage 5 experts, 
practitioners respond immediately and intuitively to the particular demands of a 
specific situation as an ethical context that offers possibilities for virtuous behaviour. 
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The deliberate choosing of what to do has given way to an immediate right action. 
Experts are those who have become personally involved in a domain and have become 
sensitive to its style and ethical distinctions of right and wrong. The expert's identity is 
invested in doing the right thing in the conventional style, and they have developed 
sufficient practical experience and the propensity to take risks to be able to know when 
it is right to play by the norms of the situation (‘the One’) and when to deviate and try 
something new. In other words, they excel at ethical expediency. Some, however, have 
gone beyond this ethical expertise of the One. Instead of a mood of serenity or 
confidence bordering on arrogance, Stage 6 masters live in a mood of permanent 
anxiety (Dreyfus 2008a, p.37). For the master, even if public opinion is that they 
performed well, there is no right way to do things and they can always perform better. 
For the master, there is no one way that is the right way that things must be. The master 
responds not to the specific situation of, say, a competitor challenge or an unusual 
customer request but to the situation’s contingencies guided by the style of the ‘whole 
meaningful context’ of their world and community of practice (ibid.). As we saw in 
Chapter 3, according to Heidegger, the origin of this style, indeed of any style, is a 
mystery. The shock of wonder at our practical role opening this style, in tandem with 
the gods, as those beyond ourselves that attune us to the situation, is the divine 
experience Heidegger that names as the last god (Wrathall & Lambeth, 2011; Sheehan, 
2015, p.268). Hence, a master is in touch with what is beyond wilful control in the 
situation’s practices. Finally, stage 7 history-makers spot and retain game-changing 
anomalies that re-define the key issue of a domain. History-makers have a vision of 
their world, whether of brewing, energy engineering, or recruitment, so original it 
transforms their own and all others’ understanding of the world.  Having argued for the 
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importance of domain mastery, Denning and Dunham go on to argue for history-
making as a domain in itself and recommend practitioners master its skills.  
According to Denning and Dunham, skilled history-making innovators 
continually observe, 
The cares and concerns of people 
The practices people have for taking care of those concerns 
The value and level of satisfaction people place in their practices, current and future 
The breakdowns and struggles people are experiencing 
The disharmonies revealed by the breakdowns and struggles 
New practices that, if adopted, would resolve the breakdowns and bring harmony 
Resistance from people who see a net loss of value in the change 
(Denning & Dunham, 2010, p.90) 
To become history-makers, Denning and Dunham recommend developing 
mastery of eight conversational practices each producing a particular outcome to 
address a particular concern as follows: 
 
Sensing: Bringing forth the new possibility that would bring value to the 
community. 
Envisioning: Building a compelling story of how the world would be better if 
the possibility were made real. 
Offering: Presenting a proposed practice to the (leaders of the) community, 
who commit to considering it. 
Adopting: Community members commit to trying out the new practice for the 
first time. 
Sustaining: Community members commit to staying with the practice for its 
useful life. 
Executing: Carrying out action plans that produce and sustain adoption. 
Leading: Proactively working to produce the outcomes of the previous six 
practices, and overcoming the struggles encountered along the way. 
Embodying: Achieving a level of skill at each practice that makes it 
automatic, habitual, and effective even in chaotic situations. 
Table 3: Outcomes of the Innovation Practices  
(Denning & Dunham, 2010, p.25) 
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Building on their “friend and teacher xxviii” Fernando Flores’ publications, 
including his PhD thesis xxix , Denning and Dunham explain that each innovation 
practice has both a conversational and a somatic aspect and that it is the somatic or 
embodied aspect that enables the highest levels of innovation performance. According 
to the authors, it is only with embodiment that mind and body, language and emotions 
and moods are connected as bodily reactions (ibid, p.24). While their book sets out the 
various performative language routes that Flores invented in his PhD to define how 
work gets done through the linguistic coordination of commitments – the so-called 
conversation for action – they insist, in line with Flores, that it is only in the absorbed 
involvement of embodied actors that these linguistic moves acquire relevance in actual 
situations of absorbed coping and, through this absorbed involvement, open up the 
possibility of learning to increase skilful performance. Thus, while beginner and 
competent students may be able to follow and repeat the linguistic patterns that their 
book recommends, only one who has absorbed those conversational practices in many 
actual situations of involved innovation, until such point as those practices are 
“transparent, automatic, and habitual”, will be able immediately to make the right move 
in response to the breakdowns that commonly occur in the uncertain and chaotic 
situations that characterise innovation situations. In the absence of such practice in 
actual risky situations of innovation, masterful performance will be unavailable to 
innovators because they lack the embodied ability to listen deeply to their 
collaborators’ concerns, respond appropriately to invent practices that bring things and 
other people out into their own, and thereby engender trust. Thus, the authors claim 
that their eight practices are conversational and embodied in nature and hence 
observable and trainable, not hidden away in unobservable drives, personality traits, or 
historical virtues and vices. This is an unusually complex claim, deriving as it surely 
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does from their phenomenological advisors’ aversion to inwardness and privileging of 
externally visible commitments, which suggests a personal transformation approach of 
practising the physical moves and allowing the conscious mind to follow along later. 
In other words, to “act their way into a new way of thinking rather than think their way 
into a new way of acting” (Pascale, Millemann & Gioja, 2000).  
Denning and Dunham specify each of the eight practices that are deemed 
essential and universal for innovation. Each specification comprises (1) an anatomy of 
the practice as an idealised path that if practised well will produce the outcome shown 
in Table 3 and (2) an account of the characteristic breakdowns that can obstruct the 
idealised performance of each practice and prevent the production of its sought-for 
outcomes or commitments. 
In outlining the eight history-making practices, Denning and Dunham’s 
recommendation risks becoming confused and contradictory. In aiming for mastery of 
history-making as a distinct practice, they endanger the meaningful innovation that 
Dreyfus’ expertise in a domain can foster and move instead toward technological 
agility. On Dreyfus’ model, one must already be an ethical expert and practically wise 
master in touch with the style of a domain if one is to be capable of history making. As 
we saw, the meaningful history-making skill appears as a consequence of undertaking 
an earlier journey to develop ethical expertise, practical coping skills, and sensitivity 
to the style of an existing domain such as driving a car, playing basketball, or brewing. 
Training in history-making skills, as a set of skills transverse to the core domain 
(brewing, etc.) and in the absence of the development of ethical expertise and practical 
wisdom in the core domain, risks a nihilistic kind of innovation for which nothing 
matters in itself, and that, as I have been arguing, is deleterious to meaningful and 
worthy lives (Dreyfus, 2008a, 2008b). Without the resolute commitment to the style of 
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a world that only comes from immersion in a domain of practice such as energy 
engineering or brewing, one’s innovations will remain uprooted from a ground of 
meaning and relevance. There are two ways in which this assessment can be taken. 
First, the nihilistic approach taken by the agile strategy, is to declare that there is 
literally no one way for things to be and nothing that limits opportunities for innovation. 
The other, which I will argue is an adaptive post-agile approach, is to declare that our 
traditional, concealed historical and social practices may be inexpressible but that they 
are all that we have if we are to pursue worthy innovations that preserve and transform 
existing meanings and reject those that deplete these meanings.   
The Thought of the Dwelling Approach 
For more than ten years, both Haridimos Tsoukas and Robert Chia have drawn 
on Heideggerian thinking to critique and reframe world-picturing and agile strategic 
management practice (Tsoukas, 2005; Chia & Holt, 2006). Tsoukas has primarily 
drawn on early Heidegger to displace the central role of deliberative thinking for 
strategy by practical nonconscious coping. Far more common than deliberation is a 
kind of non-deliberative acting by already committed and skilled actors in order to cope 
practically with familiar situations against an un-thematised background common 
sense. Deliberate coping is engaged in only occasionally in order to restore functioning 
in the event of breakdown or interruptions to the smooth coping of a skilled practitioner 
working from her background understanding of what everything is and what actions to 
take, by drawing on analogous situations encountered in the past. And, even more 
rarely, detached theoretical reasoning is engaged in by strategists in strategic planning 
workshops and processes (Tsoukas, 2010a, 2010b). Tsoukas draws on early Heidegger 
to show clearly and precisely how deliberation, ratiocination or problem-solving can 
deal with breakdowns in our ordinary practical coping. Tsoukas also distinguishes the 
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question of whether a life lived is a good life as opposed to merely an intellectually, 
that is to say, propositionally, correct life and recognises the central role to this question 
of disciplining practical judgment within a cultural context (Shotter & Tsoukas, 2014, 
pp.232-237). In this recognition, Tsoukas identifies the role played by phronesis or 
practical wisdom in exercising such judgment and of ontological skills, “skills at being 
this or that kind of person” for becoming a phronemos, a self who is capable of such 
judgment (Shotter & Tsoukas, 2014, p.237). Thus, Tsoukas is explicit about how 
everyday practical coping, deliberative coping and thematic ratiocination are parasitic 
on everyday pragmatic human action that exists in a clearing of background practices 
and suggests that the clearing can take on various styles (Tsoukas, 2010a, p.57). 
However, Tsoukas’ account of the cultural context is redolent of early Heidegger’s 
account of tool use in which the technological context of instrumentalism had not yet 
been thematised. Tsoukas’ reference to the different modes of strategizing remains 
within this tool-use context and does not extend to the historically different styles 
identified by Heidegger.  Similarly, Tsoukas’ analysis does not consider the question 
of the maintenance and transformation of the existential meaningfulness of a disclosed 
world. In general, Tsoukas does not engage with the later Heideggerian work on the 
history of different styles, of the sacred, or of austere thinking itself described in 
Chapter 3. A more genuine thinking would consider the contingency of this 
contemporary pragmatism as a historically-disposed instrumentalism and thus would 
think about what is most taken for granted and how it can be meaningfully transformed.  
Robert Chia is the academic who has done most to articulate a later 
Heideggerian approach to strategy as a practice. Working with a group of co-authors, 
Chia has developed a series of papers drawing on later Heidegger as well as a book-
length treatment that critiques world-picturing and agility and re-casts strategic action 
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in a largely Heideggerian frame (Chia & Holt, 2009). The key Heideggerian distinction 
upon which Chia and Holt draw is that between dwelling and building. Dwelling names 
an understanding of human agency and action more basic than those, mainly 
metaphysical assumptions, that we have shown dominate the strategic management 
literature. Dwelling is that engaged yet receptive stance to the world that is conducive 
to Wrathall’s description of adaptive thinking. To allude to its meanings in rather poetic 
language, dwelling roughly corresponds to a basic stance of being taken care of by the 
world at the same time as one takes care of the world. Following Heidegger, Chia and 
Holt claim that the strategy literature, even that literature such as the strategy-as-
practice literature that examines how strategy is actually formed, is dominated by an 
understanding of human being and agency that assumes that autonomous, transparent 
actors form assessments or intentional states about an objective world and creates 
explicitly formulated purposes, goals and plans to act wilfully upon this world. They 
term this dominant understanding building and follow Heidegger in arguing that such 
activity is always dependent upon a more basic dwelling. Cut off from dwelling, the 
prevailing style of building, whether modern or agile, roughly corresponds to the 
Machenschaft.  
As we saw, the dominant world-picturing and agile perspectives emphasise 
autonomous, transparent strategic decision-makers who analyse businesses, markets 
and industries as reified, stable, predictable objects and set goals, design strategies and 
make action plans accordingly, even if, in the case of the agile strategists, those cycles 
of action are compressed, volatilised, and accelerated. In contrast, the newer 
approaches to strategy emphasise ‘strategy as pattern’ emerging in local relational 
adaptations between embodied, historical and practical actors (e.g., Chia & Holt, 2006, 
2009; Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011; Tsoukas, 2010a, 2010b). These latter Heideggerian 
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practice authors begin to draw attention to the agile, and particularly the world-
picturing, styles that are the background thinking behind the calculations and 
propaganda of these dominant forms of strategic thinking (Chia & Holt, 2009; Heil, 
2011). 
What both world-picturing and agile approaches to strategy share are a version 
of an assumed subject-object building relationship. In the building mode, we have an 
“agent-strategist consciously constructing mental representations and models and only 
then acting upon them” (Chia & Holt, 2009, p.133). Accordingly, the actors involved 
are taken by researchers to be transparent subjects, autonomous, purposeful and goal-
directed, making conscious decisions about an objective world for instrumental gains. 
Their action is assumed to be consciously guided and un-perturbed by any influence or 
cognitive processes going on of which they are unaware i.e., no unconscious or sub-
conscious processes or at least none that cannot be made explicit. 
In the dwelling mode, the world and the self and all their perceptible properties 
are co-emergent, they arise and appear together in local, practical situations of everyday 
coping. Cognition is more a question of phronesis or practical wisdom primarily 
involving embodied sub-conscious and unconscious know-how. In most accounts, the 
two modes are seen as distinct and dis-connected – one is right and the other wrong. 
Chia and Holt suggest that the two are complementary and briefly describe how the 
building mode emerges when there is a breakdown in the dwelling mode (Chia & Holt, 
2006, 2009). This is an idea that is also referred to in Tsoukas’ account of the 
implications for management decision-making of early Heidegger’s distinction 
between ready-to-hand and present-at-hand in his application of Heideggerian account 
of tool use to management (Tsoukas, 2010a, 2010b). The basic point they make is that 
man’s everyday, average way of being is practical coping. The detached, theoretical 
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mode of building is secondary to the dwelling mode and occurs when dwelling has 
broken down for whatever reason. 
Chia and Holt’s recommendations for strategic practice are suggestive rather 
than prescriptive. Consistent with Heidegger’s thinking, its simultaneous saying “yes” 
and “no”, and its openness to mystery rather than wilful control, they propose a 
“different mode of engagement” to approach strategy. In this mode, the strategist 
approaches a strategic situation “pervaded by a paradoxical logic”, “modestly and 
elliptically and allowing strategic priorities to emerge spontaneously through local 
ingenuity and adaptive actions taken in situ” (Chia & Holt, 2009, p.xi). Inspired by 
Heidegger they recommend fostering what they call way-finding, an oblique, eclectic 
and fluid approach to strategy making, change and transformation. Such an open 
approach assumes the historical situatedness and sagacious prejudice of the strategist 
and the firm (ibid, p.194) and does not rely primarily on either making or using abstract 
maps of a territory nor on making bold pronouncements or plans for future direction. 
Way-finding replaces the goal-directed, spectacular, and exclusively top-down strategy 
of the dominant discourse with a more modest edging forwards by commitment making 
and an ongoing receptivity to which commitments are succeeding in gathering a world 
about them and which are foundering. Those commitments that gather a world are 
preserved and those that fail are abandoned or adjusted. In place of the rational intellect 
and confidence that leads to blindness they propose cultivating cunning intelligence or 
mētis. In place of accepting the fullness of present objects and the chatter of everyday 
life, they recommend a certain personal and organisational “blandness” that 
acknowledges the inherent lack in all things and incompleteness of the self. Such 
prescriptions, in which “indirectness, phronesis, mētis, complexity, curiosity and 
spontaneity persist without any one dominating” are certainly redolent of the tone of 
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Gelassenheit or composure that, as we saw in Chapter 3, Heidegger considers the mood 
appropriate to dwelling and the post-metaphysical age. However, there remain 
unthought areas to be developed further in Chia and Holt’s account. In contrast to 
Tsoukas, while Chia and Holt do develop an account of Heideggerian thinking of 
technology as an age of resources (ibid, pp.152-154), they do not explicitly contrast 
their own strategic blandness approach with the similarly non-foundational agile 
strategy style. However, doing so would sharpen an issue of which the authors are 
aware but which they do not fully resolve. When they introduce strategic blandness, 
they describe it as a “will-o’-the wisp endurance that invites no opposition and assumes 
no domination; it exists only in the plenitude of as yet unrealised possibilities” (ibid, 
p.xi). Later, in the context of mētis, they discuss how its survivalist selfishness and 
duplicity can lead to the loss of basic, stable character necessary for longer term 
success. In the context of strategic blandness, they describe how it prevents a self from 
being too “enamoured” with the current state of things and recognises how a strategic 
“lightness of touch” can itself “also become too habitual, too devouring of identity.” 
Thus, in its questioning of the loss of a self’s identity, it sets up but does not fully 
resolve the question of how mētic agility, blandness and meaningfulness can be brought 
together. In this absence, the extent to which they are describing agility or post-agile 
adaptiveness remains somewhat ambiguous. I will deepen Chia and Holt’s 
Heideggerian account of how dwelling with things gathers meaningfulness (ibid, 
pp.137-138) to propose an adaptive strategic practice that addresses this issue. Central 
to this resolution will be the correction of the omission made, in common with fellow 
later-Heideggerians Spinosa, Flores, Denning and Dunham of the connection 
Heidegger makes between mood and the sacred. In Chia and Holt’s Heideggerian 
account of the way a bridge, as a thing, conditions the meaningfulness of a situation 
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through what Heidegger calls the “fourfold” (Heidegger, 2012b). Chia and Holt 
provide the following account, which I annotate with Heidegger’s terms for the 
different dimensions of the Fourfold,  
The bridge [the Thing], the landscape [Earth], the sky [Sky], the tradition of human 
community and the human individual [Mortals] all meet, as a systematic unity, 
affording one another the chance to be, to live. 
(Chia & Holt, 2009, p.138) 
Chia and Holt’s account either omits mention of the sacred fourth dimension of 
the Fourfold, the role of the divinities, or it conflates it with the tradition of human 
community, which is unlikely as Heidegger always referred to Mortals in the plural and 
never singular.  I will propose that a focal thing can serve to gather existential truth and 
be the focal point for strategy that transforms and preserves existential strategy but that 
the sacred dimension must be incorporated to provide authority, beyond human control, 
for what matters most. 
The Unthought of the Commitment and Dwelling Accounts 
While modern, agile and proto-adaptive prescriptions for strategic management 
reveal that we can find no ultimate grounds for the meaningfulness of our strategic 
actions, decisions, and plans, they still only constitute an ambiguous threat and 
promise. In this respect, I support the efforts of those Strategy-as-Practice scholars 
inquiring into the meaningfulness of strategic management but suggest that what is 
unthought in both leaves significant weaknesses in their accounts. While the SAP 
agenda has served to return the study of strategy making to concrete, on-the-ground 
activity, it has been criticised for its descriptive nature, the paucity of its engagement 
with actual strategic practitioners and practices, and the un-critical nature of its 
appreciation for the way that discourses, identities and power interact to constrain or 
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open strategic possibilities (Clegg, 2011; Carter et al., 2008). Its research agenda is 
occupied with finding new ways to write about and study strategy and to broaden the 
conception of strategy beyond what it sees as a “citation cartel” of strategy scholars 
examining strategy from a narrowly economic perspective (Clegg, 2011, p.1587). If 
there is a recommendation for practice it is that of reconceiving of one’s own strategic 
practice as a reflective practitioner but that is all. While it aspires to be relevant to 
strategy practitioners, the SAP approach appears preoccupied by the task of harnessing 
meanings for productive ends, it is little concerned with distinguishing different basic 
styles, or between more or less worthy meanings, and hence continues to be oblivious 
to existential meaningfulness as opposed to instrumental meaning.  
As I have described, both Chia, Holt and Tsoukas’s dwelling work and Spinosa, 
Flores, Denning and Dunham’s accounts of history-making are influenced, at least in 
part, by Heidegger’s philosophical insights into the historical loss and recovery of 
meaning as it was set out in Disclosing New Worlds. However, important aspects of 
Heidegger’s thinking were left tacit or unthought in both that book and these strategy-
as-practice accounts that it has influenced, to the detriment of both. To re-cap, 
Heidegger hermeneutically retrieved and re-articulated what he considered to be 
Western humanity’s various styles since the pre-Socratic Greeks. He argued that, over 
the course of the Machenschaft mega-epoch, humans gained greater control over 
themselves and their world but, in so doing, also covered over, to the point of near-
annihilation, their essence as Dasein, world-disclosers or meaning-makers. On the 
basis of this insight, Heidegger argued that Western humans must attend to and 
cultivate our essence as meaning-makers and acknowledge “our participation in the 
creation and maintenance of an intelligible world” (Thomson, 2005: p.170). In 
Disclosing New Worlds, Spinosa, Flores, and Dreyfus assert that it is skilful practices 
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that will help the practitioner to identify opportunities to make a meaningful cultural 
difference, invent new practices to bridge identified value conflicts, build trust in a new 
practice to which actors are unaccustomed, and finally, build recognition of the value 
being created to help sustain the new practice (1997). More performatively, they ask 
the reader to read in such a way that they draw attention to the disclosive skills of 
writing and reading. 
We hope that this book will help you develop a skill that is essential for being an 
entrepreneur, a virtuous citizen, and a solidarity cultivator that is, for regularly and 
as a matter of course for seeing yourself and your world anew. [...] As you read, we 
ask you to keep the following questions in mind: is this description true of some part 
of my life? In what situations have I experienced something like this? Are the authors 
seeing only a part of some larger phenomenon whose overall shape they are missing? 
On the basis of experiences that I share with the authors, is what they say 
compelling? 
(Spinosa, Flores & Dreyfus, 1997, p.1) 
 
But do Disclosing New Worlds and those influenced by it successfully identify 
the essential ontological capacities? Taking up Spinosa’s question, I ask whether the 
book overlooked some aspect of Heidegger’s thinking, perhaps an aspect closest to it 
that it could not express adequately but that would prove essential to history-making. 
My answer is in the affirmative. It left unthought the sacred, the revelatory linguistic 
and affectively spiritual aspects of world transformation, and their ontological skills. 
In more recent work from the commitment-based managers’ philosophical 
communityxxx, Dreyfus and Kelly emphasise the development of skills for living well 
in a secular age that has lost, or is in danger of losing, meaningfulness (Dreyfus & 
Kelly, 2011). They recommend developing a metapoietic skill of receptivity to the 
divine moods that are the origin of meaningfulness itself and of the recognition, 
honouring and practice of the other style-making skills of physis – recognising the 
“wild, ecstatic divine that lifts us up like a wave”, poîesis – the ‘gentle, nurturing style 
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that brings things out at their divine best’, and technology “an autonomous and self-
sufficient way of life that laughs at everything of divine worth” (Dreyfus & Kelly, 
2011, pp.219-222). The specific criticism I will level at both post-agile accounts of 
strategy, is their failure to make explicit and deal satisfactorily with the sacred per se 
and with the revelatory interaction of language and mood, which omissions, taken 
together, limit their success in re-articulating a way of being freely capable of both 
instrumental meaning and existential meaningfulness. 
In the next chapter, I will closely read an exemplary text of the Heideggerian 
Strategy-as-Practice movement Disclosing New Worlds. I select this book as an early 
attempt to head off some of the problems of the agile approach that inspired a 
community of commitment-based practitioners and influenced other lead authors in the 
Heideggerian practice field, Chia, Holt, and Tsoukas. Having conducted a detailed 
reading of the text to discern its thought and unthought, I develop two paradigmatic 
case studies that illustrate how an established agile and an emerging post-agile brewer 
are dealing differently with the contemporary strategic situation we have already 
briefly considered.  
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6. Disclosing Disclosing New Worlds 
So far, I have set out how the dominant forms of strategic management, the 
world-picturing and the agile, line up with the basic styles Heidegger saw shaping 
contemporary Western selves and that he saw as leading to lives impoverished of 
meaningfulness and freedom. I have also analysed the Heideggerian Strategy-as-
Practice literature, which has begun to set out an approach to strategy that can remedy 
some of these shortcomings, and identified its neglect of the sacred as a significant 
omission if its remedy is to succeed.  Chapter 6 uses the transformative disclosure 
reading method set out in Chapter 2 to closely read a text that has influenced both sets 
of Heideggerian strategy writers, Disclosing New Worlds (Spinosa, Flores, & Dreyfus, 
1997). The chapter reveals the religious unthought of the text and shows that both sets 
of prototypical adaptive strategy fail because they either fail to get Heidegger’s 
theology right, they think of gods primarily as attuners, as opposed to derangers, of 
meaning, or because they do not get the religious appeal in today’s marketplace right 
or even at all. 
Since their earliest writings in the domain of management, Flores and Spinosa 
have proclaimed humanity’s capacity to disclose to itself its highest ethical good as 
being its own capacity for disclosing a way of being in the world. They have also 
claimed entrepreneurial history-making as the disclosure of new worlds as a 2,500-
year-old example of human life at its best. For example, in Heideggerian Thinking and 
the Transformation of Business Practice, an essay written with the support of Charles 
Spinosa and in honour of Hubert Dreyfus, Fernando Flores wrote,  
[O]ur view of business is quite entrepreneurial. Indeed, we take the innovative 
entrepreneur to be the paradigmatic business figure. […] What is important from 
this perspective is not whether, for example, flexibility or treating ourselves as 
disposable is an improvement but the fact that the ability to change our 
understanding of being is what makes us most human. […] Business as much as any 
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other highly prized activity enables us to disclose new worlds and to disclose 
ourselves as disclosers of new worlds. On my interpretation, disclosing is our highest 
ethical good, and a business promotes this good when it listens to customers to 
articulate their needs, when it designs itself around commitments, when it turns 
suppliers and customers into collaborators, when it cultivates new company styles, 
and when it enables entrepreneurs to open new worlds. 
 (Flores, 2000, pp.288-291. Emphasis current author) 
 
As is made clear in the authors’ subsequent Disclosing New Worlds, they view 
entrepreneurial business practice as not only paradigmatic of business but as 
paradigmatic of life at its best in the contemporary age (Spinosa, Flores & Dreyfus, 
1997: p.178). However, I shall argue that while Disclosing New Worlds, and its prequel 
Understanding Computers and Cognition (Winograd & Flores, 1987), defend 
“disclosure” as an important consolation in nihilistic capitalism, by failing to look 
further than the Machenschaft or to thematise the twin losses of freedom and the sacred, 
the authors miss the crisis of meaning currently underway. This crisis signals a 
transformational transvaluation that is creating pressure for a wholly new style of 
making sense of ourselves and the world. Lacking this identification of the crisis, they 
propose inadequate remedies that leave the crisis in place.  
We write in support of entrepreneurial practices within capitalist market economies. 
(Spinosa, Flores & Dreyfus, 1997, p.1) 
 
In so doing they restrict their interventions to producing further kinds of 
meaninglessness without taking this to its phenomenological conclusion – the 
experience of absurd meaningfulness amidst groundlessness that Heidegger names the 
last god – the wonder of all wonders, that things make sense. I have already shown 
how this nihilism remains in the early management writings that have drawn on 
Spinosa and Flores’ thinking and propose remedies that give shape to a more successful 
post-agile adaptive style of strategic management. 
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The authors of Disclosing New Worlds saw the coming problems of 
technological agility early and tried to address them (Spinosa, Flores & Dreyfus, 1997). 
As I demonstrated in Chapter 5, the book remains an influential text in the historical 
movement toward a post-agile management that offers remedies to the dangers that 
inhered in a life of flexibility. In this chapter, I will show how more effective remedies 
than those proposed were available to the authors but were so close to (at least) some 
of the authors’ thinking that they were not able to articulate them. However, those 
remedies can be sensed in the book’s style, its unthought, which awaits further 
evocation and articulation in language. In Seeing Things in Merleau-Ponty, Kelly 
describes his methodology for reading for a text’s unthought, 
It proposes a risky interpretive principle. The main feature of this principle is that 
the seminal aspects of a thinker’s work are so close to him that he is incapable of 
articulating them himself. Nevertheless, these aspects pervade the work; give it its 
style, its sense and its direction; and therefore belong to it essentially.  
(Kelly, 2005, p.74)  
 
Kelly goes on to argue that the main works of both philosophers and artists are 
identifiable as examples of their own familiar style. The style may be clear to those 
who witness the novels of Dickens or Austen, Turner’s or Klee’s paintings, and 
Heidegger’s or Badiou’s writings. However, it is not thematised and cannot be made 
explicit in a rule or single feature. Instead, a style withdraws into the background and 
yet pervades the work, exceeding its linguistically articulated meaning. Moreover, it is 
the author or artist who is least likely to recognise their own style. Drawing on the 
method described in Chapter 2, my goal in this chapter is first to bring out the thought 
and then the unthought of Disclosing New Worlds, that truth which they attempted and 
failed to articulate in the book. 
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Reading I: The Thought of Disclosing New Worlds 
 I read the thought of Disclosing New Worlds by discerning its style through 
two readings intended to set out its two key meaning-making aspects: a reading for 
mood and a reading for charged distinctions. I then move to articulate its style and 
articulate what it was unable to think or express in language, the book’s unthought. 
I begin by considering the mood of the book as a clue to its understanding of 
being. 
On picking up Disclosing New Worlds, one can’t fail to notice it has a striking, 
and to me, beautiful cover but one that is highly unusual for a business book. There is 
no picture of a mountain climber attaining the peak, no team of rowers working 
together, in fact no straightforward image of any kind of breakthrough. Instead it is an 
abstract spectrum of colours as a background to a rather gnomic title, in stark contrast 
to other books for a business audience that have similar origins in the early 
commitment-based practice community and which have much more direct and 
purposeful titles. 
 
 
Figure 1: Disclosing New Worlds: Front cover design and Bembo typeface 
Inside the covers, the text is set in Bembo, one of MIT Press’ standard fonts for 
its academic books. Bembo is a modernisation of a 15th century typeface described on 
Wikipedia as being “a good choice for expressing classic beauty or formal tradition”. 
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The lineation and syntax of Disclosing New Worlds is complex. This is not a 
post-modern Pandemonium (Burrell, 1997), Funky Business (Nordstrom & 
Ridderstrale, 2000) or Dangerous Ideas (Rehn, 2011) replete with multi-directional, 
non-linear texts, catchy slogans, imprecations and commands, and “too-cool-for-
school” conversational gambits. However, neither is it a modernist Exploring 
Corporate Strategy (Johnson and Scholes, 1999) or Competitive Strategy (Porter, 
1980) with their highly-illustrated formalised instruction book of theories, methods, 
structures and processes for corporate strategy.  
Following Timothy Morton’s distinction between the hot and cold affect of 
different material texts with hot texts allowing for greater ambiguity and polysemy and 
cooler texts stimulating greater specificity of meaning, the form of DNW’s text is 
unusual (Morton, 2009). As the book’s reviewer Peter Aspden wrote in the Financial 
Times,  
It is refreshing […] to find a book prepared to revise the traditional liberal agenda 
with such thoroughness, if not style. The difficulty of Disclosing New Worlds will 
preclude it from making any great impact: but it stands as a brave attempt to 
reformulate the relationship between democratic rights and economic progress in an 
age when the triumphalism of technological advance masks an unconfident vision 
of the future.  
(Aspden, 1997)  
 
Indeed, the syntax of the book is highly complex being both highly hypotactic 
and oddly paratactic (Morton, 2009). Disclosing New Worlds is generally cool, highly 
dense but hypotactically structured syntax. While it does comprise lengthy blocks of 
text and sentences of up to forty-five, often multi-syllable words per sentence, as we 
shall see, the book is clearly structured into a single coherent argument with an overall 
problematic that it is addressing. Single topic chapters are structured into paragraphs 
that are further structured by themes, and the paragraphs into hypotactically-structured 
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main and subordinate clauses; each clause is a fully formed, soberly worded, and 
liberally punctuated sentence with a subject, a verb-predicate and an object. This 
hypotactic organisation can be seen in its gross organisation: 
• The Introduction situates the book as a contribution to the debate of 
the end of history and proffers a way forward that is neither 
modernist nor post-modernist. 
• Chapter 1 introduces Heidegger’s ontology and the three skills of 
history-making and the case for continuous rather than discontinuous 
history-making as life at its best. 
• Chapter 2 introduces entrepreneurship as reconfiguration, the most 
discontinuous, if not radically discontinuous, skill of cultural 
innovation. 
• Chapter 3 introduces democratic action as cross-appropriation, the 
skill of interpretive speaking to adjust local worlds to new anomalous 
events. 
• Chapter 4 introduces articulation of a lost ground as the foundational 
skill of community solidarity. 
• The Conclusion summarises their argument for the completeness and 
centrality of their account of continuous rather than discontinuous 
history-making to meaningful lives in the contemporary Western 
political economy of the turn of the century. 
• Finally, the Philosophical Appendix deals with technical 
philosophical issues raised by the critical readers of an extended 
paper-length version of the book. 
However, there is also a parataxis at work at the fine level in the text and that 
can be seen within each chapter. I describe this effect as an exemplification of a 
Heideggerian Holzweg or forest path conversation in which the language coordinates 
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plausible statements that together construct (constructing in retrospect rather than 
either pre-ordaining a priori or discovering an existing theory) a consistent logical path 
of connections in a domain based upon noticing and dealing with the disharmonies that 
it finds in dialogue with existing works in the academic entrepreneurship and economic 
traditions. To be sure, multiple other paths and many other reputable writers are 
possible. Why for instance do the authors elect to consider Drucker, Vesper, Gilder, 
Berger, Lavoie, Casson, and Baumol for accounts of entrepreneurial practice and not 
Burgelman, Gartner, Hamel, Peters, Stacey, Pascale, and Weick? The answer I believe 
can be seen if one considers the path for a thinking inquiry that is proffered by 
Heidegger himself in his Country Path Conversations. This text comprises a three-way 
exchange between a scholar, a teacher or sage, and a scientist and, instead of taking the 
form of a univocal posing and solving of a problem or questioning, can be seen as a 
kind of answering to a call from some entity or phenomenon, an answering that in its 
very responding actually constructs the way of being of that entity in the Open-region 
where the meanings of entities is volatile. In other words, a thinking-inquiry about an 
entity thinks or discloses the style of that entity as a coordination between different 
encounters with the entity. In a style that resonates with the strategy of this thesis, the 
authors are interacting with different “paradigm cases” of “widespread ways of 
thinking” about entrepreneurship, thinkers who were selected for their credibility as 
paradigms but not necessarily in an attempt at exhaustive completeness. In their 
inquiry, the authors of Disclosing New Worlds, construct a new space of thinking of 
entrepreneurship that un-conceals aspects of it hitherto unconsidered. The authors 
themselves are active thinkers in this dialogue. It can be seen that their particular path 
of thinking is shaped by their own largely hidden Heideggerian ontology, for example, 
in the Holzweg metaphor as a path constructed between sparsely located trees that act 
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as signposts for particular elements of later Heideggerian phenomenology but with 
often substantial gaps between trees that leave room for alternative interpretations. 
Chapters 2-4 are exemplary of this wandering and wondering style that starts 
somewhere and gathers and addresses disharmonies to correct some inconsistencies or 
losses from the complete history of human being and to retrieve and re-valorise our 
deteriorating history-making skills. In the Conclusion however, they do argue for the 
completeness of the three kinds of history-making but they do so from a logical rather 
than empirical argument. History-making can be a retrieval of the lost past, an 
alignment with the un-integrated present, or a reorientation to the unknowable future. 
These three moves to address the un-grounded of the three temporal dimensions 
exhaust the logical possibilities of the Heideggerian account of the temporal structure 
of human care. They accept the possibility of other kinds of events that could found 
quite other worlds and require different skills, for example, the discontinuous change 
of cultural devastation as suffered by the Native American people (Lear, 2006), but 
they describe these as non-meaningful, therefore not life lived at its best and hence 
outside of their range of interests (Spinosa, Flores & Dreyfus, 1997, p.28, p.168). 
However, they leave the question open of such discontinuous change, and I argue that 
this openness is demonstrated in their syntax and quite consistent with their pluralistic 
stance. 
Finally, returning to Morton’s guidelines for materialistic readings, one notes 
the rather limited metaphorical content at work and the down-home, folksy and drily 
philosophical imagery – everyday examples of childcare and driving cars in city and 
the country. There is little hyperbolism here, the authors make modest, minimal claims 
for their account of life lived at its best, a claim made carefully and with modest appeals 
to the reader to confirm with inquiries into their own experience. 
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The reading for the book’s authorial mood shows it to be neither a book of 
Platonic theory, Christian revelation, modernist instruction manual, or technological 
novelty, instead it is rather a sober and intense work that wonders at and articulates an 
economic and political phenomenology, a book that wants its readers to develop their 
own sensitivity to a profound skill for living well and constructs its text to create an 
encounter with such a phenomenology. If there is a single word that expresses the mood 
or attunement of the book and hence the identity of its divinity as the sender of a style, 
I propose one, signalled by the authors’ opening appeal to the reader and reproduced 
on page 195 at the end of chapter 10, and consistent with the authors’ Heideggerian 
sympathies, Gelassenheit¸ the wonder-filled releasement or letting-be into their own of 
oneself, others and things to come. This is the sense of releasement as not simply a 
passive letting-be in contrast to an active, resolute wilfulness, but also of a responding 
to a call to “assist in letting other beings to be” (Davis, 2010). 
In order to show more perspicuously how the text’s signifying structure works 
to express a Heideggerian thinking of a response to nihilism, I outline below how 
Disclosing New Worlds as a whole traces Dreyfus’ and his colleagues’ understanding 
of a satisfactory Heideggerian response to the age of nihilism. Disclosing New Worlds 
takes on deeper meaning and opens greater possibilities for transformation when one 
is aware of the extent to which Dreyfus had devoted a thirty-year career to bringing 
Heideggerian philosophical insights of a nihilistic technological age to a wider public. 
Building from his earlier work on Artificial Intelligence which rested, as he saw it, on 
severely limited modern assumptions of human cognition, Dreyfus developed a series 
of papers in order to clarify an account of how humans could gain, what he called, “a 
free relation to technology” (Dreyfus, 1996; Dreyfus & Spinosa, 1997; Spinosa & 
Dreyfus, 2003). Dreyfus intended that his account be directly relevant to everyday life 
185 of 334 
and be grounded in specific actions rather than general, empty gestures. Dreyfus is so 
closely associated with the exegesis and leveraging of Heidegger’s work that he is 
sometime referred to affectionately as Dreydegger and his work as Dreydeggerian 
(Woessner, 2011: p208). The following detailed textual analysis identifies the principal 
concepts in Disclosing New Worlds that comprise Dreyfus’s arguments for how to gain 
a free relation to technology, in other words, their current best argument for how to 
escape nihilism and attain a meaningful life. My analysis shows the punctuation of the 
book – the moments that introduce what I have been calling “charged distinctions”, 
following BDA’s unpublished paper Listening: the general account (BDA, 1991). A 
charged distinction is a hermeneutic term derived by Flores and Spinosa in 
conversation with philosopher Richard Rorty (Spinosa, personal communication). It 
does not refer to a term but to a collection of terms that together constitute a unit of 
meaning that matters existentially to the reader as meaningful in the course of the 
reading he or she is undertaking of the text to determine the style of the authors being 
read. What you see listed below are not the charged distinctions themselves but the 
collection of terms that mark the introduction or reference to a particular Dreydeggerian 
charged distinction. 
The book starts by appealing to the reader’s own experience of the phenomena 
of entrepreneurial, civic and cultural action and makes a rather modest claim in 
comparison to those of the original est practitioners, who had sought Dreyfus’ 
assistance in their efforts to bring philosophy to practical effect in the world of personal 
development. They ask the reader to ask him- or herself whether the authors’ account 
rings true to their own experience, whether it is complete, and whether it is also 
“compelling”. This is the signature punctuation of the entire book that orientates the 
reader to release their reading towards things themselves rather than to impose a 
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theoretical structure upon the reader for confirmation or challenge. It is a request to the 
reader to enter into a conversation that brings the reader’s own experiences into 
dialogue with the observations of the authors and those of the theoreticians that they 
name.  
The authors then make a kind of invocation for readers to come together 
through the book and recover their dispersing common inheritance – our history-
making skill: 
We write in support of entrepreneurial practices within capitalist market economies, 
of citizens’ action groups in modern representative democracies, and of the culture 
figures who cultivate solidarity among diverse peoples in modern nations.  
(Spinosa, Flores & Dreyfus, 1997, p.1) 
 
The analysis of the charged distinctions of Disclosing New Worlds, and 
subsequent conversation with the book’s lead author Charles Spinosa, confirms that 
the book consolidates the principal themes that Dreyfus and his colleagues have been 
clarifying over thirty years of scholarship in their explorations of how to live a 
meaningful life in a nihilistic age. Over the course of seven chapters, the authors set 
out their proposal for a transformation in our ontological condition or understanding of 
being. This transformation, rather than despairing at or denying meaning-depleting 
agility, seeks instead to free up our relationship with it. This so-called free relation to 
technology entails being mindful of it. And being mindful means understanding it such 
that one accepts it as just one among many available styles, a style that has a time and 
a place when it can be appropriate to work within it but that is never totalising. I will 
show that they accomplish this free relation to the agile style by contextualising it as 
just one of many different ways that we have understood ourselves and the world over 
the course of human history. On this basis, they go on to recover and position 
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receptivity as the highest good of humans and describe history-making skills for 
retrieving and inventing other styles. These history-making skills include listening to 
anomalous historical and emerging practices that are marginalised by the contemporary 
common sense and bringing change to our everyday practices that take account of those 
disharmonies. Having thus re-contextualised our contemporary understanding as one 
among many and re-established our receptivity as our highest good, they intimate the 
possibility of a new beginning to our thinking overall, that of Ereignis or adaptation. 
This last though brings the question of the unthought in the book – the fundamental 
mood associated with the authentic experience of meaninglessness, our groundless 
thrown-openness and the last god. 
Life at its Best and the Greatest Danger 
In Disclosing New Worlds, Spinosa, Flores & Dreyfus argue that contemporary 
Western culture is losing the ability to make history that has marked its understanding 
of life at its best since the time of Plato. Today, they argue that while the history-making 
skill can still be glimpsed in the widespread practices of entrepreneurship, civic action 
and community solidarity, it is being obscured by modern rationalism and 
technological flexibility. They define history-making as the skill of changing our pre-
reflective understandings of a situation. In other words, history-making changes how 
humans make sense and act with themselves and entities before they have taken a 
detached standpoint from which to observe, characterise and decide upon them. After 
history-making, we think differently. They ask the reader to consider the ways that, in 
the twentieth century, feminism has changed the common-sense background 
understandings of gender in the West or the way that John F. Kennedy’s national 
mission to win the space race against the Russian efforts in turn transformed America 
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into a nation that pre-reflectively understood itself as a nation of technological 
pioneers. 
They argue that this engaged, practical way of preserving and transforming 
meanings is being lost amidst the dominance of two nonhistorical ways of living life 
or styles.  
The first nonhistorical way of life, following on from the scientific 
methodological discoveries of Galileo and deriving from the philosophical discoveries 
of Descartes, Locke and Kant, is the modern style, what we called earlier the world-
picturing style. The modern style values the detached, composed mood of the 
dispassionate, rational and autonomous spectator surveying as wide a view as it can get 
of an objective world in order to position and control it for benefit. The quintessential 
modern human being learned to value and bring to the fore those existing everyday 
practices of their repertoire that brought out this detached way of carrying themselves 
in the world – their comportment. The detached comportment had three notable 
features. Firstly, in detaching oneself from the hurly-burly of everyday messy life, the 
detached observer viewed the widest collection of entities in a world as a whole in 
order, on the basis of this wide, holistic view, to establish the entities in a situation that 
matter most in affecting the state of the whole and determine the causal relationships 
between them for the purposes of control. Secondly, the detached observer established 
a composed, mood-less mood that enabled the observer to be objective and assume the 
kind of impartiality understood to characterise our thinking at its clearest and most 
trustworthy. Finally, a detached comportment separates itself from both its historical 
and cultural practices and habits. An exemplary detached thinker, constantly looks 
afresh at her customary practices and, as if seeing through an alien’s eyes, distances 
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herself from them better to see their cause and effect relationships (Spinosa, Flores and 
Dreyfus, 1997, p.5-6). 
These three features of detachment – holism, objectivity, and alien-ism, lead to 
a style of understanding being that privileges the instrumental view of cause and effect 
relationships and a theoretical thinking that purifies a complex world into just those 
abstract or “context-free” elements that pre-eminently affect the successful 
achievement of the purpose of that world. Albert Borgmann, another Heideggerian 
philosopher illustrated this instrumental understanding in his story about modern 
central heating systems designed to maximise the availability of the single good of 
warmth. More pertinently to the business context, consider the modern analytical view 
of a business that considers it as having a single good, profit, and the purification of 
business models to identify and manipulate the principal drivers of profit. Thus the 
modern manager of a brewery would clarify the purpose of their brewery as say the 
reliable production of 12m hectolitres of uniform beer per year at minimum cost and 
then identify only those activities that affect that purpose and oversee operations to 
eliminate nonessential activities and optimise performance. Both examples illustrate 
the modern style of thinking that reduces its understanding of a complex situation to 
just those entities and relationships that affect the instrumental purpose of a world 
(Spinosa, Flores & Dreyfus, 1997, pp.6-7). 
The modern style values certainty. To the extent that we are modern, we 
experience the modern style whenever we distrust a passionate speaker as subjective 
or suspect social media networks and brilliant advertisers as controlling our thoughts 
and autonomy (Spinosa, Flores & Dreyfus, 1997, pp.8-9). However, the modern style 
leads to disharmonies, chief among them being that it is slow to respond to changes in 
history that are changing the common sense. The modern, analytical style must first 
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take a holistic view and ascertain the relevant entities and determine causal 
relationships before it can respond to those changes. However, when profound change 
is taking place, what counts as a relevant fact changes too and hence a view that strives 
for certainty is unable to respond to changes in the common sense because nothing 
emergent counts as a foundational fact. Later I will show the way the major US 
breweries originally struggled to respond to the challenge of the craft brewers as 
customers’ taste for cheap, refreshing and uniform beer gave way to a growing demand 
for complex and premium-priced fresh craft beers (Hill & Rifkin, 1999, Ch. 12). For 
the modern managers of mega-brewers, the new distinctions of worth appeared as 
trivialities or even as irrelevant to what “really counted” – cost, availability and 
consistency. According to Spinosa, Flores & Dreyfus, this inability to respond fast to 
historical change, leads in two directions. On the one hand, it leads negatively to a 
mood of resignation among modern managers and the development of various risk 
management or loss-hedging strategies to protect dwindling positions in niche markets, 
which is how the “Big Beer” brewers initially responded by dismissing craft beers as a 
fad. On the other, it leads positively to the second non-historical style, that of the 
postmodern, what we have been calling the agile, style, which embraces “change as the 
supreme good” but ends history as the possibility of any further change in our 
fundamental style beyond flexibility (Spinosa, Flores & Dreyfus, 1997, pp.9-10). 
The agile style improvises from its repertoire of skills to surf the flow of change 
and optimise its advantages from within the contingencies of that flow. Postmodern 
selves relinquish a stable self in favour of continually morphing identities that adapt 
and shift as the contingencies demand. Everything, including their formerly stable 
selves, becomes a resource for accruing advantage in a continually shifting situation. 
Thus agile selves are comfortable traversing different worlds in the course of a day and 
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shifting their different identities across those worlds when they go to work, arrive back 
at home, take business trips, meet with school friends, and engage in different social 
networks on the Web. This last practice, though only nascent at the time of the book’s 
writing, is key to our argument here. At the time the book was written, the authors 
considered playfulness on the Web along with teenager identity-morphing as presaging 
a radically shifting, multiplicitous way of living. This polymorphous, shape-shifting 
life had been marginal in modernity which demanded a stable, rational and dependable 
observer, but, already in 1997, the authors considered it a candidate to become the 
“central practice of our lives” (Spinosa, Flores & Dreyfus, 1997, pp.10-14). 
This technological flexible way of life though conceals a danger. On Spinosa, 
Flores & Dreyfus’s Heideggerian account, human beings are practical makers of 
meaning and, inasmuch as they make sense of themselves as makers of meaning, the 
proper role of the human being is distinct. It matters to the human being that it makes 
meaning and how it is making meaningxxxi. They argue that in the contemporary agile 
age, this role is being forgotten or covered over. Drawing on early- to mid-period 
Heidegger, their analysis first sets out that we are practical copers who disclose worlds 
in their skilful coping. Rather than perceiving and deciding upon action in an objective 
world, we are always already practically engaged in a world that appears from the 
context of our practical coping. 
How then, do we ourselves, other people, and things appear in average, everyday 
human activity? […] We must begin by noticing that we do not, for the most part, 
encounter mere stuff to which we then assign some sort of meaning. […] When we 
start by looking at our activity, we find, in the first instance, that we encounter 
meaningful things. […] When we say things are meaningful, we mean that they fit 
with the practices we have for using them. 
(Spinosa, Flores & Dreyfus, 1997, p. 17) 
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Following both the late Heidegger of Ereignis, the tendency for configurations 
of meaning to gather and endure in networks of relations between entities with no 
ultimate ground, and the early Heidegger of the worlding of the world, they characterise 
human being-in-the-world as meaning making, opening up a disclosive space that 
gathers meaning as an interplay between three essential aspects – equipment, purposes, 
and identities. 
The basic intuition, then, is that shared human practices tend to gather together into 
organizations that we recognize as worlds, people, and selves. Once those 
organizations gain consistency and effectiveness, we as people and selves bring 
them into sharper focus and organization. […] We call any organized set of practices 
for dealing with oneself, other people, and things that produces a relatively self-
contained web of meanings a disclosive space. […] A world [...] has three 
characteristics. It is a totality of interrelated pieces of equipment, each used to carry 
out a specific task [...] to achieve certain purposes [...enabling] those performing it 
to have identities [...] the meaning or point of engaging in these activities. […] The 
webs of practices and meanings, from cultures to tribal nations to individual 
families, are disclosive spaces. 
(Spinosa, Flores & Dreyfus, 1997, pp. 16-17) 
 
Drawing on the mid-period Heideggerian understanding of the “rift design” of 
a world (Heidegger, 2002b, p.43), they argue that a world has a style that determines 
what shows up as relevant in a world and how it shows up. As we have already seen, 
the style is a crucial charmed distinction of Heideggerian philosophy that designates 
not just a set of rules for how a world works – like the explicit rules of a game – but a 
pervasive way that all aspects and entities in a culture hang together. The style is a 
strife-filled interplay between what Heidegger calls the sky of observable and 
articulable ways of proceeding and the withdrawn background earth of those cultural 
practices and obscure traditions upon which the sky depends. In any world, the 
foreground and background are in strife with a tension between the attempts to 
articulate and clarify the ways and rules of the world and the continuing concealing of 
the background traditions and understandings upon which those ways depend. 
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When we say that things are meaningful we mean that they fit with the practices we 
have for using them. […] All our pragmatic activity is organized by a style. Style is 
our name for the way all the practices ultimately fit together. [...] A style is not an 
aspect of things, people, or activity but rather, constitutes them as what they are. 
Style acts as the basis on which practices are conserved and also the basis on which 
new practices are developed. […] A style opens a disclosive space and does so in a 
threefold manner: (1) by coordinating actions, (2) by determining how things and 
people matter, and (3) by being what is transferred from situation to situation. 
(Spinosa, Flores & Dreyfus, 1997, pp. 16-20) 
 
The authors illustrate the idea of style with Dreyfus’ example of different 
practices between Japan and America for raising a child. They demonstrate that all the 
gestures in the culture are coordinated by the style and that one learns fluency in a 
culture by absorbing its style. One absorbs a style in the course of one’s practical, 
involved coping with that culture and not through the explicit learning of rules. They 
illustrate the way that a style makes different actions and entities more or less worthy 
by considering the case of driving style in the rural states of the American mid-West, 
where courtesy and relaxation are paramount and in New York City where hustling and 
opportunism are seen as more worthy. They argue that one learns a style as one 
practically engages amidst it rather than by explicit formal teaching of rules. The style 
is constitutive of the kind of identity one will become and that will shape one’s 
interpretations and actions in future novel situations. For instance, they argue, the child 
who learns a pacifying style by interacting with a rattle may become the CEO who 
“offers employees lifetime job security” (Spinosa, Flores & Dreyfus, 1997, p. 22). 
History-making skills are those that gather and focus a style, and to the extent 
that they require a “heightened sensitivity” to that style, Heidegger’s authentic 
intelligibility possible only at the Stages 6 and 7 of Dreyfus’ model of expertise, they 
also disclose that one is a discloser (Spinosa, Flores & Dreyfus, 1997, pp.66-68). For 
change to be meaningful, disclosing must have some minimal continuity to an existing 
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disclosure of meaning. The kind of normal, everyday, practical disclosing that gathers 
and continues an existing style and acts appropriately according to that style, they call 
customary disclosing. 
By the time we are adults, most people who live in nations with market economies 
are proficient at acting in the appropriate competitive way to market their skills and 
products. […W]e compete because we enjoy the ongoing exercise of our skills in a 
context where those skills make sense as components of a meaningful way of life. 
That is, we compete to make things and ourselves more worthy. We compete to 
make the qualities of products that we care about or qualities of ourselves that we 
care about stand out. In short, we compete to develop identities within communities. 
In saying this we are also saying we do not normally compete to make money. […] 
We argue that this detached, seemingly rational account distorts our sense of 
ourselves as involved in the ongoing activity of making sense of our lives. […] 
Business owners do not normally work for money either. […] None of this is the 
goal of the activity. […] We are claiming, then, that customary businesses and 
businesspeople exist in market economies to form identities that are recognized by 
others as respectable due to their usefulness or excellence. 
(Spinosa, Flores & Dreyfus, 1997, pp.55-57) 
 
In cases where the change is discontinuous and comes from a completely alien 
world of meaning, for example, by the destruction of a culture by an invading force, by 
definition, such changes deplete or even destroy meaning. If one can find no way to 
make sense of what is taking place, one is left in a meaningless situation. When the 
style of human being becomes non-historical, whether modern or agile, it becomes 
increasingly disconnected from the prevailing style of life and hence subtly 
disconnected from meaning. In this disconnection, a threat to the human way of being 
as a maker of meaning emerges.  
As soon as one abstracts the entrepreneur from skilled activity in this way, many 
options appear that would simply not show up within either customary or 
entrepreneurial ways of doing business. […] For instance, one will see that one can 
compete by forming trusts that block competition, or by buying out potential 
competitors who have good ideas and then holding back the implementation of their 
ideas to maximize profits on products already on the market. Finally, if 
rationalization follows its normal course, as it does in some business school curricula 
and in university economics departments, one tries to work out both the theory of 
the domain that leads to success and the general theory for succeeding in any 
domain. Then business activity looks like gaming the system to produce high 
indicators of success. We call such activity uprooted because it is no longer 
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grounded in the practices that make sense of competition in the first place. Worse, 
when business activity amounts to gaming the system, searching for excellence or 
quality or any other meaningful goal will amount to no more than further gaming 
techniques. The notion of engaging in these activities to form an identity will be lost. 
(Spinosa, Flores & Dreyfus, 1997, p.65) 
 
The authors identified two kinds of skill for history-making that preserves and 
transforms meanings. The first kind is the skill to “sense and hold on to disharmonies” 
that show up within the style of an existing disclosive space. The second kind is the set 
of skills for changing an existing disclosive space.  
Disharmonies are practices in which we engage that common sense leads us to 
overlook because they are not well coordinated with our other practices. We should 
beware of the Cartesian tendency to imagine the skill of noticing and holding on to 
disharmonies as primarily intellectual, as noticing a problem in one’s life and 
stepping back to analyze it, to puzzle through it, in one’s mind. Rather, the skill of 
uncovering the tension between standard, commonsense practices and what one 
actually does is a skill of intensified practical involvement. […] The best way to 
explore disharmonies, […] is not by detached deliberation but by involved 
experimentation. 
(Spinosa, Flores & Dreyfus, 1997, pp.23-24) 
 
For instance, the authors describe how King Gillette noticed and retained the 
surprising disharmony that practices for disposability were displacing traditional 
masculine reverence for crafted objects and developed disposable razors and other 
products that took account of that disharmony. They name three possible history 
making skills that deal with different disharmonies in ways that preserve and transform 
meanings. Articulation from dispersed or lost practices is exemplified by Kennedy’s 
retrieval from dispersion of the American pioneering history to make it again relevant 
and worthy in contemporary times. If articulation is successful, a people feels more 
integrated and centred, more at home with itself, as if they have returned their practices 
to the core of what matters to them. Cross-appropriation names the skill exemplified 
by the feminists’ borrowing of practices from neighbouring domains in their lives to 
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address situational problems. For instance, borrowing from patriarchal practices of 
universal justice, that formerly marked female oppression, to fight unequal pay in the 
workplace in a kind of subversive adaptation. Successful cross-appropriation generally 
has a similar effect to articulation, a neighbouring practice has been successfully 
borrowed to help a community of people feel more themselves. Reconfiguration is the 
skill of bringing an unexplored, emerging practice to the centre of a way of life as 
exemplified by the newly forming postmodern Internet style. In contrast to articulation 
when a people might feel more at home or centred, after successful reconfiguration, a 
community generally experiences themselves as having a broader scope and range of 
possibilities for living well – their horizons have been extended. 
However, all three forms of history-making practices continue an existing 
horizon of meaning even if in preserving those meanings they transform them. 
All of these types of change are historical because people sense them as continuous 
with the past. […] When, for instance, a conqueror imposes a whole new set of 
practices on a people or a people is dispersed and must adopt wholly new practices 
to survive, such change is discontinuous and is beyond our range of interests. 
(Spinosa, Flores & Dreyfus, 1997, p.28) 
 
They ask whether the flexible, technological way of living life has succeeded 
in banishing history-making completely. As we have seen earlier, Heidegger argued 
for the late modern, technological understanding of being as the greatest Danger to the 
human way of being as a discloser of meaning and that, 
The approaching tide of technological revolution in the atomic age could so 
captivate, bewitch, dazzle, and beguile man that calculative thinking may someday 
come to be accepted and practiced as the only way of thinking. 
(Heidegger, 1966, p.56) 
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Heidegger’s primary concern is not that the two nonhistorical ways of being 
may lay waste to nature or to tradition – Heidegger is not nostalgic – but that they 
squeeze out alternative or even new understandings of being per se. As we saw, in its 
modern and particularly its postmodern or agile form, it does this by establishing an 
understanding of being in which all entities including other humans and ourselves show 
up as a standing reserve of flexible resources to be ordered and re-ordered for 
“maximum yield at the minimum expense” (Heidegger, 1993, p.15). This ordering 
relationality does away with the subject-object axis in which other entities appear over 
against ourselves as ordering subjects. In this pure relationality, God, society, other 
people, or even ourselves are removed as ultimate authorities and become resources to 
be ordered for the sake of a continually shifting drive toward optimality. The authors 
of Disclosing New Worlds argue that the nonhistorical understandings of being, 
particularly the postmodern agile kind, cover over the essential sense-making role of 
the human being as a discloser of meanings. Disclosing New Worlds is an attempt to 
recognise and recover the marginalised history-making way of living life in the face of 
the flexible technological way of living that has pure receptivity as its only good. 
We engage in disclosive activity all the time, […] But we are only sensitive to this 
disclosing as our way of dealing with things and people when we are engaged in 
articulating, reconfiguring or cross-appropriating. […] On reflection – of the sort in 
which we are engaging here – we may be able to deduce that we can deal with or 
disclose ourselves in a variety of ways, but only in history-making do we actually 
deal or disclose ourselves as disclosers and not, for example, as Cartesian subjects 
with a substantive nature. […W]hy has this phenomenon remained hidden from so 
many for so long? […] First, [...] What gets covered up by the taken-for-granted 
aspect of common sense in everyday understanding is that the ultimate “ground” of 
intelligibility is simply shared practices – that there is no right way of doing things. 
Second, [...] once we become habituated to a style, it becomes invisible to us. [...] 
We all are simply in tune with the dominant style. Third, we do not normally sense 
that we are disclosers because we are interested in the things we disclose and not in 
the disclosing. […] Through these three ordinary tendencies to overlook our role as 
disclosers, we lose sensitivity to occluded, marginal, or neighboring ways of doing 
things. Special sensitivity to marginal, neighboring, or occluded practise however is 
precisely at the core of entrepreneurship, citizen virtue and drawing people together 
into a community. 
(Spinosa, Flores & Dreyfus, 1997, pp.28-30) 
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Throughout the book, the authors carefully distinguish their philosophical 
position from alternatives offered by, for instance, Habermas, Merleau-Ponty, Rorty, 
Dewey, Derrida, Foucault, Hegel, and Rawls. For our purposes, it is sufficient to 
highlight only one. The authors take an important stand against Nietzschean 
protagonists from both the right and left. They position themselves in antagonism to 
Nietzsche as the philosopher who, like Spinosa, Flores and Dreyfus, in recognising the 
end of the entire 2,500-year arc of Western metaphysical thought, declared the “death 
of God” and the end of philosophy and inverted the Platonic prioritisation of rationality 
over the passions to propose instead that we celebrate the ascendancy of the passionate 
will-to-power over detached rationality. It is Nietzsche who, more than anyone, 
foresaw the loss of any ultimate ground upon which to make choices and celebrated 
the possibilities for a postmodern human as the self-grounding creator of brief and 
artistic lives. On this basis, Nietzsche is the anti-philosophical hero of the postmodern 
style, a celebrator of the will-to-power. Spinosa, Flores and Dreyfus’s argument is that 
Nietzschean arguments of the political right and left are nihilistic in that they, on the 
left hand, deny any role to human traditions, practices, and identities and, on the right 
hand, deny the possibility of human intervention. 
People must have identities – senses of what their lives as a whole are about. But 
they must have not have identities of the kind the right imagines – that is, identities 
that are to be forever strengthened and sharpened – for then their responses to local 
situations would be defensive and reactionary. But they cannot go over to the left’s 
view of identities that develop in wholly contingent ways. Rather, they must have 
identities whose change will be dictated by the style of practices with which they are 
familiar. This is precisely the kind of historical identity and change we advocate and 
describe. 
(Spinosa, Flores & Dreyfus, 1997, p.22) 
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In the penultimate chapter of the book, Spinosa, Flores and Dreyfus return to 
their differences with both modernism and agile ways of living. They argue that when 
a culture lacks a central figure or institution to bind it together by articulating its shared 
ultimate concerns, it attempts two unsuccessful ways of gathering its community. The 
first is the modern way of thinking of a set of stable and objective values that they argue 
leads only to perpetual divisiveness or “value wars”. The second way is the flexible 
way of caring only for skilful and forgetful “agile coping”, which avoids the endless 
value warfare of the modern approach but only at the expense of losing any meaningful 
concerns.  
Again the question arises, have the modern and postmodern agile ways of 
understanding ourselves and our worlds become so overwhelming that they have driven 
out our history-making ways? They argue that while they have succeeded in 
marginalising history-making as central to our understanding of ourselves, they have 
not succeeded in obliterating it. However, they argue that, compared to the grand 
mission of the Enlightenment, history making today can be seen only in the diluted 
ways that members of a generation see themselves as standing for a generational way 
of life and its skills have been dispersed into our everyday practices of 
entrepreneurship, civic action and political solidarity. They propose that recovering and 
clarifying each practice provides a way to avoid the meaninglessness of the completely 
flexible life. 
The choice for us now is between the style of flexibility toward which we seem to 
be drifting and a resuscitation of our history-making skills. Almost every action each 
of us in the West takes draws us one way or the other. We need to develop sensitivity 
to where we are going if we are going to make choices instead of simply following 
the drift. [...] We hope thereby to encourage a retrieval of history-making skills from 
dispersion.  
(Spinosa, Flores & Dreyfus, 1997, p.15) 
An object or event that would ground [...] a gestalt switch in our understanding of 
reality. 
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(Dreyfus, 1992) 
 
As stated earlier, Disclosing New Worlds sets out, in concrete and specific 
terms, a Heideggerian response to the nihilism and forgetfulness of the question of 
being in our contemporary age. To this point we have been introduced to three aspects 
of the argument (1) there are two dominant understandings of being in our age – the 
modern and the postmodern or agile, (2) in the face of the postmodern understanding, 
we are in danger of forgetting our roles as disclosers of being, (3) the postmodern 
Nietzschean skilful agile coping is an unsatisfactory solution to this loss as it denies 
that we are disclosers. In the final arguments of the book, they set out their particular 
Heideggerian response to this dangerxxxii. This response is an educational curriculum 
oriented toward developing sensitivity to and skilfulness in historical and customary 
disclosing. As we shall see the curriculum overlaps considerably with the agile 
conversational approach but goes rather further to address important omissions. The 
so-called curriculum for disclosing, intended to produce, among others, entrepreneurial 
business practitioners, would be organised into three modules, each introducing one 
type of disclosing and describing an ontology for that kind of disclosing. When 
practically skilled in such an ontology, students are considered to be in position to halt 
the drift toward losing our sense of ourselves as disclosers and mindfully make choices 
of how to disclose. 
The first module introduces and sensitises students to historical disclosing. The 
module would itself have two components. The first would reveal to students some of 
the radically different ways that humans have made sense at different times and in 
different cultures. Students would examine works of literature, art, history and 
philosophy to encounter different styles. For instance, students would learn of the 
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Homeric Greeks’ polytheism and how they lived exemplary protean lives as heroes, of 
the Athenian Greeks’ theoretical way of life, and of the mediaeval Christians’ pious 
lives as saints or sinners. Students would also situate the roots of current management 
science and agile thinking in the Enlightenment and postmodern epochs. The course 
would exemplify each epoch’s style, find ways to practically experience the style by 
drawing attention to existing but marginalised contemporary practices, and show how 
each epoch’s style had been concealed by later styles. Dreyfus has subsequently 
developed and taught such a module. First, in the general education courses Dreyfus 
has taught for over a decade at Berkeley and subsequently by his former student, now 
Professor of Philosopher at Harvard, Sean Kelly and written up in their co-authored 
book All Things Shining (Dreyfus & Kelly, 2011). The second component would 
provide students with practical experience with the skills of history-making described 
in Disclosing New Worlds (sensing, holding on to and dealing with disharmonies) and 
alternative examples of such skills such as Derrida’s deconstruction or Foucault’s 
problematisation (see Denning & Dunham, 2010). 
The second module backs up from history-making to show students our 
everyday customary disclosing practices. This module would teach how everyday 
conversational practices customarily disclose a world by coordinating commitments 
within an existing world of practices with its own implicit style. BDA’s commitment-
based management (see Chapter 5) is introduced as an account of “the general 
constitutive practices that structure all customary disclosing”xxxiii. Thus a business 
student would learn to understand a business as a dynamic network of commitments 
made in conversational practices and coordinated by a style. Examples of such a 
module have been developed by Denning and Dunham (2010) and Flores (2012). 
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Finally, a third module would teach theoretical disclosing – the disclosive style 
of various epochs of the Machenschaft but particularly of the modern style, and 
demonstrate why such detached, theoretical understanding of decontextualised cause-
and-effect relationships fails in the human domain. 
The Disclosure of Disclosing New Worlds 
The essencing of language as saying is the realm. […] The realm, now to be 
experienced as the essencing of language, is the dominion of play, wherein all 
relationships of things and beings playfully solicit each other and mirror each other. 
[…] The realm is the location in which thinking and being belong together. […] 
Language is the house of being. 
(Heidegger, 2012a, p. 158) 
 
Disclosing New Worlds should be seen as an attempt to gather and articulate a 
later-Heideggerian free relation to the agile style, in order to help our culture escape 
from nihilistic flexibility and find a new central focus for meaningful life amidst 
groundlessness (Dreyfus, 1992). The moods and signifying structure of the text 
disclose this attempt. In marked contrast to the agile mood of busyness that can still be 
seen to dispose the works of the earlier practical exemplars of post-agile practice in 
business such as Denning and Dunham’s The Innovator’s Way, Spinosa, Flores, and 
Dreyfus create distinctly philosophical moods of wonder in the reader. DNW neither 
rejects nor capitulates to the busy moods of productivity that dispose Machenschaft 
thinking but instead, always tempers its own argument with its opening philosophical 
invitation to readers to consider their own experience “Ask yourself...?” and its allusion 
to the philosophical injunction to “Know Thyself”. This strikingly philosophical 
introduction already discloses the later Heideggerian mood of the book and sets up a 
tension with the background business mood of bored busyness that ordinarily 
conditions commitment-based management. Similarly, an analysis of the charged 
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distinctions of Disclosing New Worlds reveal Spinosa, Flores and Dreyfus’s conceptual 
argument as a Heideggerian protreptic towards a proper response to nihilism and show 
how the book works to express a later Heideggerian philosophy of a free relation to 
technology. 
To bring together my analysis, I adopt Spinosa’s own advocacy of the linguistic 
practice of articulation as a way to witness something gathering into its own (Spinosa, 
2001, pp.206-207). 
To structure this gathering, I draw on Heidegger’s fourfold to disclose the four 
elements of the book that work together to establish it as a thing thinging i.e., bringing 
a thing out most clearly, in its existential truth, as what it is in a style (Heidegger, 
2012a). These elements are Earth, Sky, Mortals and Divinities (See Figure 2 below). 
Below, I articulate how Spinosa’s own text acts as a thing thinging to gather an 
understanding of a self and a world, and thus bring both into their own. 
As the disclosive space at work at the level of the whole book as a Heideggerian 
fourfold, it becomes apparent that for the book’s “purpose to be brought out most 
clearly and worthily” (Spinosa, 2001, pp.206-208) it must work on the reader’s 
appropriated clearing such that it: 
1. Draws on the reader’s background familiarity with the stylistic 
understanding at work in the early and particularly later Heideggerian 
phenomenology (the Earth) 
2. Foregrounds and clarifies the Heideggerian phenomena of business 
practice by providing narratological, phenomenological accounts that 
enable the authors to distinguish and name those phenomena that are 
normally overlooked in economic activity (the Sky) 
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3. Reveals a fragile and cherished identity among readers as the articulators 
of the poetic, disclosive role of humans that can pull us back from 
nihilism (the Mortals) 
4. Evokes a mixture of moods (startled dismay, wonder, awe) appropriate to 
setting up the composure of Gelassenheit that is necessary as “the very 
essence of thought” (Haar, 1992, p.167) initiating an epoch and history 
itself (the last god of the Divinities). 
In other words, for the book to work most powerfully in interaction with its 
reader, it is necessary for the Heideggerian fourfold to manifest and for its dimensions 
to inter-play. 
Earth: The Heideggerian traditions 
 
Early Heidegger of Being-in-World 
(Dasein, Modes of Existence, Releases from 
the One – authenticity, etc.) 
 
Later Heidegger of Gelassenheit (History of 
Being, The Greatest Danger and das 
Gestell, Works of Art, world preservation & 
transformation, Dwelling, the Fourfold, 
abandonment of ontological difference) 
Divinities: The Senders of a Style 
 
The last god moods of startled dismay, 
wonder, and awe necessary for establishing 
Gelassenheit as the essence of thinking 
enabling an active engagement of oneself, 
others and things to come into their own by 
preserving and transforming worlds. 
Sky: The focal practices 
 
Authenticity – receptivity, heightened 
sensitivity. 
 
History-making skills: reconfiguration, 
cross-appropriation, and articulation. 
Mortals: The finite beings 
 
The mystic poet’s philosopher – neither a 
sophist nor a mystagogue but a calm, 
inquiring facilitator of the developing 
sensitivities and skills of others. 
Figure 2: Disclosing New Worlds working as a Heideggerian Fourfold 
 
The operationalisation of Heidegger’s philosophy occurs on two levels that set 
up the possibility of a way of being a teacher or consultant of commitment-based 
practice and on the level of entrepreneurial and democratic practice itself. 
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Firstly, on the level of the book itself, it can be seen to be drawing on the 
authors’ technical Heideggerian writings (the Earth) as the traditions upon which it 
rests. These writings then set up the possibility of developing an articulated 
philosophical and phenomenological form of business consulting as protreptic teaching 
of authentic disclosing (the Sky). This form of philosophical consulting is disposed 
itself by the moods of shock, awe and wonder that signal the arrival of the last god 
which counters an actor to become mindful of their own appropriated clearing and role 
as disclosers (the Divinities), and demands of its practitioners that they devote 
themselves to its operationalisation in the awareness that they may fail and that the 
future existence of this way of life may falter along with their death (the Mortals).  
It is the text itself that acts as the thing that opens up this possible way of being 
in the world but that only works if it is seen for what it is. Turning to the literary 
techniques that act as a kind of disclosure in themselves, I see the authors exemplifying 
in their writing an identity as the mystic poet’s philosophers who wanderingly – in the 
sense of meandering – and wonderingly, in the sense of awe, weave together listening 
and speech acts as the focal practices that disclose what is worthwhile and what may 
be missing from the ontologies of other writers in entrepreneurship and economics. The 
sequencing of the text does not go quite as linearly as one might expect for a 
philosophical tract. It starts with an account of feminism as an example of history-
making and then moves on to the retrieval of a national character in the Kennedy space 
race and its key skill of articulation then meanders back to feminism to name the skill 
there as cross-appropriation. Then it steps back to look at the loss of history-making 
amidst modernism and postmodernism, stopping along the way to name-check the third 
history-making skill reconfiguration while discussing postmodernism. The flow of the 
tract works as literary technique that materially evokes a Heideggerian theme – the 
206 of 334 
Holzweg (Heidegger, 1998: p.xiii). The Holzweg or woodland walk characterises the 
task of meditative thinking as the tracing of a path, through a forest, that is only 
recognisable in retrospect and is to be contrasted with the representational cognitive 
and wilful thinking that Heidegger sees as characteristic of the agile age. Reading the 
text throws one into that mood of engaged wandering wondering. Note how the authors 
declare the existence of new key phenomena and baptise them with names (articulation, 
cross-appropriation, and re-configuration), make assertions to orientate and unsettle 
their readers, offer and request new actions on the part of readers, and finally declare 
their satisfactory completion of their task. Hence, the book itself is a disclosive thing 
that discloses its readers’ pre-ontological understanding of entrepreneurship, 
community action and solidarity, names what our generation has been ignoring all 
along i.e., that we are disclosers who are always disclosing whether customary or 
historical disclosing and places the normative emphasis clearly on historical disclosing. 
The authors’ textual techniques develop in such a way that they show what needs to be 
in place for the narrative to exist at all as the thing gathering an adaptive style. It is 
replete with assertions, requests, promises, and finally assertions of completion and 
declarations of satisfaction, for instance in declaring themselves satisfied that they have 
identified all possible historical skillsxxxiv, structured into sequenced conversations that 
show what needs to be present for any kind of political economic invention to take 
place. However, it is also structured by a different kind of language, one much closer 
to the revelatory language of faith – of namings of new phenomena and requests to 
dedicate oneself to the exploration of the phenomena. One notes for instance how it 
starts with a declaration of what is not, asserts a problem of the loss of sensitivity to 
history-making and declares what the authors stand for at exactly the moment that they 
say it is being lost and the world dying catastrophically. 
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Secondly, at the level of entrepreneurial practice, it is possible to see how the 
book clearly sets out an account of the most skilled entrepreneurial business practice 
as an exemplification of the Heideggerian fourfold that is an antidote to the 
technological, egocentric and wilful understanding of being that the authors see as 
dominating contemporary business practice. The authors have oriented their writing to 
market economic and representative-democratic political practices as the hidden or 
concealed Earth background of our everyday life and, in particular, the everyday 
communicative language-action practices of contracting (requests and promises) that 
comprise customary disclosing (the Earth). By thematising language-action, via the 
note on customary business practice as coordination of commitments through speech 
acts, and the focal practice of entrepreneurship and its principal skills of 
reconfiguration supported by articulation and cross-appropriation, the authors have 
articulated the Sky of this fourfold by focusing on simple practices with which we are 
all familiar. By declaring and emphasising these focal practices, in the context of 
economic practices, as life lived at its best, the authors articulate the Heideggerian 
notion of the dwelling of finite, vulnerable Mortals taking care of, and being cared for 
by, the Fourfold. Finally, inherent to the authors’ understanding of new affordances of 
receptivity at the highest levels of skilfulness, I note how the understanding of 
participants in a world is transformed to the extent that the divinities appear – either 
the divinities of the existing customary style (phronesis) or of a newly disclosing style 
(history-making). 
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Reading II: The Unthought of Disclosing New Worlds 
I have shown how Disclosing New Worlds defines history-making as an 
example of life lived at its best in a technological age marked by two dominant styles 
of making sense of a situation and oneself – the modern world-picturing and the 
postmodern agile. In particular, I have shown how Spinosa, Flores and Dreyfus 
construct an image of a disclosive self that is active in both political and economic 
domains. In the economic domain, the disclosive, history-making self stands in contrast 
to the modern rationalist and postmodern agile managers. Disclosive managers find 
solidarity and meaning in their cultural innovations by retaining their shared concerns 
for excellence while still working to effect change. Disclosive entrepreneurial 
managers effect cultural innovations by holding on to and dealing with surprising 
disharmonies that they find between the style of their current way of life and their 
experiences of on-the-ground events. As they work to address these disharmonies they 
recover or extend their disclosive space of understanding in ways that enhance rather 
than deplete existing meanings. In contrast, the rational modern business manager 
seeks to purify the purpose of a particular world, such as brewing, most usually into a 
single-purpose, profit-making system and then designs efficient solutions to maximise 
the availability of outputs while minimising inputs. The postmodern agile manager, 
exponent of multiple brief lives, embraces the lack of stability and coherence of their 
identities and, in the absence of these cornerstones, celebrates change and flexibility. 
Both modern and postmodern styles deplete meaning. Modernism reduces available 
meanings to a purified instrumentalism that counts disharmonious surprises as 
distractions and hence as meaningless – ignorable because without value in the current 
regime. Postmodern agility counts any stability as temporary and contingent and thus 
promotes the possibility of any aspect of a situation serving as the ground for meaning, 
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regardless of its rootedness or otherwise. Anything is potentially optionalised and 
reconfigurable, but nothing is truly sacred in itself. 
The authors propose a remedial higher education curriculum for disclosing 
intended to produce disclosive entrepreneurs, virtuous citizens and political leaders 
who can gather a community around a common meaning. Strikingly however, in their 
curriculum, the authors do not distinguish communicative from revelatory views of 
language and do not thematise or even explicitly mention a central aspect of 
Heideggerian philosophy of which they have made lengthy treatments elsewhere. Yet 
this aspect is essential not only to the remedy that they are proposing but also to a fully 
worked out account of how anyone makes sense of a world at all, how worlds and 
selves hang together, and of how worlds change and new worlds become meaningful.  
This unthought element of the interplay between moods, gods and truth was 
suggested by a passage that captured my attention when I first read the book and that 
stayed with me as I re-read and discussed it with its authors. In the last three pages of 
the “entrepreneurial” chapter, Spinosa, Flores and Dreyfus write of the “truth” of an 
anomaly that overturns the common sense. The following passages abound with the 
expressive, charged and emancipatory language of “captivation”, “joy”, “complete 
absorption”, “curiosity”, “reflective thinking”, “heightened sensitivity”, “intensity”, 
“involvement”, “irresistibility”, “scrupulousness” in which “the world comes to look 
different” as this “truth comes out” (Spinosa, Flores & Dreyfus, 1997, pp.66-67). 
Elsewhere, in their various writings on technology, works of art as preservers and 
transformers of truth, on living gods, on practices, even on the loss of meaning in 
contemporary life, Dreyfus and his co-authors have developed a central role for moods, 
as the divine harbingers and carriers of the truth a style. As we saw in Chapter 3, divine 
moods disclose different styles – Aphrodite’s erotic and Ares’ martial moods, classical 
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Greek astonishment at Athenian theory, modernism’s twin moods of doubt and 
certainty, and technology's mood of bored busyness. The many different moods or 
divinities are themselves only particular messengers from a less specific Godhead, that 
which sends being in any variety at all (Heidegger, 2012b, p.15). In the latest 
Heideggerian research, the Godhead or last god is that indeterminate sender of the 
whole process of being gathering itself or Ereignis (Mitchell, 2015, Ch. 4). As 
described above, according to Heidegger, humans live life at its best when they dwell 
in a so-called fourfold dance between their mortal selves and the divinities to open an 
intelligible world of practices (sky) from out of the meaningful background 
understanding (earth). In poetic terms, if we leave out an account of moods, we banish 
the Godhead and all its messengerial divinities and we close off the possibility of 
dwelling. As we saw in Chapter 3, each of the epochs of the Machenschaft is attuned 
by its own grounding mood. However, there is a particular set of moods that Heidegger 
named as presaging a turn away from the Machenschaft. 
My reading of Disclosing New Worlds shows how, to the extent that book works 
as a work of art or a thing thinging to gather a meaningful world, these distinctive 
moods play a central, though only implicit and unthought, role. In Heidegger’s post-
metaphysical thinking, the truest entity is the thing that reveals a dynamic tension with 
a contextual background and that invites one to think. The invitational, philosophical 
style of the book, its imagery, rhythm, structure and syntax evoke certain moods 
particular to the later Heideggerian notion of Gelassenheit or releasement towards 
things. There is the abyssal feeling of shock and startled dismay that comes when the 
easily recognisable, habitual styles of world-picturing and agility are brought out from 
the background, placed in front of the reader and named and contextualised as only two 
among many possible styles rather than as natural and universal ways that things are. 
211 of 334 
There is the restraint that can be experienced in the authors’ initial invitation to 
consider the authors’ distinctions against the reader’s own experience rather than the 
strident advocacy of procedural steps that disclosive managers should follow to 
succeed. And there is an overall mood of composure or diffidence that comes when a 
deep inquiry into everyday practices of management, community action and politics 
leads to an awareness of the mysterious “groundless grounds” for meaning that 
underpins human life. According to Heidegger, it is these that are the moods of the last 
god, that counters the Machenschaft by recalling to us our thrown-openness as a 
clearing and our essence as makers of meaning (Heidegger, 2012b, p.14, pp.321-330; 
Wrathall & Lambeth, 2011, Sheehan, 2015). But moods, the gods and the sacred are 
more or less completely omitted. 
Readers seeking straightforward lessons from a quick-fix management how-to 
book will find such advice elusive and suggestive at best. However, the most powerful 
lesson of the book, the role of the sacred for a meaningful life in a post-theistic age, 
lies unthought in the style of the book rather than its explicit argument. From my private 
correspondence with one of the authorsxxxv, I learned that the authors could not reach 
agreement between themselves about whether to include the religious dimension of 
moods and divinities. They also could not construct an account of the Heideggerian 
turn away from the Machenschaft and toward a new beginning or age of Ereignis or of 
the role of the last god in this turn. Heidegger contended that the potential for this turn 
away lay within the greatest Danger or technology, that the eventual discovery of the 
groundlessness of agile life would startle a human being into a restrained awe at the 
sending of being and at its role as the discloser of meaning. In the end, the authors 
avoided it almost completely. In fact, mood receives only nine mentions in the whole 
of Disclosing New Worlds. Most of those mentions are made only in passing. There is 
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only one extended section that explicitly deals with the importance of mood, that which 
considers the mood of bitter distress in the chapter on the politics of democratic action, 
which has six of the nine mentions. From those nine mentions, three general 
observations can be made about the importance of mood to cultural innovation. The 
first of these lessons is that there is a historical general mood of detachment associated 
with the Cartesian modern way of making sense in which we see ourselves living life 
well when we can be objective, separated from our subjective passionsxxxvi. The second 
observation is that there is a contrasting entrepreneurial mood of captivation, a “joyful 
personal involvement”, that is necessary if an entrepreneur is to hold on to 
disharmonies or surprises that they might otherwise ignore or let drop, bring that 
disharmony to bear in the different domains of their life “so that its truth comes out”, 
and be able to listen to others and the ways that they respond to the disharmony and the 
entrepreneurial inventions that it gives rise to in order to adjust and adapt those 
inventions to local situationsxxxvii. Finally, the third general observation, drawn from 
the cross-appropriation chapter that is a subsidiary skill for entrepreneurship as cultural 
innovationxxxviii, is that a mood of distress (in this case, grief mixed with outrage and 
bitterness) is necessary to disclose the discrepancies between the general style at play 
in a situation and particular instances of injustices that this general understanding 
overlooks. The mood of distress mixed with a sense of some important oversight by a 
community is the motivating mood that underpins “all genuine political action” 
(Spinosa, Flores & Dreyfus, 1997, p.90). 
I argue here that these three brief observations of mood are suggestive of a more 
comprehensive but absent account of the relations between truth, mood, language, and 
the sacred that is necessary for business lives, indeed any lives, that are to avoid the 
despair and frustration commonly experienced in the modern and late-modern 
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workplace (e.g., Sennett, 2008; Crawford, 2015; Fleming, 2009; Wrathall & Lambeth, 
2011). However, the authors of Disclosing New Worlds do not develop such an account. 
I go further and argue that the authors do not lay out the most important intricacies of 
Heidegger’s different way of thinking, those aspects which he proposes are necessary 
to avoid the despair and frustration of agile life (Wrathall & Lambeth, 2011)xxxix and 
make a turning to a different way of post-Machenschaft, post-agile, fully adaptive 
thinking. It is to an elucidation of this post-agile adaptive style in a paradigmatic case 
of practice and a positive proposal towards its development that I turn in the final two 
chapters. 
The results of my reading of Disclosing New Worlds can be summarised as an 
assessment that, in its privileging of a communicative account of instrumental truth 
through communicative language-action as the adept fulfilment of propositional 
promise-keeping, and in its neglect of those fundamental moods associated with 
existential meaningfulness through expressive language and the last god, the book 
ultimately fails to avoid the same problems as agility, namely the depletion of the 
meaningfulness of contemporary life.  
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7. Paradigmatic Cases of Agile and Adaptive Practice 
In Chapters 4 and 5, I set out three paradigmatic theories of strategic 
management: the modern, world-picturing style of strategy theorised by Michael 
Porter, the technological, agile style theorised by Donald Sull, and the post-agile, proto-
adaptive style introduced by various Heideggerian scholars. I argued that, with its 
emphasis on the sacred and on austere thinking, a more developed adaptive strategic 
management could provide a remedy for agile strategy’s loss of meaningfulness and 
freedom. In this penultimate chapter, I test the theoretical contrast between agile and 
adaptive styles by turning to paradigmatic examples of each style in practice: the 
world’s largest brewer AB-InBev and one of its craft brewing competitors, The Boston 
Beer Company (BBC). I show the way that both businesses draw on the agile styles, 
but that the dominant agile strategic style of AB-InBev’s founding leader, Marcel 
Telles, covers over the sacred while the adaptive style of BBC’s Jim Koch makes it 
central to BBC’s work. As such, these are companies at which this study advocates 
strategic theorists should look. In the following chapter, I draw on my account of the 
strategic management style of the Boston Beer Company to set out an adaptive kind of 
strategy making that addresses the problem of the loss of the sacred, truth and hence 
freedom and meaningfulness in business.  
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Demonstrating the Agile and Adaptive Styles: The Case of Beer 
Beer isn’t magic; beer is process.  
(AB-InBev consultant Vicente Falconi, quoted in Hill and Daneshkhu, 2015a) 
 
Fermentation is magical and mysterious. 
(Jim Koch, Founder of Boston Beer Company, 2016, p.120) 
 
In November 2015, AB-InBev’s “DreamBig” actions suggested that its leaders 
recognised a new strategic context had emerged, one in which two radically different 
ways of being a brewer were vying for excellence. Over a twenty-year period beginning 
in Brazil, a group of financial engineers had re-engineered one brewing company after 
another to ensure cost leadership and enable it, not only to survive local market jolts, 
such as price wars, currency devaluations, and global recessions, but also to out-
perform and then acquire rivals weakened by those same jolts (Sull and Escobari 2005; 
Sull 2009). Their strategy consisted in instituting a management methodology that 
drew all aspects of the beer invention, brewing, marketing, sales, and distribution 
process into an iterative loop of improvement and adjustment to anomalies and 
instilling a culture of highly committed, flexible managers for whom the methodology 
served as the way in which to over-perform in a fast-changing environment. By 2015, 
the strategy built the cost leadership in one local market after another that enabled the 
brewer to take over local competitors, move out of Brazil to the international and global 
scale, and eventually establish itself as the largest and most profitable beer producer in 
the worldxl.  On 11 November 2015 AB-InBev lodged a formal bid of £71 billion to 
acquire its principal global rival, SABMiller. The deal was closed 11 months later on 
10 October 2016. The combined brewing operation of the two companies would 
represent 30% of global brewing capacity and over half the industry’s profits. Analysts 
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projected the merger would result in cost synergies valued at just under 16% of SAB’s 
sales or $2.45 billion from savings in head office, procurement, brewing and 
distribution costs. In the same month in the US, AB-InBev also announced an incentive 
plan to consolidate its powerful market share among independent beer distributors and 
thereby reverse its declining share of supermarket sales. Repeating a strategic 
manoeuvre its managers had first honed when establishing Companhia Cervejaria 
Brahma as the leader of the Brazilian beer market, on the terms of the voluntary 
incentive plan, AB-InBev would reimburse over half of a distributors’ marketing 
support costs in return for the distributors agreeing to stock 95% share of their capacity 
with AB-InBev products (Sull & Escobari, 2005, pp. 84-86; Philpott, 2015).  
However, over a five-day period in Winter 2015, AB-InBev’s announcement 
of its acquisition-led entry in to the craft brewing marketplace and its subsequent 
hands-off approach to managing these craft brewers also suggested a recognition that 
competition was changing in a way mysterious to its financial engineer founders. On 
18 December, it announced the acquisition of Arizona-based Four Peaks Brewing. It 
followed this on 21 December with the acquisition of UK-based Camden Town 
Brewery and, on 22 December, with the acquisition of the brands and brewing assets 
of the independent Breckenridge Brewery of Colorado.  
AB-InBev did not acquire SABMiller nor introduce the incentive plan because 
of its fierce competition with SABMiller but because of its dominance. These moves 
are better seen as demonstrations that it had already won the battle for cost efficiency 
and market power and was now simply driving home its advantage. Even its launch of 
a disruptive innovation unit was a sign of “more of the same” preoccupied, as it appears 
to be, with data, efficiency and standards, and, consonant with AB-InBev’s style, led 
by a graduate in financial economics xli . Even its recently described beer mastery 
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certification programme emphasises quantification and standardisationxlii. Rather the 
acquisition of the craft brewers showed AB-InBev seeking a better platform for using 
its agile capacities to take on its most dangerous competitors.  
Over the last decade, both AB-InBev and SABMiller lost US market share to 
small-scale craft brewers. Craft brewers strive not purely for scale but in order to 
establish a community of fervent aficionados of their brew. Over a twenty-year period, 
AB-InBev had consolidated many of the world’s most famous beer brands including 
Stella Artois, Beck’s and Budweiser, re-located the brewing of these brands to be close 
to US consumer markets, introduced standardised and continuously improved 
manufacturing processes to reduce costs and ensure consistency, and invested heavily 
in marketing techniques to create brand associations among consumers. These efforts 
made them far more efficient producers with a dominant share of the biggest markets 
in the world, and quadrupled the company’s share price in the four years following AB-
InBev’s creation. Yet despite its significant brand presence and process efficiencies, 
AB-InBev had lost share in their mature Western markets to smaller craft beer brands. 
While the two big US brewers AB-InBev and Miller-Coors still control around three-
quarters of beer volumes in the US, since the 1980s, small craft beer companies, the 
US equivalent to UK “real ale” brewers, have made dramatic inroads into the so-called 
Big Beer’s markets. While Big Beer’s share of the total US alcoholic drinks market has 
declined almost 10% over a fifteen-year period, craft beer’s share has grown. In 2011 
alone, total beer sales fell by 1.3% by volume in the US while craft beer sales were up 
13% xliii . On the whole, beer drinkers are turning away from mass-produced and 
additive-rich beers supported by massive but gimmicky advertising campaigns in 
favour of niche, fresh beers. And, year after year, the leader in the craft beer industry, 
The Boston Beer Company and its flagship brand Sam Adams has taken share from 
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Big Beer. As we will see, The Boston Beer Company draws on its founder Jim Koch’s 
180 year-long family commitment to making what he calls “challenging beers”. Koch 
(pronounced “Cook”) rejects orthodox marketing approaches by professionals in 
favour of personal and deep involvement in recipe-making and brewing, management 
of carefully chosen contract manufacturers and suppliers of raw materials, and 
particularly the face-to-face pedagogical selling of purer, fresher and more complex 
beers to bar staff. It is while talking with bartenders as they pour and taste the complex 
beers that Boston’s staff can see what beer means to its customers and how they can 
innovate in ways that matter to this community and draw it closer to the deep pleasures 
of drinking challenging beer. Boston Beer grows sales primarily by encouraging 
bartenders to talk about the beer to their clients. At first, just as in the UK real ale won 
back the aficionados, so it was for the US. Big Beer more or less sniffed at craft beers’ 
first efforts and ignored them. But the bartender conversation has paid off. Craft beer 
has begun to take share in the mass rather than specialist consumer markets. Today, 
consumers first learn of a beer at the bar and then later purchase it in larger quantities 
at the supermarket for drinking at home. While craft beers charge consumers up to two-
thirds more than Big Beer for every drink they generate intense customer loyalty to 
beers that taste better and that mean more to consumers.  
Craft brewers have been so successful that the craft-brewers’ trade body, The 
Brewer’s Association, has raised volume restrictions for inclusion as a craft beer 
producer from two million barrels per year to six million. And as described, Big Beer 
has begun to fight back and launched so-called “crafty” beers that looked like craft 
beers but lacked their small scale and craft-oriented style and, for all the reach and 
persuasion of their advertising campaigns and marketing gloss, could not manifest the 
deep traditions, community spirit and authentic craft of the real craft beers. 
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Consequently, AB-InBev sought the acquisitions and incentive plan to reduce prices 
even further for their mass-produced brews but also began developing their own craft 
beer range while flexing their marketing muscle to push the independent craft beers off 
the supermarkets’ shelves. In short, AB-InBev is pushing its agile market manoeuvring 
and cost-cutting to the limit. 
This contrast between the dominant and the emerging way of being a brewer 
demonstrates the clearly different ways of coping with technology described in Chapter 
3 and, I contend, characterises a shift away from a nihilistic capitalism towards a form 
of economic organising that is both more meaningful and freer. 
  
220 of 334 
AB-InBev: Master of the Agile Style 
AB-InBev, owner of leading beer brands including Budweiser, Beck’s and 
Stella Artois, excels at an agile style of strategic management. A style briefly defined, 
is the most basic understanding of “what counts as a thing, what counts as true/false, 
and what it makes sense to do” of a particular time and situation (Dreyfus, 1996, p.4). 
In Chapter 3 we articulated the styles of different epochs by setting out their most real 
entity, the attitudinal aspects that most lucidly reveal the truth or falsity of any entity, 
and the paradigmatic activity that reveals truth. In the following section, I draw on 
several different sources, including personal accounts of AB-InBev’s long-term 
consulting partner, to describe how it exemplifies the agile style. In the subsequent 
section, I contrast AB-InBev’s agile approach with the style of The Boston Beer 
Company, which I contend exemplifies a new post-nihilistic style. 
In the agile style, all entities, whether people, products, equipment, 
conversations or occasions, appear as flexible options or resources and the material 
aspect of a thing, which best allows one to unlock its truth, is the feature. By feature, I 
do not refer to any feature in particular but to the feature per se. A feature of an entity 
can be distinguished, named and evaluated. Furthermore, a feature can be volatilised, 
considered as an option, and reconfigured for the satisfaction of a human desire or 
whim.  
In customer management for instance, AB-InBev managers break down every 
part of the customer’s world of beer-drinking into modularised options that can be 
optimised for various kinds of quantifiable performance.  
Continual innovation and renovation are essential to our efforts to keep our brands 
fresh and relevant in the minds of our consumers through initiatives such as new 
liquids, line extensions, creative approaches to brand identity and packaging, and 
new marketing and trade concepts. In this manner, we continually refresh the interest 
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of existing consumers, and extend the reach of our brands to new consumers and 
consumption occasionsxliv. 
 
AB-InBev strips out climactic, seasonal and geological variations, indeed even 
actual craftsmen, fruit and vegetables, from its standardised production of drinks. It 
invents cidres that are not true ciders, ingenious line extensions like fruit beers, and 
novelty pouring devices and containers like bottles that play music like a record. In 
AB-InBev’s agile brewing firm, beer becomes “new liquids”, which comprise bundles 
of tastes, gassiness, nutritional qualities and quantity formats, each of which are to be 
optimised for novelty in pursuit of short-term sales volume boosts and higher margins. 
Thus, the exemplary agile brewer invents fruit beers such as Cran-brrr-itas. Packaging 
also becomes the focus of invention for enticing customers and delivering micro-thrills 
as they drink. The Budweiser “bowtie” beer-can is shaped to echo the Budweiser logo 
but holds less beer than a standard container. Similarly, the Beck’s Edison bottle can 
be played like a record, if you have an Edison cylinder player to hand.  
Beer drinkers and their beer consumption also become resources. For AB-
InBev, drinkers have become “consumers” and “fans”, their gestures co-opted and their 
financial value quantified, and AB-InBev practices improved to continually optimise 
their financial value.  
For instance, consider AB-InBev’s approach to social media marketing in 
which its marketing officers target a beer drinker’s devotion to a beer in order to drive 
up the financial value of its marketing efforts: 
The financial value of a fan who has chosen to engage, compared with a consumer 
who has not, is a figure that [AB-InBev’s Chief Marketing Officer] Burggraeve 
claims to have quantified, though he doesn’t reveal it. He knows why he wants fans, 
and last year devoted 18% of his budget to attracting and connecting with them. 
Indeed, some of AB-InBev’s local brands are now marketed almost exclusively 
through social media. 
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“Fans are our brand ambassadors. If you take our 30 million fans, the influence and 
amplification potential is huge,” Burggraeve saysxlv. 
 
However, contemporary AB-InBev’s co-optation of human behaviour for 
financial gain can be traced in Brahma’s earliest marketing efforts to defeat its main 
competitor Antarctica and the way that beer drinkers’ ordinary gestures were co-opted 
as resources: 
He carried out a survey to find out how Brazilians generally ordered beer in bars. 
The customers’ responses were videoed and Fischer [the brand marketing 
consultant] studied them. It revealed that a large number of them raised their index 
finger to show waiters they wanted “another cold beer”. It was a simple direct 
gesture, recognised nationally. That finding gave Fischer the origin of a slogan for 
his new client: Brahma was now “Number 1.” 
(Correa, 2013, p.182)  
 
Figure 1: Brahma beer can in Brazilian football colours and displaying index 
finger “Numero 1” gesture. Downloaded 17 October 2016 from 
http://www.blogsoestado.com/danielmatos/files/2014/10/brahma.jpg. 
 
The nationally-recognised raised index finger signifying “another beer please” 
was co-opted to signify “Brahma beer is Number 1” and subsequently run through 
guerrilla marketing campaigns involving celebrities and crowds raising their index 
finger in front of the press’s cameras at major sporting and cultural events and thus 
undermining Antarctica’s more conventional advertising strategies.  
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To AB-InBev, all human beings whether celebrities, communities, or its own 
relatives, and employees are to be re-shaped and, revealing the pervasiveness of the 
style, re-shape themselves better to be able to play changing roles in this optimisation 
and to accumulate power. Celebrities and musicians, whether in the early days of 
Brazil’s popular musical movement MPB or contemporary global artists like Jay-Z, 
Justin Timberlake, and Avicii, rent out their identities and their index fingers to AB-
InBev to endorse its products in theatrical advertisements that facilitate the co-optation 
of their identities by consumers.  
[Chibe] has put a premium on music-themed marketing, signing up artists like Jay 
Z and Justin Timberlake, as the brewer seeks to appeal to millennials with more 
aspirational ads and fewer frat-boy pranksxlvi . 
 
As we saw, cultural events, music festivals, sports events, and community fairs 
provide new occasions for raising awareness or sampling AB-InBev products in return 
for AB-InBev’s sponsorship and co-branding. However, every human being at such an 
event is considered a resource for optionalisation. For instance, when giving his reasons 
for refusing his own cousin’s entry to Brahma’s VIP lounge at the Rio Carnival festival, 
Lemann said,  
“This is a business. The invitations are for those who help me gain money, famous 
people and beautiful women. In what category are you?” 
(Correa, 2013, pp.182-183) 
 
And, of course, employees themselves are resources competing against each 
other to meet promises in games of performance and to become ever more flexible and 
productive performers. Any employee’s commitment to their particular profession as a 
craft in itself will be willingly jettisoned if the situation calls for them to play another 
role and take a different identity. 
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We human beings can get used to anything. 
(Falconi, 2010, p.157) 
Individuals in a company should be constantly challenged to seek new knowledge, 
and this is done by setting goals or changing people’s positions so as to make them 
feel uncomfortable. 
(Falconi, 2010, p.169) 
You will probably have to spend less time with your family than many people are 
used to but, on the other hand, you will have another kind of benefit. You will be 
looking after your future. You will earn a lot of money and your life will change. 
That’s what happened to those who chose the company’s style. Everybody gained a 
lot of money in this business.  
(Correa, 2013, p.204) 
 
Finally, time itself is optionalised. For instance, the consumer’s day is broken 
up into consumption occasions or thinking-about-consumption occasions for the 
purposes of optimising liquid sales. On this view, the lives of beer drinkers are to be 
divided up into quarter-hour segments, each of which becomes the focus of invention 
of reasons for thinking of an AB-InBev brand or consuming an AB-InBev beverage. 
Everything that I am running on air is an ad that has been tested and qualified to 
drive purchase intent and persuasion," [said Paul Chibe, VP for U.S. Marketing at 
AB-InBev]xlvii. 
 
In the preceding passages, I have focused on the product and customer process 
to illustrate how AB-InBev everything is a portfolio of options with a constantly 
reconfigured, tracked and optimised financial value. 
If the truest entity for the agile brewer is the co-opted feature, the truest attitude 
and paradigmatic activity that reveals the truth of an entity, the “epicenter of the 
company’s strategy” (Zook & Allen, 2012), is the wilful management attitude that 
continually draws those features into an iterative system of information in order to 
constantly simplify and stabilise a chaotic reality into productivity. AB-InBev has 
developed such an iterative overall method and refined it into three specific methods 
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for customer relationships (WCCP: World Class Customer Processes), brewing (VPO: 
Voyager Plant Optimisation), and financial management (ZBB: Zero-Based 
Budgeting).  
“Marcel (Telles, former CEO AB-InBev) likes to use the expression ‘one trick pony’ 
to explain what we do… We have one ‘trick’, which is to put in good people and our 
management system to change a company’s results.” 
(Alexandre Behring, Garantia Partners, In Correa, 2013, p.171) 
This work stresses the importance of understanding the meaning of Management 
Method and System … There aren’t various methods for achieving goals. There is 
only one: The Cartesian Method… since the Management System is based on one 
method, there is only one such system... Few people understand systems. 
(Vicente Falconi, Board Director and inventor of AB-InBev’s management system. 
Falconi, 2010, p.11) 
 
In Falconi’s description, the method of breaking down any entity into options, 
evaluating them, and making them available for productivity becomes especially clear. 
In each routine, the complex domains of customer management, brewing, and 
budgeting are broken down into specific “packages” each assigned a global and a local 
owner who are tasked with devising an iterative measurement and management 
processxlviii, agreeing transparent current baseline and promised performance goals, 
identifying best practices to close performance gaps and fulfil improvement promises, 
and communicating progress globally.  
AB-InBev’s current strategic thinking style can be glimpsed in its leaders’ 
educational experiences and their earliest methods for running Companhia Cervejaria 
Brahma. In 1989, when Garantia Bank bought a controlling share, Brahma was ailing. 
It was a close second to its nearest rival Antarctica in terms of market share but trailed 
Antarctica badly in consumer taste tests as well as in gross and operating profitability. 
However, Garantia CEO, Jorge Lemann, was sure that he could turn the business 
around and become exceptionally wealthy doing so. 
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He never liked to have a lot of money lying idle. […] Buying control of another 
company, as had occurred with Lojas Americanas, seemed the ideal solution. 
Deciding which company would be the target of another acquisition was another of 
his favorite exercises. The pulp and paper producer Aracruz, for example, was one 
of the companies he tried to buy, but the negotiations did not work out in the end. 
Another company had also caught his eye for some time, the brewer Brahma. 
(Correa, 2011, p.120) 
His absolute confidence had nothing to do with any sixth sense or anything like that. 
Lemann sees himself as a many without any kind of intuition. He relies mainly on 
good sense, a view of the future and simple thinking in taking decisions. The 
argument he used to convince Haddad [Garantia’s senior economist] that the 
acquisition made great sense was as follows:  
“Tropical country, hot climate, good brand, young population and poor 
management… OK, that gives us everything we need to transform it into something 
great,” he said. […] I was looking at Latin America and who was the richest guy in 
Venezuela? A brewer. The richest guy in Colombia? A brewer. The richest guy in 
Argentina? A brewer. These guys can’t all be geniuses…it’s the business that must 
be good.” 
(Jorge Lemann quoted in Correa, 2011, p.124) 
 
Lemann, was the scion of a wealthy Brazilian family of Swiss origin. After an 
early career as a world-class tennis player, Lemann attended Harvard. For several 
reasons, Lemann found Harvard an unpleasant educational experience and resolved to 
graduate as fast as possible. His solution for achieving this result suggests AB-InBev’s 
future style that emphasises the efficient delivery of measurable results.   
“Harvard also taught me to focus on a way of obtaining results. To finish within 
my deadline meant I had to create a system involving great focus… I always try 
and reduce everything to what is essential and this has also helped us a lot in 
forming our businesses. Most of our companies–and people–have five 
goals…Doing something simply is always better than doing it in a complicated 
way.” 
(Jorge Lemann, CEO Garantia Partners, Owner, AB-InBev. From Correa, 2011, 
p.42) 
 
Once determined to acquire Brahma, Lemann put Marcel Telles, a securities 
trader with no previous brewing, manufacturing or even significant management 
experience, in charge as CEO of a company of 25,000 employees. Telles took the 
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agility that he learned as a trader at Garantia into Brahma and dismissed its historical 
modern world-picturing, analytical strategy style in favour of a wilful, agile leadership. 
His vision of a fast moving, performance-oriented approach depended upon ambitious, 
elite business graduates who would commit to narrowly focused but dramatic goals for 
performance improvement and break down every component of the brewing world to 
make it available as a resource for vigorous management (Sull 2009, pp.173-192). 
Telles was puzzled, “What am I going to do with this mess?” he asked Falconi. 
The consultant said the answer was to establish standards for each plant activity 
and measure everything. 
(Correa, 2013, pp.140-41) 
 
Telles hired the most talented and ambitious leaders and graduates, had them 
make personal promises to out-perform in specific areas, and rewarded high 
performance generously. Each year, senior Brahma executives made three priority 
promises such as broadening distribution, re-launching a low-price brand, and 
improving productivity. Bonuses were linked to out-performance against personal and 
team objectives. Up to eighteen months’ salary and equity went to out-performers. The 
bottom 40% of performers received no bonus. As Telles said, “A bonus has to be large 
enough to truly motivate people. If you give it to everybody it won’t be big enough” 
(Sull, 2009, p.181). The performance culture created a fighting force of coloniser-
leaders, with the attitude of a “cohort of Vikings”–energetic, acquisitive adventurers 
constantly on the look-out for new market territory or operational performance 
horizons to explore and dominate (Sull, 2009, pp.182-185). The relentless, wilful “high 
performance” attitude developed first at Brahma became the basis of AB-InBev’s 
business culture as Brahma overtook and then acquired Antarctica to form AmBev in 
Brazil, then Belgian brewing group Interbrew owner of the Stella Artois brand, and 
then Anheuser-Busch owner of Budweiser to form AB-InBev, each time implementing 
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its cultural system. New recruits to AB-InBev are all hired for this attitude and 
indoctrinated into an iterative method of performance improvement based upon a 
totalising system of information and then, as they progress through different parts of 
the organisation, producing masters of the method over five to seven years.  
“AmBev’s experience in Brazil has shown it takes five to seven years to have a good 
human resources system functioning satisfactorily and for the first wisely recruited 
and well-trained exceptional elements to reach a high managerial level”  
(Falconi, 2010, p.49) 
 
The system itself was devised by Brazilian consultant and management 
professor, an engineer by education, Vicente Falconi. Falconi has described the method 
in detail in two books with multiple illustrations drawn from AB-InBev (Falconi, 2010, 
2011).  
The systems method that Falconi describes, though he erroneously attributes it 
to the thinking of Descartes and neglects Nietzsche’s later development of recurrence 
of the same and its Japanese cultural inflection, is based upon the familiar Toyota 
Management System and its Plan-Do-Check-Act cycle (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: PDCA Method (Falconi, 2010, p.53) 
 
Plan
DoCheck
Act
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In an important sign of the kind of underlying nihilistic thinking that levels all 
meaningful differences, the iterative method translates all other concerns and sources 
of value into a single fungible measure–financial value. As Falconi writes, “financial 
indicators allow us to translate all the other objectives into a single measurement unit, 
which gives us the opportunity to compare them and to identify priorities more clearly. 
[…] I am convinced that financials are foremost, not only for companies but also for 
governments and even for churches. Nothing exists without financial resources, which 
are human labor’s means of exchange” (Falconi 2010, pp. 20-21).  
Financial value is deployed through the method both to improve the 
organization’s operations on a day-to-day basis and to improve the entire system of 
operations in order to pick up and deal with recurrent anomalous issues that the current 
system fails to address (See Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3: Model of the PDCA Method (Falconi, 2010, p.55) 
 
The iterative PDCA method is then institutionalised throughout an organisation 
to draw all people and their activities to set strategic mission, strategic policy, 
innovation and operational work management into a cycle that picks up and addresses 
anomalies in order to improve the system’s performance for the sake of excellence in 
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generating long and short-term financial value. As Falconi writes, “Everything in this 
world is a system or part of a system” (Falconi, 2010, p.55) (Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4: Model for the PDCA Method Used for Operating and Improving an 
Organization, (Based on Falconi, 2010, p.57) 
 
Today, this method remains in place and performance goals or promises are still 
made public. Everyone, including its most senior executives, visibly posts his or her 
performance against their personal commitments. 
On a wall outside the brewery's control room, a board tracks every worker's 
performance on a specific indicator he has chosen to improve. “There will always 
be people who don't like it, especially the ones who were just entitled to be there for 
historical reasons, the ones who were not performing,” says Luiz Edmond, chief of 
AB. “Our processes, our systems, do not allow that. They do not allow you to hide 
in a nice room, stay for the whole day. No.”xlix 
 
These commitments are generally quantitative, not simply because of a 
preference for the hard over soft, but because quantitative assessments change much 
more frequently and so reveal more opportunities for innovationl.  
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Examining a complicated printout that shows one rep's sales goals for the week, [AB 
InBev CEO Carlos] Brito says, “This is very much our company, this sheet. We like 
metrics, tons of numbers.”li 
 
 Is the use of the agility loop really strategy? Businesses that employ the agility 
loop make a strategy out of exploiting opportunities. Their competitive advantage is 
that they time and execute their pursuit of opportunities better (not just faster) than their 
competitors. Hence, although they seem like pure opportunists, they have speed as a 
durable competitive advantage. Each of the strategic changes Telles and his successors 
have made–all the consumer inventions, factory and process improvements, the 
distribution network, and so forth–conferred minor benefits but collectively, over the 
course of a decade, they made the company four times more valuable than its closest 
rival Antarctica and positioned it for the global consolidation that was on the horizon. 
The mergers with the European brewer Interbrew and North American Anheuser-
Busch, built upon the cash generated by their performance, were timed in part to 
continue to offer further opportunities for all these high-performing managers to 
continue to make their name and develop their personal wealth within the company. 
Brahma’s pre-eminent success and the role of the iterative method and performance 
culture in securing that success can be verified by the fact that, after the merger 
campaign, Brazilian executives took chairman, CEO and 90% of the senior executive 
roles in the newly formed AB-InBev. Today, under Telles’ successor Carlos Brito, the 
method and culture have been continued and extended to leave AB-InBev 40 percent 
larger than its closest brewing competitor and the low-cost producer in most of the 
markets in which it operates (Zook & Allen, 2012, p.101).  
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Demonstrating the Adaptive Style: The Case of Boston Beer 
The “magic” of brewing thus doesn’t just happen; you need to create the right 
conditions first. […] Fermentation is magical and mysterious. 
(Jim Koch, Founder of Boston Beer Company, 2016, p.12, p.120) 
 
So, is there a limit to such a perfectly flexible system? For a hint of the 
limitation of the system, compare AB-InBev’s ingenious liquids and dramatized 
drinking occasions with drinking a locally brewed real ale with friends after a hard 
day’s work. If AB-InBev succeeds by eliminating magic from brewing and replacing 
it with iterative method, The Boston Beer Company has succeeded by returning magic 
to its centre. In the former, the production of the drink is concealed, the drink itself 
transformed into a device for delivering alcoholic liquid refreshment, and the drinker’s 
enjoyment relieved of any demand for engagement, discernment, and skill. In the latter, 
complex beer is a thing that engages skilful drinkers in a meaningful practice that 
enhances their gustatory skills and discernment and embeds the drinker in a 
community, a landscape and a tradition. The problem with the agile style is not that it 
is too inventive. Mine is not an argument from nostalgia. The problem with the agile 
style is that its invention ignores the mystery of beer and of beer drinking (or any other 
product or thing at all) as essential to meaningfulness at all, and the wonder felt at the 
recognition that it is one’s own sense-making skills, one’s own history and locality, 
and one’s relationships with a community of drinkers, brewers and hop farmers that 
ground all and any meanings. It is as though an abstract belief in an unlimited power 
to make anything at all matter has temporarily displaced the reality that some things 
actually matter more than others. Therefore, the agile style tends towards absurdity, a 
confrontation with the nothingness – no roots in traditions, skills, communities, or 
materials – that can disorientate all meaning and identity. In the face of such absurdity, 
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one faces a choice. One can either attempt to posit new meanings and values that 
reinvent a commodity over and over again in further attempts to stabilise oneself and 
the world. But in the name of what would one attempt this? Nothing that matters! Or 
one can be jolted into a resolve to take over and make one’s own an existing thing and 
its supporting practice that, at the same time, preserves and transforms an already 
existing culture and identity. To help us better understand the distinction, we can look 
to the difference drawn by Heideggerian philosopher Albert Borgmann between 
devices supplying commodities and focal practices guarding things. 
Commodities, in comparison with focal things, are highly reduced entities and 
abstract in the sense that within the overall framework of technology they are free 
of local and historical ties. Thus they are sharply defined and easily measured. Focal 
things, on the other hand, engage us in so many and subtle ways that no 
quantification can capture them. As with social phenomena, it is not the case that 
things are imbued with mysterious unquantifiable properties. Rather their 
significance is composed of so many, if not all, of their physically ascertainable 
properties that an explicit quantitative account must always impoverish them greatly.  
(Borgmann, 1987, p.81) 
 
I have argued that the attempt to posit values leads to an infinite regress and 
endless turbulence that becomes literally unendurable. However, another style of 
managing, which I have been calling adaptive, is being borne of this confrontation with 
absurdity and nothingness. Adaptive management simultaneously preserves and 
transforms meaningfulness by focusing on a simple thing and cultivating the practices 
that preserve the depth and integrity of that thing and its meanings. The thing that 
gathers meaningfulness is termed a focal thing and its supporting practices, focal 
practices. This adaptive management of focal things is already being pursued by 
companies. At present, it is being adopted mostly by smaller companies though one 
need not be small to adopt it. Patagonia, Illy, Interface, and Whole Foods Market 
adopted it. One might argue that Disney adopted it. Many other well-known companies 
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have either preserved it or turned to it. But, to stick with beer, I will set out this strategy 
by turning to craft brewer The Boston Beer Company (BBC), which has successfully 
established itself as a serious competitor to America’s Big Beer brands. It has 
accomplished this by concentrating on beer as a focal thing and beer brewing and 
drinking as the focal practice that gathers what matters to its practitioners. As BBC’s 
founder Jim Koch writes,  
Done right, business is a noble pursuit well worth our energy and passion. In 
business, you have to create value for other people before you can capture any value 
for yourself. […]  When I launched The Boston Beer Company, I knew what I 
wanted: freedom, personal growth, connectedness with others, and to do something 
that mattered, [at] least to me. […] I’ve had a chance to give the world something 
simple that matters to me: a better glass of beer.  
(Koch, 2016, p. 386-87)  
 
In the adaptive style, the truest entity is the focal thing. The focal thing offers 
deeply resonant and manifold meanings as well as the promise of further, still-
concealed meanings. This rich and fertile meaningfulness, which is borne by its 
interconnection with a deep, material and historical moral context, can be opposed to 
the shallow, explicit, and narrowing meanings of a commodity cut off from its moral 
context (Borgmann, 1987). The Boston Beer Company’s focal thing is beer. It offers 
what it calls “challenging” craft beers, such as their original Sam Adams, to compete 
with the simplistic and codified associations and meanings of a Big Beer commodity 
such as Budweiser. Discovering and choosing the truth of one’s focal thing involves, 
not so much analysis aimed at certainty nor creative wilfulness, but rather the letting 
go of certainty and an attitude of tuning in to anomalies that are there already. In the 
mid-1980s, when he was in his mid-thirties, married, and a father to two small children, 
Jim Koch recognised that while he was successful his work was not meaningful, he 
liked his job as a management consultant but he did not “love it” (Koch, 2016, p.9). 
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Koch resolved to start a new life and began to consider ways he could run his own 
business in order to find something that mattered to him. Drawing on his own 
experience of starting again, when he dropped out of an elite Harvard graduate degree 
to take up a life as an Outward Bound wilderness instructor, Koch was not perturbed 
by the prospect of failing in order to find his “true self” (Ibid, p.12).  Importantly, Koch 
recognised the crucial role of mood and of an openness to mystery in the discovery of 
one’s focal thing.   
Business ideas are like radio signals. They’re out there, and in fact, they surround 
us. The trick is to turn your receiver on so you can tune in. Once my receiver was 
turned on, I was almost overwhelmed with possibilities, opportunities, and ideas 
(p.15).  […] When I read Thomas Kuhn’s writings on such ‘paradigm shifts,’ it 
struck me that we only think we know what we know, and that most of our 
assumptions at any point in time are wrong and will be revised (p.19). […] Most 
[consultants] looked and saw the general rule, but I liked to observe and wonder at 
the weirdness of the outliers. Everybody already knew the general rule–that’s why 
it was the general rule (p. 20). […] Even if the solution to a problem didn’t come to 
me immediately, I knew that if I hung in there, I would find it. I just needed to be in 
the right frame of mind to see it. Doing something you love isn’t the only reason to 
start a new life. You could also do it to find out what you love, or to prevent yourself 
from moving too far down a track you suspect isn’t for you (p.11).  
(Koch, 2016, pp. 11-20)  
 
In contrast to the aggressively calculating and controlling mood of the agile 
style, Jim Koch’s style is attuned by a mood of composure or Gelassenheit, which as 
we saw in Chapter 3 is a simultaneous saying “yes” and “no”. It is the mood of 
composure that opens actors, in this case brewers, bar-tenders and beer drinkers, to the 
mystery that a particular beer means so much to them and of how the brewing and 
drinking practices make possible and hold open these meanings but ultimately lie 
outside of their control. Despite its explicit sales zeal, Koch’s own description serves 
to demonstrate why beer as a focal thing, rather than a commodity, can still draw on 
scientific, even technological, thinking while escaping being defined by such narrow 
thinking. For a thing, there is always a mysterious remainder. The beer reveals ever 
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more of itself and unlike AB-InBev is not completely consistent. Koch’s descriptions 
reach, through language, to reveal more and more of these phenomena, more and more 
of the real, and, in his reference to “alchemy”, even a hint towards the mystery, but the 
overall impression is that neither can be exhausted. 
I love watching it come out of the tap. I love the thick, muffled sound of the liquid 
cascading into the glass. There’s this alchemy of physics, chemistry, and 
mathematics–the dynamics of bubbles and aromas. As I look at the glass, I notice a 
slight, veil-like haze in the liquid comprised of proteins from the malt. The color is 
amber, with overtones of golds and reds, almost like looking into a candle flame. 
The aroma is slightly floral, sometimes a dab of red fruit like cherry or raspberry. 
That first sip wakes up my palate, leading to a three- or four-second parade of the 
body and sweetness from the malt, followed by spiciness and nuanced bitterness 
from the hops–not sweet like white sugar, but like caramel, biscuit, toffee with just 
a slight roasted note. And then that noble hop aroma and taste with pine, grapefruit, 
and softer fruits like orange and tangerine, followed by a lingering bitterness at the 
end that brewers call the “hop signature” of the beer. 
I’ve related on television and radio what I taste when I drink Samuel Adams Boston 
Lager, and the hosts sometimes think I’m crazy going on and on like that about beer? 
Am I overdramatizing it? Actually, I’m not. […] After so many years and all the 
beers I’ve tasted, Samuel Adams Boston Lager just never gets old for me. 
(Koch, 2016, pp. 40-41) 
 
Codify, simplify and, eventually, reduce the beer and its brewing into just those 
features that can be manipulated to maximise options for productivity and the 
meaningfulness dissolves. Indeed, ultimately, our paradigmatic case shows that a thing, 
in this case craft beer, is centrally important compared to a commodity, because it opens 
and preserves a connection to divinity, as an ultimately mysterious origin of meaning.  
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Koch himself cites poet Nikki Giovanni’s poem praising the sacredness of 
Utopia, one of The Boston Beer Company’s beers, 
And now that I’ve found Utopia, I am at peace.  
I have Utopia, and if I were Egyptian I would be buried with it.  
I use it to start conversations and make friends.  
It is not for mortals. Or Americans. Utopia is for the gods.  
(Giovanni, 2013, p.3) 
 
In the early days of The Boston Beer Company, Koch sensed that, while beer 
was not yet a focal thing, it could become one.  
It’s not like I had always been obsessed with beer. Sure, beer was a fairly strong 
presence in our family life when I was growing up; I visited breweries with my father 
on many occasions and, in keeping with our German heritage, we kids were 
sometimes given a little beer with dinner. But that didn’t translate automatically into 
an irresistible business idea.  
(Koch, 2016, p.15) 
 
Koch’s father drew his attention to the partial success that Fritz Maytag, of the 
washing machine family company Maytag, had had with a small-scale brewery in 
California. Koch’s father also helped his son think through his early business plans, 
donated the family archive of brewing recipes going back to 16th century Germany, and 
was an early investor in the small start-up. Gradually, beer and brewing began to gather 
into a thing that Koch loved and that mattered to him. We have already seen the 
importance Koch places on adopting the appropriate “tuning in” attitude of a 
practitioner to the revelation of important truths and meaningfulness and yet, at the 
same time, the preservation the mystery of a beer. An account of BBC’s focal practices 
will reveal that Heidegger’s description of dwelling, as the way that things gather and 
transform meaningfulness, characterises well the way that BBC’s focal practices work 
238 of 334 
to preserve the depth and integrity of a beer by maintaining a connection and tension 
with a background context.  
From his earliest conversations with his father about brewing history, Koch was 
aware of the importance of history, setting, provenance, and skills to bringing out the 
meaningfulness of beer. With regard to the practice of brewing, the first recipe that 
Koch brewed up adhered to German purity laws dating from 1516, its recipes depended 
upon so-called noble hops supplied by a German farmer Peter Barth whose farm had 
existed since 1792, and it drew on traditional brewing methods like kräusening, 
decoction mashing, and dry hopping. Just as AB-InBev built a business culture on the 
thinking of a guru, engineering professor-turned-consultant Vicente Falconi, so Koch 
also found a scientifically-educated professor and built a business around his insights. 
However, in BBC’s case, the foundational professor was also an expert in beer. Joe 
Owades, who died in 2005, had a PhD in Biochemistry but he was also a brewmaster 
with decades of industry experience brewing beer and inventing recipes. Koch 
collaborated with Owades to develop the original BBC beer, which was to become Sam 
Adams Boston Lager. Unlike AB-InBev’s collaboration with Falconi, their work did 
not begin by nullifying the traditional practices, the “magic,” of the existing craft 
brewmasters. Instead, Koch and Owades experimented with both traditional and 
contemporary methods, contracting with established breweries to brew their beer in 
small batches, and adapting fermentation equipment to allow for older methods like 
decoction mashing. While Koch retained and still brought to bear his process 
consulting skills to raise efficiency and profits. 
Sixty-five percent of revenue went into the cost of the packaged beer, and my other 
costs were about 25 percent, so there was 10 percent left.  
I decided to look at every place we spent money. I found money everywhere! It was 
like opening all the drawers in your house and finding a pile of cash in every one. 
Occasionally, it was as simple as asking for a lower price. Usually, it required that I 
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be a better customer. For example, I had sixty-day terms with our contract brewery 
because I needed extra time to pay, but once we were profitable, I asked for and got 
a 5 percent lower price by paying in five days. I found a way to use lighter-weight 
bottles of equal strength, and that saved 15 percent on bottles. We got our 
wholesalers to contribute twenty-five cents a case to help support the salespeople we 
put in their market. The list went on and on, and a year later we were making twenty 
cents on every dollar of sales. (p. 65) […] We figured out that on about 80 percent 
of our trucks we could fit twenty-seven pallets of beer instead of twenty-six. That 
one little change saved us four cents on a case of beer. Doesn’t sound like a lot until 
you consider that we were shipping 16 million cases every year. We’re talking 
hundreds of thousands of dollars of savings from one adjustment. In another 
instance, we saved $200,000 a year by using excess space of our trucks to ship 
coasters to distributors from our breweries rather than from our warehouses. 
(Koch, 2016, p. 65; pp. 177-178) 
 
However, these efficiency measures had their limits and Koch was clear that 
the thing and its quality must always take precedence and that the existence of a 
network of focal practitioners sustained or depleted the thing. 
Wholesalers in turn got good at playing a game I called “hide the beer,” whereby 
they found an out-of-the-way retailer and sold them beer that was about to expire at 
a discount. […] No outright deception was taking place when it came to freshness; 
rather, all of us were playing an elaborate and collective game of pretend. Pretend 
to stand for something. Pretend to care. Pretend you’re giving drinkers fresh beer. 
You see this all the time in business, most often when you’re dealing with big 
companies. […] Nobody calls out the bullshit. The result is cynical disenchantment 
throughout the system. 
(Koch, 2016, p.127) 
 
Turning to the beer drinking practice, Koch downplayed marketing in favour of 
encouraging and leading the face-to-face selling of beers to bartenders. The 
conversations in which he, and now BBC’s sales teams, engaged with bartenders 
allowed him to educate their palate to discern the particularities of a beer and enable 
the bartenders in turn to educate beer-drinkers on how to appreciate it.  These aspects 
of beer brewing and drinking each in turn show how, in contrast to agility’s 
communication of propositional truths in a system of information, dwelling works to 
disclose truth by conditioning a Heideggerian fourfold as a dynamic interplay. The 
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fourfold, introduced in Chapters 3 and 6, describes the way that a thing relationally and 
dynamically gathers and transforms meaningfulness in an interplay between mortals, 
divinities, earth and sky. In his account of dwelling and the fourfold, Heidegger 
describes how some humble entity, a thing, (he talks of a peasant jug, we will talk of 
beer) calls people (the mortals) to take up a form of life, a particular identity and 
appropriate action such as drinking a beer, against a dynamic background context of 
meaningfulness. At the same time, the beer draws upon and is conditioned by a sense 
of what is intrinsically good to this form of life–one’s ultimate concerns such as 
ecological gratitude and social conviviality in the case of beer. These ultimate concerns 
manifest as moods which, recalling the Homeric gods, act as divine messengers of the 
Godhead and call us to a form of life. The moods connect us to the mystery of the 
source of meaningfulness, an aspect lying beyond wilful human control. The simple 
beer also sensitises the drinker to the earth, the stream of time, of cultural history and 
practices, and of the particular materials, the yeasts, sun-ripened malt and hops, and 
mineralised waters that are woven in to the beer but are not present here and now. 
Finally, this particular occasion, the associations and memories that are conjured up 
and skilfully imbricated into the drinking of this beer right now (sky) enable the drinker 
to take up their place and savour the depth and integrity of the thing.  
Recalling Chapter 1 and 3’s discussion, we see how, by engaging with the 
‘tiniest spheres’ of a focal practice, an individual can generate a sensibility of the way 
that their “focal awareness” sits within a background agile style as a moral context 
conditioning Western life to treat all entities as resources or commodities. Revealing 
the agile style and holding it in tension with beer, as the deeply meaningful thing, 
prompts the drinker to take up the human’s role as a linguistic being, a maker of 
meaningful value. It is this interplay between focal thing and contextualising world that 
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allows the thing to be neither economically nor morally commoditised (Borgmann, 
2010, p. 29). Dwelling with beer allows both the thing to be “the locus of the full corona 
of liminal meanings” conditioned by the fourfold and the focal practitioner to sense 
that their “zone of focal awareness is surrounded by a corona of potentially articulable 
meanings, corridors that I might explore” (Taylor, 2016, p.95). Thus, dwelling with 
focal things and practices both preserves and meaningfully transforms truth and 
freedom by allowing the practitioner to think. Thinking, you will recall from Chapter 
3, requires that a practitioner holds a dominant style lightly and allows other marginal 
styles to become manifest. Thus, the agile style, with all its productive and creative 
benefits, can be retained and deployed appropriately alongside other, more meaningful 
and perhaps even sacred, liminal meanings that co-exist but are marginalised by 
technology. 
Koch resurrected the beer drinker’s conversation with the knowledgeable 
bartender as a focal practice that might explore these “potentially articulable meanings” 
among its drinkers. Just as we saw Koch doing in his description of a beer to radio and 
television stations, Boston Beer Company salespeople educate bartenders to educate 
their customers in the art of appreciating complex beers (Koch, 2016, Chapters 12-17). 
Koch and his subsequent salespeople would arrive at a bar equipped with ready cooled 
beers to share with a bartender. They would describe the beer’s ingredients, its hand-
selection of those ingredients, arcane brewing practices, human-based timing of the 
addition of hops to the brewing beer, and the CEO’s personal tasting of small batch 
brews and point out the contribution each practice would make to the nuances of the 
beer’s flavour. This kind of sales involves a high level of linguistic facility as a poetic 
and expressive skill–one is not simply conveying messages efficiently when expressing 
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liminal meanings opened by the fourfold of a thing–but above all it requires the skill 
of listening.  
It takes skill and attention to listen to someone, to notice what they’re really saying. 
We tend to think communication is just rhetoric–words strung together in persuasive 
ways. But people also communicate between the lines. They seem to be saying one 
thing when in fact they’re saying four different things, talking about their fears and 
joys and hopes. I’d much rather hear it with my own ears and puzzle it out rather 
than trust the job to someone else. It takes artful listening to arrive at any useful 
insight. 
(Koch, 2016, p. 83) 
 
The education of the BBC employees to sensitise them to these skills is equally 
distinctive and it is here that different use of the communicative and revelatory views 
of language between AB-InBev and BBC become apparent. AB-InBev’s new 
employees are inculcated into a communicative view of language for propositional 
truth by being taught the “main commandments of the Garantia Culture Management 
Handbook” (Correa, 2013, p.170) and encouraged to make Falconi’s method their 
“mental management model” (Falconi, 2013, p. 51). For them, language is 
communicative and secular, restricted to enabling them to make propositional truths 
and coordinate action in the existing world.  In contrast, Boston Beer’s new employees 
spend a few hours with the founder of the company being taught how to appreciate 
beer. Koch spends two hours at the start of the day introducing the company to the 
employees. At the end of the day, Koch returns to the group and personally shows them 
how to drink beer mindfully and intelligently, pointing out, revealing, and naming 
phenomena in the beer and fostering the naming skill. 
Of course we have a whole training manual on how to taste beer, but I want to teach 
them myself how to do it, walking them through each beer one-by-one [they drink 
twenty-five in two-ounce tasting cups], and pointing out the key flavors, talking 
about elements like mouthfeel, appearance, and aftertaste. I’ll describe what flavors 
come from what ingredients, and what to look for in the beginning, middle, and end 
of a taste experience. Are the flavors in balance? Does one overpower another? 
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(Koch, 2016, p.220) 
 
In contrast to AB-InBev which rides turbulence, Koch’s kind of management 
makes a venerable practice for drinking beer more resonant in the West’s already 
volatilised world. This resonance reduces the turbulence by providing an already-
existing and real foundation for creating value. The practice of personally listening and 
talking to a bartender is a dying art. One might speculate, and empirically observe, that 
the art of conversation is dying more generally in an increasingly digitised world 
(Turkle, 2015). Yet, Jim Koch brought artful conversation back to life, as a spiritual 
practice that fosters a certain kind of truth, that of a thing thinging, and preserved a 
brewing focal thing and practice among a wider culture that has become the foundation 
for its business’ success. The adaptive management style transforms by continually re-
gathering its original mood of composure and the meanings of the brew and, as beer 
drinkers’ worlds change, re-articulating them with those developments, whether agile 
innovations in production or packaging or in the core product itself.  
The Unthought of The Boston Beer Company Case 
The Boston Beer Company case relies substantially on autobiographical and 
journalistic accounts of successful strategic action by a single leader or management 
guru. It has been well described how business leaders, management gurus, and 
journalists interact to shape the cultural discourse in such ways that existing dominant 
discourses are reinforced and the stature and wealth of dominant groups of all three 
actors are raised among the wider community and critical voices depressed (Thrift, 
2005, 2008; Phillips, Sewell, & Jaynes, 2008). In particular, management memoirs tend 
to facilitate leadership celebrity rather than critically examine their actions or the role 
their elevation plays for the wider community (Guthey, Clark, and Jackson, 2009). In 
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this case, it is plausible that Jim Koch develops an account of his own leadership that 
positions him as a saint and Big Beer leaders as corporate cyborgs (Alvesson & Spicer, 
2011, pp. 51-75; 138-161). Saintly leaders encourage and mentor others to attain a 
“moral peak” in their actions (ibid.) Koch’s stories of how he mentors employees’ 
tastes and “artful listening” and disparages Big Beer’s pretence of caring, contrast 
clearly with Big Beer’s cyborg leaders who valorise superhuman levels of individual 
productivity, and thus supports his overall differentiation strategy. Similarly, 
management consultants are adept at sensing and exploiting emerging managerial 
fashions and fads that may last only a few years (Abrahamson, 1996). Did Jim Koch, 
as an ex-consultant, whether cynically or not, merely anticipate and exploit the coming 
generations’ taste for nostalgia and authenticity? As the BBC matures and grows, will 
Koch and the firm fail to adapt in ways that remain meaningful? As profitable growth 
flattens out, will they also follow Big Beer and abandon face-to-face selling, uproot the 
provenance of their ingredients, and turn to ingenious “new liquids” and “packaging 
solutions” to drive growth? It is possible and, notwithstanding my observations about 
the weaknesses of Cartesian scepticism and unmasking critique, these remain important 
questions to be addressed by empirical studies of both the historical development of 
BBC and of its actions in future.  
However, I think there is a deeper question to pose of the case study, a question 
that focuses on what is unthought in Koch’s account. Recall Marcel Telles’ research to 
identify the next sector into which he would invest. He asked in which sectors the 
richest people in each South American country made their money. He discovered, in 
each case, that it was beer and decided upon that sector. Now recall how Koch made 
the same move. Both Telles and Koch could be considered highly skilled practitioners 
in the technological style. Telles as a securities trader, Koch as a process management 
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consultant. Telles answered the question by simply navigating to the most recent sector 
where fungible capital growth was being generated. Only the iterative cycle of capital 
as power mattered. By contrast, Koch discovered something in his past, a focal thing 
that mattered. It didn’t dominate or organise his life at that time but it made sense that 
it might in future. Both people shared the broader technological clearing but only Koch 
sought to make meaning in ways that would not foster greater uprootedness. This is 
one way to describe experiencing the truth of one’s own appropriated clearing – the 
last god, the sacred to be sheltered and adapted so that it commands authority over 
one’s life – and it is still left unthematized in Koch’s account. Left unthematized and 
undeveloped, it leaves his account vulnerable to charges of cynicism, an ossified 
nostalgia and bogus authenticity, charges which, as we will see, he is having to defend 
against in recent years. It also leaves undeveloped the question of how to develop the 
capacities for receptivity to the sacred and the kind of adaptive strategic to which it 
leads.      
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Adaptive Management 
If I am to defend this adaptive form as a generalizable remedy for an absurd 
contemporary strategy, I must convince the reader that the essence of human being is 
meaning making, that contemporary economic life threatens this essence, and that post-
agile thinking puts right what is endangered by today’s style. My argument rests upon 
the Heideggerians’ account of how to remedy the loss of the ontological skills of 
meaning-making in the agile age. I turn first to an account of the human being as a 
meaning maker who relies, for a life lived well, upon an understanding of how its 
practices are changing and responding to those changes rather than, as postmodern 
thinkers are inclined to argue, on simply accepting and working those contingencies ex 
nihilo. 
Drawing on Chapter 3’s distinction between instrumental and existential 
meaningfulness, I can sharpen and modify my account of the dangers of technology. 
Heidegger claims that the agile style generates its own anomaly. In the agile style, 
nothing really matters, and yet we have seen how, for the experience of beer drinkers 
at least, some things really do and, if we abandon those things, the way of making sense 
of the world dies along with our abandonment. Heidegger names this shocked 
realisation–that some things and not others really do matter to particular selves even in 
the age of technological flexibility–the shock of the last god (Heidegger, 2012b, p. 14, 
pp.321-30). Now, I can elaborate on this claim by drawing on Wrathall’s account of 
the twin anomalies of despair at the loss of the sacred and of frustration at the loss of 
freedom. Building on these I can cash out the work of this thesis and say more about 
why Disclosing New Worlds’ avoidance of the question of the sacred and of mood is 
so deleterious to its attempt to address the dangers of technology.  
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To re-iterate, technology is the style of thinking that un-conceals all entities as 
only a standing reserve of resources. Resources are co-optable, interchangeable and 
reconfigurable and, as such, they need not be respected, preserved or revered. In the 
agile style, nothing matters existentially, there is nothing sacred. Resources are pure 
instrumental entities and matter only with a thin instrumental importance as options. In 
contrast, durable sacred things gather lives around them and convey importance and a 
sense of worth to those lives they gather. To the extent that we live with nothing sacred, 
we lose a place for ourselves in the world that provides a sense of things and of our 
lives mattering.  
The more we attune ourselves to agility, the more we make every entity 
available everywhere and at all times and at minimum burden. And, the more we 
deconstruct and de-contextualise entities, so that their many different aspects and 
complex goods are always at hand as singular goods, the more we diminish the call of 
any particular thing or locale upon us. Thus, we noted how AB-InBev’s executives 
configure and reconfigure every option of their products to “drive purchase intent and 
persuasion” and “relevance”. If any aspect of the beverage configuration proves even 
fleetingly irrelevant to this intent, even if only temporary, a more agile brewer will 
replace and reconfigure it. One can be sure that if tradition, locality, and authenticity is 
shown to be relevant, then these aspects will quickly be deconstructed, quantified and 
manipulated into just the right formulation to “drive purchase intent and persuasion”. 
But in so doing, the agile brewer will eliminate just those qualities that were first sought 
after. As Heidegger writes,  
A mere change of attitude does nothing, just as all of what now stands in the 
distanceless as objects are never able on their own to transform themselves into 
things. 
 (Heidegger, 2012a, pp.19-20) 
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One cannot just co-opt traditionally meaningful aspects as resources and, at the 
same time, preserve their meaningfulness. Why not? Because the mood in which they 
are co-opted is already a technological one in which all such meaningful aspects lose 
their sacredness and show up only as resources to be co-opted. In the agile mood, 
nothing really matters, always and already. 
Heidegger’s solution to the loss of the sacred in the age of technology is to 
recover a sense of place and the existential, religious call that certain things place upon 
human beings as mattering beyond their instrumental worth. It is in this call to the 
divine that we can pinpoint the weakness of the solution recommended by Dreyfus and 
Spinosa in Disclosing New Worlds (1997) and, in their essay of the same year, Highway 
Bridges and Feasts. In their accounts, anomalies abound in the world and, equipped 
with language as the ultimate flexible commitment coordinator, we can flourish in an 
agile age if we can only learn to enjoy living flexibly and to relish its thrills. On Dreyfus 
and Spinosa’s account we must celebrate ourselves as endlessly flexible disclosers of 
new worlds. However, for Heidegger, Wrathall, myself and, even later Dreyfus, such a 
life of seemingly endless freedom, is neither humanly feasible nor free. As countless 
literary examples show, from Citizen Kane to Pip in Moby Dick, as well as my brewing 
example, AB-InBev, a life of freedom separated from tradition, community, and 
biology is an un-liveable life that leads to madness and absurdity. Worse, it also covers 
up that one is not free. Instead, one is condemned to seek ever greater excitement, 
novelty and other affects that most Heideggerians see as covering up a profound 
boredom and sickness. It is a perverse freedom to be homeless, a homesickness in 
which we are continually wandering lii . While Dreyfus and Spinosa offer joyful 
flexibility as a consolation in an age of technology, a more durably meaningful solution 
is available if we can find a way to develop the ontological capacities we have lost in 
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losing existential mattering and to develop a way of life in which things can again have 
worth in themselves. As we have seen, in Heideggerian terms, the last god is the god 
that counters any style and reveals it as the necessarily contingent way that things make 
sense, one that is only preserved to the extent that we preserve it as it takes care of us. 
The last god is that god that shocks the human into an experience of this contingency, 
that a style may only be temporary, our identities temporary, and all of them dependent 
on events outside of our control. As I have argued throughout this thesis, this is what 
Heidegger argues the divinities, as uncontrollable moods, make possible in general, 
and that the last god, as the particular god that discloses technology, as only one of 
many styles is precisely the part of Heideggerian philosophy that Disclosing New 
Worlds omitted to make explicit.  
To remind you, the Heideggerian fourfold of earth, sky, mortals and divinities 
is intended to explicate how focal things and practices work to create the most intense 
and worthwhile existence, what Heidegger called dwelling. To the extent that we dwell, 
we live in such a way that we allow each aspect of this fourfold to condition and be 
conditioned by each of the other aspects. Divine things, practices and places put in play 
this conditioning whereas an informational, agile age tends to diminish the sense of 
context, banish the divinities, and thin out the conditioning effect of the fourfold. As 
we saw, Heidegger’s name for this happy or “apt” mutual conditioning of one aspect 
to (or ad-) another is Ereignis or adaptation liii  (Wrathall, 2013, and personal 
communication). If one allows oneself to be conditioned by the fourfold then one 
breaks the grip of technology to the extent that this conditioning reveals a technological 
background style to the world as just that, a style of a world. One can set this 
conditioning by the earth in play by allowing the physicality of one’s locality to 
condition one’s actions rather than attempt to dominate the locale. One destroys this 
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conditioning for instance if, when the noble hops grown by the same farming family 
on the same German fields for centuries are deconstructed and re-created in 
laboratories. One is conditioned by the earth if one preserves these relationships with 
the German hop farmers, and restricts beer production to volumes that can sustain crop 
outputs. One is conditioned by the sky if one allows its seasonal, cyclical and diurnal 
rhythms to influence one’s activities – drinking beers at times that respect seasonal 
availability of ingredients and family rituals, work cycles, weekends and holidays. One 
does violence to this conditioning if one smothers those rhythms by drinking any beer 
“anywhere and anytime”. One allows oneself to be conditioned by one’s mortality by 
recognising one’s ongoing learning and maturing, preserving and transforming one’s 
cultural and historical traditional practices, and allowing one’s healthy capacities and 
infirmities to condition one’s actions so that one takes account of one’s finitude and 
eschews instant gratification. Thus, one might drink different beers with different 
people at different times of one’s life and always affirming the community of growers 
and brewers who brought the beer to the table. Finally, one allows the divinities to 
condition one’s life by respecting a culture’s holy festivals, practices and places and 
giving thanks for its affordances and upholding the mystery of the beer’s brewing. One 
covers over these divinities to the extent that one ignores or routinely observes such 
occasions and such magic. 
Such a practice of dwelling may seem odd, particularly from within the secular 
agile age that dismisses the importance of anything in itself. It is this difficulty that 
answers the final question of why one needs a God for such a worthy life. Surely, one 
could simply develop focal practices and allow oneself to be conditioned by the 
fourfold? However, if one is both to embark on such a dwelling and not to do so in the 
agile or world-picturing styles, optionalising, quantifying and controlling one’s 
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dwelling activities and so forth, one must also be shocked into the authentic recognition 
of the always already operation of any such style. Heidegger calls such a shock or jolt, 
which invites participation rather than commands a further stylised action, an encounter 
with the last god. Recall, from earlier in this chapter, how gods counter us out of any 
one particular style and a counter-mood moves one from one style to another, the last 
god is the surprise that shocks us to recognise the groundlessness of any one style, 
refuses to replace it with a new style but instead reveals to us the mystery of style itself 
and of our participatory, thoughtful role in bringing meaning and meaningfulness to 
everyday life. If the last god, as the revelation of our existence as the finite and mortal 
thrown-open clearing, is required for the worthiest kinds of life, the question remains 
of what capacities we must bring to agile strategic management to ensure its worthy 
practice. Thus, it is to the elucidation of adaptive strategic practice and the capacities 
required to support it that I turn in the final chapter. 
  
252 of 334 
8. Discussion and Conclusion: On Adaptive Strategy 
In Chapter 7, I explored and tested the agile and adaptive styles with two 
paradigmatic cases of practice drawn from the beer industry. I compared AB-InBev’s 
agile style, in which everything appears as a resource in an ever-changing world, to 
Boston Beer’s adaptive style that finds a focal thing, beer, that gathers what matters in 
life in practices that preserve and transform it. This adaptive approach is becoming so 
successful that it is challenging Big Beer’s dominance as well as demonstrating 
sustained success in other sectors. In the final section, I explained the Heideggerian 
idea of the essence of human being as meaning-making and, building on this, in this 
chapter I return to the Boston Beer case study to distil and set out an adaptive strategic 
management practice, propose the ontological capacities required to practice it, and 
then conclude this thesis by summarising its argument and considering its limitations 
and future research directions. 
The Adaptive Strategy Loop 
The Boston Beer kind of meaningful strategy depends upon leaders preserving 
a set of practices that hold open the fourfold context necessary for producing and 
consuming their products through the ups and downs of the markets and their 
background cultural context. Preserving these practices requires understanding the 
thrown style of the community that comes together to make a product and make its use 
matter to people when they live at their best. At its most admired, beer drinking requires 
preserving practices of friendship, good humour, mutual support, and temperance so 
that everyone can get home safely, and the homeliness of a pub setting. At its best, it 
also includes a local brew, whose ingredients are drawn from a known location, perhaps 
whose owners or master brewer are known, and where even some of the farms serving 
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the brewer are known. One wants to feel that the craft that goes into the beer came out 
of a community of other people. Drawing on my earlier description of focal practices, 
I describe adaptive strategy making as one that centres around preserving and 
transforming a focal thing and its focal practice, such as beer drinking, that (1) inspires 
the sacred foundational mood of composure even if we are not at the present time 
engaging in it, as well as the specific mood of the particular practice such as the 
conviviality of beer drinking, (2) has evolved since our youth and that of our forebears 
and thus keeps a thrown-open clearing of meaning alive, (3) gives us a clear role with 
clear actions when we engage in the practice, for instance, a friend who takes care of 
other friends and supports them in their need to wind down, and (4) draws us to preserve 
the practice by evolving it as it is threatened by new cultural values, for example, by 
appointing a designated driver to take more care so that friends can get home safely 
when public attitudes towards drink-driving change. 
Under the generalised cultural pressure to perform in an agile way, while many 
managers may recognise the existence and importance of such focal practices, they 
have not been able to stick to them or make them the heart of their businesses. In the 
following section, I provide a framework for adaptive strategy and show how Jim Koch 
innovated in this authentic way to gather rather than fragment a community. 
My framework for adaptive strategy has four key phases: (1) managers are 
jolted into an awareness of the fourfold that reveals the clearing as the space for 
meaningful action that is held open by practices; (2) the managers take a stand to 
preserve that clearing in a focal practice; (3) find ways to publicly mark the 
commitment to the focal practice; and (4) work to strengthen and adapt to the 
background cultural world that supports and calls for adaptation of the focal practice 
(Figure 5). As well as the political leaders and civic activists who lead the way in which 
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the members of a community make sense of and adapt their lives, we typically think of 
focal strategies in commerce as the work of founding entrepreneurs. Founding 
entrepreneurs do indeed tend to bring such vision, sense of purpose and cultural 
innovation. But there are many hugely successful adaptive strategy organisations 
including Whole Foods Market, Illy Coffee, Patagonia, Disney, Google and Linux. 
Michael Eisner, who transformed Disney by going back to its focal practices in 
animated movies and wholesome television shows for kids, showed that you do not 
need to be a founding entrepreneur. I will set out the adaptive strategy style by turning 
back to brewing to recall how the founder of The Boston Beer Company, Jim Koch, 
first discovered what he loves but then how he twice experienced the tension between 
the focal thing and its contextual world and twisted back toward his focal practice to 
preserve and transform a business that builds both financial and ethical value. 
 
Figure 5: Adaptive Strategy 
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Jolt 
Adaptive strategy-making starts with an affective jolt out of a complacent 
forgetfulness of the clearing and into an awed awareness of one’s responsibility to hold 
open and take care of this background meaningfulness through one’s everyday actions. 
This jolt is the revelatory experience of the fourfold brought by the last god. Because 
the actor experiences their actions as justified ultimately by their committed 
appropriation of their own contingent past, present and future, the jolt inspires intense 
commitment in actors to take ownership of their actions that preserve and transform 
the clearing. This jolt may come from reading the founder’s statements or from older 
employees giving accounts of the feel of their older way of working and comparing 
them with the present day, remarking upon what is missing. Or it may come from 
talking with new, perhaps younger, customer-enthusiasts and noticing the 
disconnections between their practice and love for the product and that which currently 
prevails among the company’s own employees. Instead of looking to create a map of 
all the current anomalies, adaptive strategy starts with a jolt of dismay that re-attaches 
managers to the focal practice sustaining the clearing that is the background of the 
company. I call this an “inward turn”, because it is a turn away from surface events 
back towards the heart or essence of the practice, the first twist in the adaptive agile 
loop (for an example of an exercise that can help create this kind of jolt, see Spinosa, 
Hancocks & Glennon, forthcoming). 
As we saw, in 1983-84, Jim Koch felt a calling back to his roots (Koch, 2016, 
pp.9-21). At the time, he was a successful manufacturing consultant for the Boston 
Consulting Group earning $250,000 per year but he reported feeling that something 
was missing from his successful lifeliv. When he looked at himself and his colleagues, 
they all looked the same. What was missing for Koch was his connection to the clearing 
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that was his family’s 150 years of brewing. As an ambitious student, Koch had turned 
his back on brewing as irrelevant to the modern world. However, when he read of how 
Fritz Maytag was re-creating all-malt steam brewing in San Francisco, Koch saw that 
brewing was not just a relic of his past. If Maytag could find a way to take brewing 
back then brewing could also be Koch’s future. Koch was a home brewer already and 
knew brewing well (Koch, 2016, p.16). It was his family's cultural background. His 
father and grandfather had both been brewmasters in Cincinnati. As the industry 
consolidated under the giant brewers Anheuser-Busch, Miller and Coors, the Koch 
family and other local brewers’ flavourful, challenging beers were swept away by the 
cheaper, simpler, long-life beers. The big cost advantages and broadcast advertising 
campaigns of the giants undermined the distinctive position of producers of local, 
interesting and fresh beers. 
Koch saw an opportunity but he also felt a shock. As a successful consultant, 
he had often helped businesses dominate markets by eliminating competition from 
smaller businesses. Still, he felt intensely the frustration that drinkers of imported beer 
felt when they tried to find an alternative to the bland, inexpensive US beers. He felt 
that those people were his own community and he wanted to give them something 
better. His distant and his recent past were clashing in the present. 
Working with his father, Koch dug around in the family recipe box and brewing 
magazines stored in his family attic. His father recommended an old family recipe for 
all-malt beer from the 1860s (Koch, 2016, p.3). Koch bought the hops and brewed up 
a small batch in his own kitchen. When he tasted it, he knew he had something special. 
With that taste, the jolt was complete. He had successfully engaged in brewing a 
difficult family recipe. 
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Stand 
Managers deepen their personal commitment by developing a stand for the 
focal thing and practices that preserve what they have re-discovered about the truth of 
the way people are using the product. 
Koch could see from the niche popularity of import beers and the 
distinctiveness of his new home brew that he had a beer so superior that it would, by 
itself, create new customers in a market that seemed to be a closed shop. He invested 
$100,000 of his own money and raised a further $150,000 from friends and family to 
start his own company (Koch, 2016, pp.25-28). He perfected his recipe and rented part 
of a disused Boston brewery to brew and bottle the first batch of his beer – Samuel 
Adams.  
He made his first sale by taking a case of his new beer to a local bartender and 
engaging him in a poetic conversation that created the language in which the truth of 
the new beer could be articulated and make sense. He invited the bartender to join with 
him in lamenting the decline of the local brews and the dominance of Big Beer. He 
pointed the bartender toward the flavour notes of his new beer and invited him to taste 
it. He reminded him of the popularity of imported beers and painted a picture of those 
drinkers who he knew would love and buy Koch’s beer. The manager sniffed and drank 
the beer, nodded appreciatively and straight away ordered twenty-five cases. The 
success of this one moment reinforced Koch’s antipathy to traditional marketing and 
his distinctive conversational practice has become renowned within Boston Beer 
Company and the wider industry. Koch still spends time visiting bars, testing ideas 
with passengers sitting next to him on planes, and directly pitching new brews face-to-
face to small groups of customers. Koch took a stand for the face-to-face creation of 
communities who loved challenging beer. As he said, 
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If more CEOs had to go out and sell their products, day in and day out, they’d pay 
more attention to what they are making. When you are out there selling, face-to-face 
with your customer, there’s no place to hide. 
(Hill & Rifkin, 1999, p.235) 
Mark 
Adaptive strategy leaders create a signal, historic event that appeals across 
generations of customers and employees and marks out a territory to which others can 
gather and begin transforming the wider cultural common sense. These followers re-
experience the jolting contrast that the manager felt at the beginning between the thing 
(the craft beer) and the wider cultural world (the stylised context of agile Big Beer). In 
this sense, the third step doubles back and repeats the first, this time finding a way to 
bring an articulation of the fourfold and its focal thing to bear upon the world. That is 
why the adaptive loop is twisted in contrast to the iterative agility loop. 
Six months after founding the company, Koch and first employee Rhonda 
Kallman, a former bartender, made their mark. They took the beer to the Great 
American Beer Festival in Denver, a small three-day festival with almost a thousand 
craft beer drinkers sampling over 100 craft beers from breweries from across America 
(Koch, 2016, p.90). While most breweries sent sales people and press kits, Boston Beer 
sent the Chief Executive and Deputy Chief Executive to tell stories and engage 
personally with drinkers. Koch and Kallman threw themselves into telling the story of 
Sam Adams and mentoring the samplers to appreciate their beer just as they had done 
with bartenders (Koch, 2016, p.90). At the end of the festival, Sam Adams was voted 
best beer and, at the airport on their way home, Koch and Kallman cycled through 
telephone call after call to the Boston press. In their taxi home from Boston’s airport 
they heard the news on the radio, “Local Boston Beer is the Best Beer in America!” 
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They had made their first historical mark: they were the ones who made and explained 
meaningful beer.  
Culture 
When they have made their mark, instead of revising their commitments and 
reinventing themselves, adaptive strategy moves to adjust the prevailing regime of truth 
or style of the wider world. Adaptive strategists preserve and intensify a wider culture 
that will sustain their own practice. Over time, they build the cultural structures that 
the community of users, producers, partners, and other actors will need for the focal 
practice to flourishlv. 
The Boston Beer Company was America’s Best Beer four years in a row. When, 
in the face of suspicion and pressure from other craft brewers, the beer awards moved 
away from a single award to multiple categories and to blind tasting, Sam Adams still 
won three gold awards in the first year under the new arrangements. Now was the time 
for Koch to turn to build a stronger beer-making and drinking culture among US beer 
drinkers. Koch had always focused on challenging recipes and selling by mentoring. 
To compete he wanted those to remain his distinctive marks. Now he needed to add 
something to the culture of beer drinking more generally. He turned to freshness (Koch, 
2016, pp.126-129). One of his main complaints about Big Beer, which he shared with 
craft beer fans, was their use of additives and preservatives to extend the shelf life of 
beer. Big Beer’s bottle and cans might be on the shelf for four or five months, and the 
taste of the beer suffered from both its preservatives and staleness. In 1987, Koch 
contracted with a local West Coast contract manufacturer to promise that beer would 
be on the shelf within 24 hours of being brewed. He became the first US company to 
print a sell-by date on the bottles and promised that any bottle would also be taken off 
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the shelf as soon as its sell-by date had passed with Boston Beer buying back the stale 
beer from distributors and retailers. Fresh beer was highly successful and the response 
from customers to the sell-by date has been such that the competition, including Big 
Beer, now routinely prints sell-by dates on their products. “Freshness” has become the 
common sense for the entire industry, and it plays into The Boston Beer Company’s 
contract manufacturing model. Koch takes the long view of customer loyalty despite 
short-term costs. In the early 1990s, when BBC began the buy-back programme, it 
bought back and destroyed beer valued at around $100,000 in lost revenues. By 2016, 
this figure had grown to $6 million annually (Koch, 2016, p.129). In 2010, they 
reinforced their stance by launching the Freshest Beer programme to re-engineer the 
supply chain and cut the time wholesalers hold beer by half (Mickle, 2016). 
Round and Around the Twisted Loop 
Koch’s story might sound like that of any founding entrepreneur who, one day 
in the future, will fall prey to agile practices and the agile companies, like AB-InBev, 
which pursue them. However, in adaptive strategy, companies such as Koch’s only fall 
prey to technology if they forget themselves and the clearing that sustains them. It 
almost happened to Koch.  
By 1998, Jim Koch and Boston Beer had refined the American beer drinking 
public’s idea of drinking to the extent that craft beer was breaking out of being a niche 
product. He and Kallman believed that Boston needed to re-position itself to succeed 
with the emerging generation of beer drinkers who loved novelty rather than 
rootedness. Koch reluctantly accepted that his own face-to-face methods might hinder 
this re-positioning and agreed to appoint a professional brand marketing executive with 
a background in Big Beer. The executive assembled an expensive marketing team and 
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invested large sums in marketing research, focus groups, consultants, and broadcast 
advertising. However, his efforts fragmented rather than intensified the identity of the 
brand (Hill & Rifkin, 1999, pp.245-247). His newly hired team had no relationship 
with Koch, no connection with the brand, and they did no face to face sales. They never 
tried to sell a beer to one of the new generation of potential customers. Koch was 
horrified when he discovered that, in an effort to attract younger customers, they had 
resorted to packaging gimmicks like snowmen and sailboats, un-related promotional 
gifts like satellite dishes, and radio ads of a “guy slurping beer off the floor, another 
playing spoons” (Hill & Rifkin, 1999, p.246). Unsurprisingly, those gimmicky 
initiatives failed to increase sales and, worse, they had nothing to do with Sam Adams 
beer. Had he let the marketer continue, I believe Koch would then have fallen victim 
to agile Big Beer. But Koch’s response was to go back to the key practices that 
underpinned success. He fired the brand marketer, brought the slimmed down 
marketing team under his direct control, and returned to the face-to-face selling and 
personal marketing that was necessary to educate a new generation in how to love a 
challenging beer (Koch, 2016, pp.32-34; pp.147-48; pp. 210-15). 
In 2008, Koch returned to going cultural. At that time, there was a drastic 
shortage of aromatic hops. Koch, turning away from the more generic social 
responsibility activities his management team were conducting, made a move intended 
to sustain the community that in turn sustained him. At the time, global supplies of 
hops were greatly reduced and prices rising sharply. Most small craft brewers were 
desperate for hops and could not afford to buy them on the open market, Boston Beer 
had a surfeit. Its scale was such that it could buy hops years in advance and command 
lower prices. Koch held a lottery for small craft brewers to buy all of Boston’s excess 
at cost price (Koch, 2016, p.229). In the same year, Koch continued with this style of 
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building a wider culture to change its common sense by setting up the Samuel Adams 
micro-loan scheme to support other smaller craft food and drink manufacturers and 
hospitality entrepreneurs to start or grow their business (Koch, 2016, p.226). 
On 3 October 2013, the share price of Boston Beer Company was such that Jim 
Koch was now craft beer’s first billionaire. Personally, becoming a billionaire is not 
the point of the story, it merely serves to illustrate that adaptive strategy is not an 
approach that best suits small-scale hobby businesses but can also support large-scale 
business enterprises. Koch’s success is still rooted in having the focal thing of having 
the best “challenging beer” and the focal practice of face-to-face selling. Koch still 
visits hop fields in Germany and England, he still goes to small craft beer fairs and sells 
his brews, and he still occasionally goes to bars and pubs to invite them to taste his 
newest recipe and learn how to sell it. In multiple daily actions, in his moods, and in 
his conversations, Koch is still religiously holding open the meaningful space of craft 
beer. 
Limits to Koch’s Strategy: Back Round and Around the Twisted Loop. 
As suggested in Chapter 7’s brief discussion of Jim Koch’s unthought, although 
Boston Beer Company serves as a paradigmatic case of adaptive strategy in practice, it 
is not without challenges. In the last few years, some of those have appeared, the 
company’s rise has slowed and a backlash begun in the social media world and among 
beer consumers (Crouch, 2015; Mickle, 2016). BBC is clearly the most successful craft 
beer in the USA but its growth rate has slowed dramatically and craft beer aficionados 
have begun to decry its claims to craft beer authenticity. In the last twenty years, the 
craft beer market in the US has grown dramatically. In 1999, there were 1,564 
breweries whereas, in 2016, there are 4,200 with two breweries being opened every 
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day in recent years (Mickle, 2016). However, despite the growth in demand, the rise in 
ultra-local, hipster beers as direct competition has meant that BBC’s growth has fallen 
from regular 20% annual volume growth to just 3.6% in 2015 (ibid). Among beer 
drinking aficionados, Koch and the BBC have begun to attract criticism as being closer 
to the giant brewing corporations than to an authentic, local craft brewer (Crouch, 2015; 
Mickle, 2016). Koch’s personalised, story-based and conversational approach has been 
attacked as merely clever but manipulative marketing, the historical roots of the 
original Sam Adams recipe portrayed as an exaggeration given that it was developed 
by technical brewer Joe Owades, and his brewing approach criticised for a lack of 
localism and authenticity (Crouch, 2015). The younger craft beer drinker who is driving 
the market growth seeks authenticity, “more so than any other generation that we’ve 
seen before. Millennials can see right through insincerity and they’re actually looking 
for it” (Strategic marketing executive, Michelle Snodgrass, quoted in Crouch, 2015). 
These newer drinkers want beers that are even more local, even more artisanal, and 
with an even more visible connection to the farms and community of farmers that grew 
the hops and malt. For this generation of beer drinkers, “Sam Adams has a coolness 
problem. And the company knows it” (Crouch, 2015). These criticisms of Koch and 
the BBC are significant and serious challenges to the business’ strategy but they do not, 
as they stand, represent a fundamental challenge to adaptive strategic management 
itself rather to Koch as an exemplar of it. 
Adaptive strategy accepts that the worldly context is always changing. The 
adaptive strategist must recognise the tension between the focal thing and its practices 
and the dynamic background context that conditions them and deems them relevant or 
not. The task for Koch’s thinking is how to make sense of the current challenges in 
ways that preserve what is most resonant in BBC as a craft beer brewer but take account 
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of the threats to its existence. Koch’s initial response suggest he is only partly grasping 
the adaptive challenge.  He appears to doubt whether this emerging segment of beer 
drinkers really is seeking authenticity or whether indeed it is itself merely evidence of 
a deepening nihilism that demands the same response from a brewer focused on 
something that matters. In the past, Jim Koch’s approach has drawn on modern and 
agile strategic management styles to improve quality and freshness and reduce costs 
but always focused on the meaningfulness of brewing and drinking beer. The rise of a 
new generation of beer drinkers poses new challenges for the company but not one that 
calls for a straightforward response. Rather than being a seeker of authenticity, another 
veteran craft brewer has characterised the new drinker as having an “annoying young 
hipster attitude toward beer. It’s the same sort of attitude that you find in music. ‘Oh 
that brewery was so last year.’ People want to try new stuff all the time” (Dann 
Paquette, cofounder of Pretty Things Beer and Ale Project, quoted in Crouch, 2015). 
Pacquette is describing the nihilistic, agile self who seeks endless novelty and, for 
whom, authenticity is just another form of novelty. Koch himself appears to agree, 
“You can’t meet the needs of every hipster bar” (Jim Koch, quoted in Crouch 2015). 
However, Koch’s task as an adaptive strategist is to accept the genuine inconsistencies 
in the authenticity of his business while also adapting to the growing nihilistic demand 
for novel authenticity, which could threaten his company. It remains to be seen whether 
he can go back around the twisted loop to transform his focal thing once again to adapt 
to another contextual world, and do so without sacrificing what matters. 
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An Education in Thinking: ontological capacities and 
developmental practices 
In Chapter 3, I began to describe the role of education in developing the 
sensibility among practitioners of the kind that allows for skilful sense-making to 
accomplish results reliably in a situation and that yet also preserves the mystery that 
allows for truth, freedom, and meaningfulness. 
Heidegger characterised the selves called into existence by the age of 
technology, in which reality is accepted as essentially chaotic, as ones marked by 
conflict between doubt and confidence, and especially, by boredom in the face of an 
abyss of meaning (Heidegger, 2003, pp.89-91; Thiele, 1997, p.507). Dreyfus and Kelly 
named the predicament facing selves in the agile age as the “burden of choice”, the 
necessity, in a godless age, of making choices based on “nothing at all” (Dreyfus & 
Kelly, 2011, p.6). We have seen how the kind of agile self that is emerging to deal with 
uncertainty can be seen as the purification of the “will-to-power” in an incarnation of 
pure “will-to-will”. This joyful active nihilist, one lacking a gathering centre of 
meaningfulness to life other than the circulation of power, wills simply for the sake of 
continuing to exercise the will. For the nihilist in general, entities are no longer even 
objects distinct from a subject but simply a “standing reserve” of resources available 
for ordering and re-ordering and in pursuit of no purpose other than the continuation 
and accumulation of power and the will. The self itself becomes such a resource, values 
are posited and can be taken back, and nothing has any purchase beyond the will-of-
the-wisp chasing after whims. Hence, the agile–self, as an active nihilist, welcomes 
uncertainty, is gloriously vigorous and endlessly flexible but is unable to distinguish 
more from less worthy choices. All ends are equally valuable to the extent they 
accumulate power. The active nihilist sees alternatives everywhere but denies the 
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burden of choice and, by making no distinctions of the worthiness of ends other than 
the joyful accumulation of power, gets enslaved to flux and to novelty itself. 
In the age of technology, one is called to maximise the availability of all 
resources, posit values ever-anew, and actualise these ever-changing values in 
aesthetically-satisfying ways, before doing it all again. Borgmann described this as the 
device paradigm for which one makes all resources ever-more available, by un-
bundling, standardising and making them universally, frictionlessly connectible one to 
another. Any friction encountered is not encountered as an externality to be respected 
but as a technical challenge to be overcome (Borgmann, 1987). In the case of the New 
Age religions, even the gods can be reduced to such flexible, frictionless resources. The 
exemplar of the agile style is the Internet-enabled life parodied in contemporary novels 
like Super Sad True Love Story by Gary Shteyngart or Dave Eggers’ The Circle, which 
describe lives of mobile technology-enabled total financial performance, mood 
assessment, and performance promise-keeping. 
Recall from Chapter 3 how, for the Heideggerians, the agile age also containing 
the seeds of its own overcoming. As Wrathall and Lambeth argue, the misery and 
instability commonly experienced in the age of emergence was the anomaly that led to 
a receptivity to monotheism and metaphysics and the age of Machenschaft (Wrathall 
& Lambeth, 2011). Similarly, they argue that the despair felt at the loss of anything 
that really matters, the loss of the sacred as that which we cannot laugh at, and the 
frustration felt at the way optionalisation co-opts our freedom into the freedom simply 
to obey the demands of a system become the twin anomalies of the age of technology 
(Wrathall & Lambeth, 2011, p. 177).). Together these twin anomalies spark a third 
anomaly that forms an existential crisis that the Heideggerians consider sufficient to 
open up a new third mega-epoch. Having described the current agile style of 
267 of 334 
understanding and suggested how it is destroying the possibility of a flourishing life, I 
turn next to describe the key elements of the Heideggerians’ remedy for the danger of 
the agile age. 
So far, we have seen that the constitution of meaning is volatile. Both contextual 
networks and the entities they constitute are changeable and without fixed essence. We 
have also seen how there has been no foundational entity, whether a God or a human 
with a fixed essence, to serve as the stable ground of substantive meaning for all worlds 
over time but, rather, stable worlds of meaning and mattering tend gently to gather by 
Ereignis. According to Heidegger, it is humans who play the central role in Ereignis of 
stabilising the meanings of a network and its entities. While the most un-
anthropomorphic Heideggerians including the speculative realists and materialists such 
as Bruno Latour argue for all entities as meaning-constituting actors or disclosers of 
worlds, none would argue that humans do not play an important role (Morton, 2013, 
p.23). Heidegger argues that the human is distinguished by being the only entity able 
to disclose its role as a discloser, that which receives and responds to the potential 
meanings of a situation. This is the human essence, not an essence of particular qualities 
but a minimal essence as the being able to disclose its role in disclosing being or 
meaning. Thus, humans can be mindful or mindless of their participatory role as 
disclosers. To the extent, that they are mindful or reflective of this role, he describes 
them as authentic. Recovering this role for humans as participants stabilising 
meaningful relational networks is the Heideggerian key to remedying the shortcomings 
of technology.  
As we saw, the agile era is different not just because there is uncertainty but 
because today agile Western selves live in a unifying understanding of being as 
infinitely flexible. Flexibility is so total as to even encompass the gods, those 
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traditionally divine sources of legitimisation that we have relied upon as the ultimate 
bases for our choiceslvi. Even the gods can be chopped and changed, deconstructed and 
re-combined in an ironic justification of any position. For Heidegger, the agile Western 
self is estranged from the hidden source of meaning and sees only the endless 
productions of its own will as justification enough for action. On this basis, it feels 
homeless because if any home will do, no home is truly a home. Heidegger’s remedy 
for the agile self’s state is to cultivate its spiritual way of being to be able to participate 
in the gathering of meaning, Ereignis or adaptation.  
This description of the twist from the pre-metaphysical to the metaphysical 
raises the question of how to accomplish a further shift into a post-metaphysical age. 
This is precisely what Heidegger considered we are currently entering into by virtue of 
a twist out of the age of planning. As we have seen, in Heidegger’s thinking, the 
metaphysical twist and its subsequent 2,500 years of variations on a theme of stability 
and correctness, came at the cost of a gradual estrangement of human being from the 
wonder of its fitting together with a sending of a style of being. Heidegger’s view is 
that the current agile epoch fosters an experience of absurdity that can be the ground 
for a twist away from the Machenschaft styles. The problem with the flexible age of 
technology is that all creations tend again to be sacrificed and transformed, nothing is 
worth keeping, all are made again into options for consumption. While it may, on the 
surface, feel like freedom, after a time it begins to appear as an ultimate, near-perfect 
trap, in which we are always subject to a metaphysical law to turn everything into an 
optionalised resource to be organised for maximum productivity, a contemporary 
example of the Chinese finger trap in which every effort made in order to free oneself 
only leads to further entrapment. The imperative to optionalise actually reduces our 
capacity to respond to that which surrounds us. To take one seemingly absurd example, 
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who today working in a sawmill making roof timbers could treat each piece of 
incoming timber as an ensouled being to be venerated and released to a carving process 
that releases its highest potential, perhaps as a wheel, a sculpture, or a pepper-pot? If 
the first twist was prompted by the anomaly of the lack of stability, Heidegger argues 
that the twist out of experience will be prompted by two anomalies that lead to a third 
(Wrathall & Lambeth, 2011, p. 177). Our despair that we have lost the divine will push 
us to seek things and practices that “push back” on us and give us the experience of 
something that really matters (ibid). And our frustration that we are not free from the 
flexible, commoditising style will push us to listen to particularities rather than simply 
obey the demands of the agile style–the market system (ibid). However, Heideggerians 
have speculated about how these twin anomalies appearing in the ultimately flexible 
age of technology leads to a third and most crucial anomaly, the experience of a last 
god. As described earlier, rather than jolt us into a new substantial and singular style, 
the last god is the one that shocks us back into a recognition of the groundlessness and 
instability of any current style, whether by refusing to provide a historical ground, or 
future goal, or contemporary completeness to any current style, and that opens us up to 
a new ontological capacity, a kind of receptivity that allows things to matter and make 
demands upon us, and yet the last god refuses to bestow any single substantial style 
either. Thus, we encounter the last god only in a refusal of the contemporary style to 
offer up its grounding (either from the past, the present or the future) and in “hints” and 
“intimations” of a new style–invitations to explore liminal meanings not yet articulated 
in the situation. The last god shows up in anomalous experiences between a thing and 
its shifting contextual background and opens up unforeseen ways that we can go on 
together. The last god is not a supernatural entity that will arrive from out of the skies 
to save us but is an encounter with an aspect of something already there in our things 
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and practices but concealed, namely the agile style. It is the experience of the 
remainder, of resistance or refusal in our practice (ibid, p.178), when something refuses 
to be optionalised, a gnawing doubt for example about how one is treating an employee, 
a natural resource, or a skilled practice by codifying and optionalised its explicit 
economically commodifiable nature. The sense that, for all one’s brilliance at 
technologisation, one is not getting at what really matters. The conversation I had with 
a senior UK retail executive in which he said, “We measure and manage bloody 
everything except for what really matters! We keep losing that.” This would be an 
example of the hinting and winking passing by of the last god – the momentary 
penetration into thought that there are things, events, moments that “really do matter” 
but not because they are options.  
Heidegger considers that the twist to the age of Ereignis will be led by a few 
individuals, in earlier writings he calls them forerunners but I will retain his later term 
thinkers, with the ontological capacities for these contextual hints and winks to take 
root. In his latest writings reviewed in Chapter 3, he suggested an educational practice 
to develop the ontological capacities and practices that these thinkers will have that 
will enable this rooting to take place. Following suggestions from Heideggerian 
scholars in particular Mark Wrathalllvii, I describe three ontological capacities that can 
be developed as ways of being for thinking managers and that make possible or 
condition an adaptive strategic management. As already described, if one is to be 
attuned to a last god, one must first have a sensitivity to the sacred as something that 
resists us and our wills, that sets in play a gathering of mutual adaptation, and that 
bestows a profound happiness. For this ontological capacity, I prescribe a disciplinary, 
apprentice-based education in the “tiniest spheres”, in other words in a focal thing and 
focal practice.  
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Anomaly Ontological Capacity  Educational Practice 
Despair Tiniest spheres: experience the sacred Focal Things and Practices 
Frustration Sensibility: abandonment by being Metapoietic Education 
Openness Composure: reticent courage Education in Thinking 
 
Secondly, these individuals must have developed a sensibility, the “calm, self-
possessed surrender to that which is worthy of questioning”.  As we saw, disciplinary 
mastery brings instrumental skills to deliver results within a currently prevailing 
clearing or way of making sense of things ordinarily. However, the human essence is 
to be a receiver and discloser of meaningfulness per se and not only of one set of 
meanings. Thus, Heidegger speaks of the necessity of an abandonment by being that 
throws in to question the reigning cultural style and personal identity that was hitherto 
unquestionable. This disruption of confident action within a regime of meaning 
sensitises one to Ereignis, the relational and dynamic gathering of a style in itself, rather 
than to any particular settled configuration of meaning. On a collective level, the death 
of the Crow nation’s culture and the reticent listening for new possibilities by its leader 
Plenty Coups has been described in Jonathan Lear’s Radical Hope (Lear, 2006). On 
the individual level, the death of an identity is also depicted in the transformation of 
master sergeant Galoup in the movie Beau Travail (Denis, 1999) and in Robert 
Stolorow’s psychotherapeutic account of the facing up to the death of one’s personal 
identity following the physical death of a spouse in his book, World, Affectivity, 
Trauma (Stolorow, 2011). Thus, an education for thinking must have built on the 
disciplinary mastery that brings awareness of the sacred and facility in the focal 
practice, to allow the thinker to develop the sensibility of the many ways that meaning 
has been configured over the course of human history and is configured across 
humanity in the present day. The thinker must have experienced that any particular 
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style is contingent, its survival is precarious and its dawning and its destruction 
precipitous. Thus, sensibility reveals that existential meaningfulness requires active 
participation by people to gather and preserve it in the face of further contingencies. 
Thus, a sensitivity to the history of meaning and the requisite modesty towards any 
particular configuration, and an openness to other configurations, must be in place. 
Finally, the thinker must have the composure to withstand the questioning of 
current ways of making sense and yet resist the urge to retreat into optionalising, 
theorising, calculating, or some other metaphysical style. The reticent courage to think 
resists the reactionary tendency to reduce a thing to a commodity for the sake of co-
opting it for management. Instead, the thinker will remain resolute, diffidently or shyly 
listening out for and gently developing new possibilities. My contention is that this 
foundational mood is only experienced at the highest levels of skill with a focal practice 
in the contemporary epoch. Hence, its appearance comes only after development of the 
other two capacities and disclosure to oneself of the fundamental attunement of our 
contemporary epoch–the “busy-bored-whatever” affect. 
Based on this analysis, I prescribe three recommendations for educational 
practice that interact to develop these three ontological capacities. The prescriptions 
align to each of the capacities though they interact and their effects are multiplicative. 
Their effect is to create strategic thinkers able to disclose themselves as disclosers, 
listening and responding to the particularities of the situation rather than applying some 
universal style to it.  
For sensitivity to the sacred, I prescribe discovering and dedicating oneself to 
an apprenticeship in a focal thing and practice that connects with the sacred from the 
outset and that, as one develops one’s disciplinary skilfulness and sense-making to 
higher and higher levels, opens a sensibility to the un-groundedness of the style of the 
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practice itself and a mood of composure or Gelassenheit that allows for its courageous 
and mindful development. As we saw, a focal practice is a practice that encourages a 
thing to become closest to human practice, rather than be set at a distance for the 
purpose of correct ascertainment or co-optation. Speaking against the context of the 
technologically-mediated world, Borgmann offers four propositions for the affirmation 
of a focal practice: (1) there is nowhere I would rather be, (2) there is no-one I would 
rather be with, (3) there is nothing I would rather be doing, and (4) I will remember 
this well (Borgmann, 2007). Developing one’s skill in the focal practice opens the next 
two ontological capacities, hence a pre-requisite is that an executive has a focal practice 
connected to the core of the business. Affirming information engineering or financial 
engineering as a focal practice is seen as problematic as the material at their centre, 
signs and money respectively, are understood as fungible means and measures of ends 
but in their fungibility are disconnected from context and hence inadequate for 
supporting a focal thing (Borgmann, 1987, pp. 216-217; 2000, pp. 210-11).  
Sensibility emerges as one’s own disciplinary skilfulness in a focal practice 
reaches the highest levels of facility. At higher levels of capability in the “tiniest 
spheres”, one discovers that one has adopted a style from one’s teacher and, that this 
style can be swept away by another quite different style. For example, if one learned to 
play piano with a teacher with a formal, classical style of playing and has reached the 
highest levels of technical capability one might initially be devastated as the teacher 
turns you over to another teacher, one with a fluid, jazz-inflected style of playing 
(Dreyfus, 2008a, 2008b). While one’s technical facility (the playing of scales and so 
on) remains, the experience is of having one’s world and one’s identity washed away 
is an experience of existential death. For the development of sensibility to styles and to 
Ereignis as adaptation, I prescribe Dreyfus and Kelly’s metapoietic general education 
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practice alongside, and at later stages of, the disciplinary apprenticeship in a focal 
practice. This programme develops sensitivities to the various configurations of 
meaning that have held sway and then passed away across human history. Metapoietic 
education would also educate a practitioner in the skill of reading for mood of an 
individual at a moment in time, then for the mood of a general style, such as that of a 
teacher, and eventually to the attunements that have dominated historical epochs and 
that still exist even if only at the margins of our contemporary world. This awareness 
both expands the repertoire of possibilities for responding to the affordances of 
different situations and sensitises one to the most fundamental attunements necessary 
for adaptation (Dreyfus & Kelly, 2011).  
The development of sensibility and especially of this last sensitivity to 
adaptation is necessary to support the third prescription, a programme of education in 
thinking aimed at the character development to foster and support composure necessary 
to invent new and meaningful responses in the face of the existential death of one’s 
historical culture and personal identity. Such educational programmes are in their 
infancy but parallels are clear between Dreyfus’ stages of the transformations of 
intelligibility with higher levels of expertise and the various transpersonal 
developmental frameworks and practices (Kegan, 1982, 1985; Kegan, Laskow Lahey, 
Miller, Fleming & Helsing, 2016; Rooke & Torbert, 2005; Dreyfus 2008a, 2008b)lviii. 
Koch’s story illustrates all these aspects.  
First, in the jolt at the start of his story, Koch re-dedicated himself to recovering 
the family focal practice of craft brewing fresh and challenging beers that he had 
personally marginalised and inventing a new one of conversational selling as 
mentoring. He apprenticed himself, first to his father and subsequently to brewmaster 
Joe Owades, and he continues to apprentice new recruits to BBC by personally 
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educating them in the focal practice of making and drinking beer. With each subsequent 
twist in his loop, he re-dedicated himself to these focal practices, drew upon scientific 
and agile practices such as efficient production and mass marketing, but always 
swerved away from being co-opted by them. He did not argue so much for the 
commercial sense of this practice as for its meaningfulness in the traditions of his 
family and in his own identity. The focal thing and practices carried intense existential 
mattering rather than merely instrumental worth. Above, I described Borgmann’s 
simple questions to help in locating one’s own focal practice. These discovery practices 
contrast with the more typical mission and vision kinds of inquiries of agile 
practitioners that risk turning an existential discovery into rational cost-benefit 
analysis. For instance, Sull’s examples of “inescapable” and “reinforcing” 
commitments are littered with examples decrying people’s inability to properly 
calculate the costs and benefits of their existential commitments (Sull, 2009, Chapter 
4, especially pp. 70, 75). It may even be the case that technologists have a religious 
moment too, albeit a diluted one. It may even have been that Sull missed the one truly 
religious moment that founded AB-InBev. In his earlier account of the inception of 
AB-InBev’s agile strategy, Sull & Escobari (2005) reports how new CEO, Marcel 
Telles, fired their strategy consultants and hired Vicente Falconi and who fervently 
declared AB-InBev’s anti-spiritual article of faith that underpinned its crusade and its 
future success, “Beer is not magic, beer is process”lix. The next years will see how many 
zealous followers this faith can attract. 
Secondly, Koch demonstrates not only a disciplinary mastery of one style of 
thinking and management but a sensibility of his own and of others. He is an 
enthusiastic scholar of styles of thinking in addition to today’s modern and agile and 
particularly of those non-Machenschaft, mythical styles seen in the pre-Homeric 
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Greece of Homer’s Odyssey or the mystical science fiction of George Lucas’ Star Wars. 
Rather than only learn and repeat the formulae of TQM or of Harvard marketing 
classes, Koch uses Star Wars metaphors and notes Luke Skywalker’s humble return to 
feel the Force (Koch, 2016, p. 4, p.183). In addition to Deming’s Out of the Crisis, he 
also recommends reading Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Argyris and 
Schön’s Theory in Practice, and Borges’ “magical realist” Collected Fictions (Koch, 
2016, pp. 245-248). Elsewhere, Koch recommends turning to The Love Story of J. 
Alfred Prufrock to discover what we find empty and abhorrent in modern management 
science and to Homer to re-awaken our sense of enchantment in business: 
If you want to understand [why I believe good management lies not in marketing 
texts but in metaphor], you might as well go to the first four chapters of The Odyssey 
and find out what was in Telemachus’ head when he set out to find his father. Or 
read Eliot’s The Love Story of J. Alfred Prufrock and find out what makes Prufrock 
unappealing to us. Yes it’s esoteric. But you are not going to figure out why people 
started smoking cigars again by thinking rationally. It’s metaphorical. So you go to 
people whose stock in trade is metaphor, not marketing. 
(Hill & Rifkin, 1999, pp.247) 
 
Koch may consider his advice to be esoteric, and to the extent that esoteric 
implies specialist knowledge appropriate only for a few, he is right. However, this term 
surely also obscures the sensibleness of what he is advocating. Koch is not a mystic or 
literature professor but a Harvard graduate in government, law and business and a 
brewing and manufacturing expert. In his advocacy of literature from the distant and 
near past and present, he is only drawing attention to the human being’s many different 
historically actual and currently possible ways of understanding other than modern 
management science. The metapoietic curriculum for disclosing described above is 
explicitly intended to serve the same purpose–the development of sensibility. 
Finally, note the contrast between a youthful Koch and his older counterpart. 
The younger Koch, fresh out of Harvard business and law schools, fluent in Boston 
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Consulting Group’s manufacturing sciences, was driven to re-conceive clients’ 
manufacturing operations as inefficient value-creating systems. As the authors of 
Radical Marketing recount, Koch saw more than just a business opportunity when he 
tuned in to beer, “he felt a calling” (Hill & Rifkin, 1999, p.232). It is obvious that he 
felt rather more than that. He also felt and withstood an abandonment by being. His 
previous existence, identity and style as a rational manufacturing consultant was 
shattered by this calling. Shattering is the word. Koch uses the term “blow it up” to 
describe both the experience he felt when the Harvard life became meaningless to him 
and he became an Outward Bound instructor and later when the life of a management 
consultant also died for him and threw him into a new unknown identity as a re-inventor 
of old recipes and a face-to-face salesman. He drew on his manufacturing skills but 
never returned wholly to the management scientist identity. Such a transformation hints 
at our third ontological capacity and developmental practice. Koch’s character 
developed from the conventional way of making meaning that is typical of young 
managers whether modern or agile, what Dreyfus calls the average, everyday 
intelligibility stage of meaning making, and toward the kind of composure that 
characterises a primordial, authentic or freely historicising way of making meaning 
shown by thinkers whose conventional way of being has been thrown in to question 
(Dreyfus, 2003, 2008b). Koch’s move away from the Ivy League-educated consulting 
professional to a passionate advocate of a focal practice can also be conceptualised as 
a developmental process. It first describes the dissolution of the inauthentic identity of 
an elite American business executive living within but not questioning their 
convention. It then describes the emergence of a resolute but existentially humble 
identity. While this latter identity no doubt has its bravura aspects, it is clearly devoted 
to bringing a more meaningful culture, one that acknowledges technology but finds a 
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source of meaningfulness that puts technology in its place as a servant rather than 
master. I conclude this thesis by summarising its argument and contributions to the 
field, and noting its limitation and making connections to other studies with a view to 
suggesting further lines of research. 
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Conclusion: Retracing the Argument of the Thesis 
At the core of my research are the questions of how the agile style has depleted 
meaningfulness in business strategy and how agile strategic management can be 
modified to foster greater meaningfulness. In particular I asked: Why is agile strategic 
management so unsatisfying? What resources do Heideggerian scholars provide that 
shed light on the root of this dissatisfaction? How do Heideggerians, who witness the 
changes in today’s commercial culture, understand the emerging meaningfulness? 
What strategic management practices can I propose for the future? 
In the Preface and Chapter 1, I introduced and situated the question of meaning 
and meaningfulness both personally and in the wider domains of professional strategic 
management practice and its scholarly literature. I provided a brief autobiography of 
my own strategic management consulting career working in both world-picturing 
strategic planning and agile strategic management styles. I noted what each style 
enabled and made possible as a consultant but also an important anomaly: that despite 
their proclamations of meaningfulness and particularly of freedom, both styles led 
increasingly to an empty-feeling, purely technical pursuit of profitable economic 
growth. Moving on from the autobiographical experience, I turned to an account of the 
wider phenomenon of meaninglessness in contemporary Western culture and briefly 
set out Heidegger’s analysis and remedy for this phenomenon. I then gave an account 
of how strategic management has developed from its earliest forms that sought timeless 
success factors made in conscious strategic decisions guided by rational thinkers 
towards a dynamic, relational, emergent and largely non-conscious process. I briefly 
reviewed the contributions to this development of game theorists Pankaj Ghemawat 
and Donald Sull and of the strategy-as-practice scholars Robert Chia, Haridimos 
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Tsoukas and Charles Spinosa. Chapter 1 also set out the conceptual, analytical, 
methodological and practical contributions and structure of the thesis. 
In Chapter 2, I set out and defended my transformative disclosure methodology 
and materialist literary reading method. The transformative disclosure methodology is 
a Heideggerian methodology first described by Kompridis (2000, 2006). Simply put, 
transformative disclosure first aims to disclose the way a thinker makes sense to 
themselves, what is sensible to them, before then moving on to an immanent critique 
of that way of thinking through a consideration of what it misses or fails to think on its 
own terms. Following Kompridis, I distinguished transformative disclosure from its 
principal alternatives, scientistic scepticism and unmasking-critique, noted their 
tendency to disable positive action and promoted transformative disclosure on the basis 
of its greater relevance to incumbent practitioners and greater productiveness for future 
action. Consistent with other Heideggerians’ advice for social sciences, the 
transformative disclosure I developed is conducted through a process of prototypical 
or, better, paradigmatic case study (Dreyfus, 1986; Flyvbjerg, 2001, 2006; Borgmann, 
1987). Paradigmatic case method elucidates and illustrates clear cases of a general style 
that can serve as scaffolds upon which to compare and construct other more specific 
cases. In this thesis, I developed three such paradigmatic cases: modern, agile and 
adaptive strategic management. I detailed the materialist literary reading utilised on the 
paradigmatic cases to reveal their style. I elaborated on the way that, in contrast to 
classic discourse analytical methods that in some way still remain in the realm of the 
conceptual, the emerging literary materialist methods attempt to analyse how the real, 
in the form of tone, syntax, and written marks on a page, act affectively and directly 
upon a reader’s body to trigger meanings in the reader. Finally, I set out the warrants 
of ethical, valid and reliable research for this study.  
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In Chapter 3, I set out the full Heideggerian argument for the loss of meaning 
in contemporary agile life. I introduced the Heideggerian notion of the human being as 
a practical coper within an already existing world. I showed how the human gathers a 
particular sense of their own selfhood by taking up available roles and ways of thinking 
in that world and introduced authentic or freely historicising action as possible to the 
extent that one holds existing ways of making sense as question-worthy. Finally, I drew 
upon Heidegger’s suggestions for how to think in the face of the question-worthy in 
order to construct an account of education of authentic strategic managers able to 
manage their business in such a way that they combat the meaninglessness of 
contemporary economic life. 
 In Chapter 4, I showed how strategic management has moved a certain kind of 
instrumental meaning to the centre of its understanding but has marginalised the 
question of meaningfulness per se. First, in the world-picturing style exemplified by 
Michael Porter’s work, entities are understood as stable and natural kinds and 
represented in cause-and-effect relationships that allow for predictable planning of 
profitable growth. The second style, is that of technological agility in which all entities, 
including the strategist herself, are seen as resources to be co-opted in an endless cycle 
of positing and re-positing of value and wilful reconfiguration of the world to meet 
promises for performance. I showed how, in both styles, all entities that are encountered 
come ready-freighted with the meaning of profitable opportunity, and how this 
overarching Machenschaft meaningfulness of “reaching for ever-greater certainty” 
eliminates the possibility of the nasty surprise that these ways of making sense 
themselves are contingent and not total. Paradoxically, it is the nasty surprise, that 
brings awareness of the ungroundedness of all meaning, which can lead to authenticity. 
As the nullity that reveals the lack of any firm grounding or null basis for any particular 
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form of meaning, the nasty surprise can act as the last god who reveals the human 
being’s unique role as authentic thrown-open meaning-makers. 
In Chapters 5 and 6, I showed how various post-agile strategic management 
scholars have recognised the nihilism underlying modern and agile business practice. 
In Chapter 5, I described how researchers in the Strategy-as-Practice school, 
particularly those influenced by Heidegger, have begun to demonstrate how a focus on 
practice can restore our essential role as meaning makers in an adaptive agile strategic 
management. In Chapter 6, I closely read Disclosing New Worlds, a seminal text in the 
Strategy-as-Practice school and revealed how its failure explicitly to address the loss 
and recovery of the sacred leaves it fatally flawed as a remedy to the loss of 
meaningfulness.  
In Chapter 7, I set out the cases of AB-InBev and The Boston Beer Company 
as the paradigmatic practical cases that characterise agile and adaptive strategic 
management practice respectively. As paradigmatic practical cases, the two accounts 
can serve as clear cases of how strategists practice both agile and adaptive strategy. 
Finally, in Chapter 8, I defined and deepened my illustration of an adaptive strategic 
management practice, and suggested educational practices for thinking that can help 
develop three ontological capacities necessary for such an adaptive agile strategic 
management practice. 
I am now in a position to summarise my answers to my research questions: Why 
is agile strategic management so unsatisfying? How do Heideggerian scholars shed 
light on the root of this dissatisfaction? How do Heideggerians, who witness the 
changes in today’s commercial culture, understand the emerging meaningfulness? 
What strategic management practices can I propose for the future? 
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Agile strategic management is dissatisfying because, while it brings things into 
the economic sphere, at the same time, it also undermines the meaningfulness of those 
things and hence of their worth. Underlying this answer is an argument advanced first 
by Heidegger and later developed by Heideggerian scholars. The simplest form argues 
that bringing things into the economic domain of the market tends to result, not only in 
their economic commodification but also in their moral de-contextualisation and the 
closure of possibilities to the impoverishment of human life (Borgmann, 1987, 2010). 
As ever-more things and features of things have been progressively co-opted and 
rendered instrumentally meaningful for productivity so those things have been 
increasingly torn from their historical, material and social contexts and become 
existentially meaningless. This sundering of things from context may have led to the 
enhancement of their instrumental meaning but this has been to the detriment of their 
existential meaning. However, I argue that this win-lose situation is not a necessity and, 
with the paradigmatic case of The Boston Beer Company, I show how it is possible for 
a company to choose and create both economic and moral value. I simplify the situation 
and the stakes of the choice in Figure 6 below. 
 
Figure 6: Strategic Choice for Economic and Ethical Value 
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Bringing entities into the productive cycle of the market has the great benefits 
of making them more accessible to more people at more times and, by exposing them 
to competition, making them potentially cheaper, easier to use, more reliable, and 
higher performance.  All else being equal, these are undoubtedly benefits–who would 
want medicines that are not any of these. However, bringing all of these benefits while 
maintaining the complex, dynamic and relational connections with the material, 
cultural, and historical contexts that make those things worthwhile also makes possible 
invention in ways that retain the profound worth and integrity of those things. 
Heideggerians argue that putting the agile genie back in the bottle is an unrealistic ideal. 
As Heidegger himself wrote in 1957,  
Many, even most, indications are that the devastation of Dasein into an always 
merely calculative thinking will continue to increase. To imagine that nihilism 
would be overcome is probably the fundamental error of the present age.  
(Heidegger, 2012a, p. 126) 
Given that unrealistic hope, the choice facing strategists is whether to think, 
question and reform technological thinking itself or accept it as complete and either 
celebrate it or seek consolation in joyous nihilism. The stakes of that choice are of 
pursuing purely economic value or creating both economic and ethical value. Putting 
that choice even more starkly, one can choose to build an economic enterprise that 
lacks a focal thing and creates mere affluence or to build deep and ethical wealth by 
enabling lives worth living. In this thesis, I have described a Heideggerian adaptive 
strategic management that creates both economic and ethical value by inquiring into 
the tension between a focal thing and its shifting world context.  
The role that the focal thing and the fourfold play in both adaptive management 
practice and scholarship will be central to unlocking its ethical potential. For instance, 
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adaptive strategic practitioners can work with people in a business to challenge the 
dominance of financialisation among the power hierarchies of the firm. 
Financialisation, as the penetration of the logic of financial capital into all aspects of a 
firm in a way where capital is entirely fungible and uprooted from any context, is a 
quintessential example of the agile style (Clegg et al., 2012: Chapter 11). Developing 
methods to demonstrate the contextual roots of a firm’s value through the explication 
of its focal thing and the aspects of its fourfold that connect its meaningfulness, and 
hence value, to the shifting background world can support a strategic management 
framework that can combat the increasing abstraction of information-based economies 
(Borgmann, 1987, 2007, 2010) and return a robust ethics and plural realism to 
management (Dreyfus & Taylor, 2015). For instance, does the firm inspire 
commitment to a focal thing that has the authority to bring consistency to its practices 
or is it a purely financialised abstraction? Does the firm’s excellence at the focal thing 
gather a community around itself or are stakeholders only fleetingly connected? Does 
the effort for complete clarity of management (sky) dominate or is there always a sense 
of tension with inexpressible history, culture and language that remain out of reach of 
management techniques but bring meaning? What mood prevails and, if it is one of 
boredom, routinised novelty, or neutral detachment, how can it be transformed by a 
counter-mood that brings meaningfulness? For strategy scholars, operationalising the 
epochal styles and, particularly, the fourfold into research methodologies can provide 
normative and empirical methods for evaluating the outcomes of different styles of 
firms’ strategic management. For example, it is an empirical question whether the 
adaptive firms that I identify, and which I am contending will multiply in number and 
size, do reduce worker despair and frustration and raise the sense of well-integrated 
worthwhile work. Fleming reported how attempts by firms to make work more free, 
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playful and authentic are better viewed as technological manipulation for productivity 
(Fleming, 2009). If the adaptive style successfully accommodates but resists nihilism 
then adaptive management will evade such manipulation.  
Contributions 
I claim that I make four key contributions in this thesis. 
Conceptually, in Chapter 3 and 8, I built on the work of Heideggerian strategy-
as-practice scholars (Spinosa, Flores & Dreyfus, 1997; Chia & Holt, 2006, 2009; 
Tsoukas, 2010a, 2010b) to develop an adaptive strategy capable of instrumental agility 
and existential meaningfulness. I developed and applied a framework of the key 
Heideggerian terms that can be used to analyse the historical style or kind of 
meaningfulness at work in different strategic management styles. Each style enables a 
certain kind of truthful action and, at the same time, obscures other kinds of truth. I 
contrasted this framework with a comparable history of being analysis (Cummings, 
1999, 2002, 2008). I criticised Cummings’ conceptual analytical framework for its lack 
of a justification for the categories of analysis that it draws upon. The Heideggerian 
framework I propose identifies the necessary and sufficient aspects of a style that serve 
as the conditions for one kind of truth making over others. It can be further refined and 
utilised to support empirical work to understand the meaning-making style at work not 
only of management texts but, perhaps more importantly, of actual management 
thinking “in the wild” with management practitioners. Informed by this framework, I 
set out the various disciplinary styles of strategic thinking that underpin modern and 
agile thinking and an austere style of adaptive thinking that gathers itself around a 
meaningful focal thing and its supporting practices and that can draw on, interweave 
or transform the other, narrower styles of disciplinary thinking as a situation demands. 
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Conceptually, I also outlined a theory of adaptive strategic thinking, which builds on 
Chia and Holt’s strategic blandness and wayfinding (Chia & Holt, 2009), to deepen its 
Heideggerian account of the preservation of existential truth or meaningfulness as well 
as radical change. In the course of developing this adaptive strategy I identified the 
neglect by Chia, Holt and Spinosa of Heidegger’s thinking of the interplay between 
moods, the sacred and focal things in the preservation and transformation of any 
particular style and the truth that the style conditions. I drew on this thinking to develop 
conceptual resources for strategy practice in the shape of ontological skills and 
pedagogical practices for their development. Surfacing the possibilities and constraints 
of the particular style of thinking serving as a background to a manager’s strategising 
can help managers to be more reflective of their own style and avoid egregious blunders 
and irresponsible decision-making. 
Analytically, I drew on this initial conceptual framework to analyse and 
illustrate the basic styles of strategic thinking at play in particular strategic management 
texts. I demonstrated the prevalence in contemporary strategy theory of two kinds of 
disciplinary thinking, the modern and the agile, and identified how the loss of 
meaningfulness and freedom for radical difference in these two forms was diminishing 
the worthiness of the life they conditioned. I also analysed the post-agile strategic 
thinking that is emerging among Chia, Tsoukas and Spinosa to identify their common 
neglect of the sacred as a significant weakness in their accounts of how their work can 
lead to long-term, sustainable strategic success. I illustrated the agile and adaptive 
strategy with paradigmatic cases of strategic practice. I showed how AB-InBev’s pure 
technological agility led to economic success but, at the same time, undermined the 
meaningfulness of its products to its own customer base and led ultimately to an 
experience of absurdity. I contrasted AB-InBev’s technological agility with The Boston 
288 of 334 
Beer Company’s adaptive strategy.  The BBC’s adaptiveness also drew on agile and 
modern strategic methods but always gathered itself around beer as a focal thing and 
brewing and drinking beer as focal practices that showed its brewers and drinkers who 
they were at their best. The BBC’s adaptive strategy drew on and deepened its own 
ever-changing material, social and historical context to develop economic value as it 
deepened existential value. This analytical contribution serves as an immanent analysis 
by a practitioner of his own field of practice and can complement more objective 
discourse analytic methods. This analytical work has already been extended with a 
paper delivered to the Critical Management Studies conference presenting the stylistic 
origins of influential strategic management texts by Osterwalder and Pigneur, 
Mintzberg, Johnson and Scholes, and Roos (Hancocks, 2013) and a second published 
paper on structural moods at work in businesses to which the current author contributed 
substantially (Spinosa, Glennon & Sota, 2014). 
Methodologically, I set out a transformative disclosure strategy based on 
paradigmatic cases and materialist literary reading method that further develops a style 
of research proposed as most appropriate to the human sciences. The use of 
paradigmatic cases and close literary reading method approaches the kinds of thick 
description and “near-documentary stance” recommended to ensure the relevance and 
quality of strategy practice research (Chia & Holt, p.132). The disclosive critique 
approach that has an existing practitioner conduct an immanent reading of an unthought 
of his or her own practice further builds this relevance while also addressing criticisms 
of the non-transformational, uncritical nature of practice research (Carter et al., 2008). 
Finally, the purpose of the foregoing is to improve a field of human practice with which 
I am directly concerned, and so, based upon the theory of adaptive strategy that I 
outline, I propose ontological skills for strategists and pedagogical practices for their 
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development in support of the practice of adaptive strategic management. This 
methodology and method has already informed two additional studies into the role of 
mood and management and two forthcoming studies of time and thinking in 
management (Hancocks, 2013; Spinosa, Glennon & Sota, 2014; Spinosa, Hancocks & 
Glennon, forthcoming; Spinosa, Hancocks, Glennon & Flores, forthcoming). 
Finally, the purpose of the foregoing is to improve a field of human practice 
with which I am directly concerned. Accordingly, I have proposed an adaptive 
alternative to agile strategic management. Adaptive strategy making takes account of 
the neglect of the sacred discovered in my analytical work of existing post-agile 
strategy, whether Tsoukas’ modes of strategy, Spinosa, Flores and Dreyfus’ history 
making or Chia and Holt’s bland wayfinding. I also suggest pedagogical practices to 
develop the kinds of ontological capacities required by adaptive strategists. Further 
empirical work to practice and develop this adaptive strategy is underway in my 
ongoing consulting work and ongoing collaboration with the originators of the 
commitment-based management approach. Some of the outcomes of this practice are 
to be published in the papers already cited in these paragraphs but considerable 
additional work remains to be done. For instance, of what do the revelatory and 
listening language practices described in the thesis consist? While the difference that 
they lead to in terms of existential rather than simply instrumental meaning may be 
clear, how does one develop the skills of listening for an unthought or an ultimate 
concern? How does one bring these inchoate intuitions into language that expresses but 
does not alienate people conditioned into current everyday practice? Or, on a quite 
different front, how does one construct an economic commodification that does not 
thin out and diminish the moral context? How does one hold the two discourses 
together with different communities of practice that might value one but not the other? 
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Jim Koch has skilfully built bridges between economically-oriented investors that want 
to bring things into the market and social and environmental activists who want to 
preserve their connection to material, social and cultural, historical contexts of 
meaning. But generalising and building on Koch’s success (as well as addressing its 
limitations) into a strategic management practice and educational programmes both 
within business and in business schools is a further task that remains to be done.     
Connections, New Directions and Limitations 
I have described two kinds of strategy-making that are both successful today. 
The agile approach thrives on turbulence and indeed creates its own turbulence but 
undermines the meaningfulness of the communities upon which the business depends. 
The other approach, adaptive strategy, decreases turbulence by deepening its roots and 
the meaningfulness of the lives it fosters. The agile approach depletes meaning but 
builds economic value while adaptive strategy grows and preserves both. 
My analysis is broad-reaching but preliminary. It connects to and builds on 
other work in the strategy-as-practice field particularly the Heideggerian accounts of 
Chia, Holt, Rasche, Spinosa, and Tsoukas. My account makes three contributions to 
those different accounts. Firstly, it highlights the role of the sacred in management 
practice and develops a plausible role for a business practice that provides not only 
instrumental meaning but also existential mattering to strategic management practice. 
Clearly, this direction can influence strategic management practices in ways that I have 
described but it can also be extended to include the Heideggerian, strategy-as-practice 
grounded critique and reconceptualisation of contemporary economics. I briefly 
introduced the shape of this reconceptualisation in my consideration of economic and 
moral commodification but its further development is evident in the ongoing work of 
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Albert Borgmann (2000, 2006, 2010), and also Todd Mei (2011), Catherine Malabou 
(2011), and Krystszosf Ziarek (2012). Their critical work has begun to outline an 
economics, not of rents and the privatised capitalisation of entities, but of the 
communal participation and happy adaptation of human and other material beings and 
their practices to one another and to being itself. Their work begins with an inquiry into 
ontological capitalism, and the perverse freedom to capitalise every entity, and 
continues into the consideration by Mei (2011) of the givenness of land (earth) and thus 
of human beings’ already existing indebtedness to that gift. Such an indebtedness lends 
itself to recognition of the commonness of public goods and to the inappropriateness 
of the collection of rents from the commons.  
This broader Heideggerian economic critique remedies a significant 
shortcoming of the strategy-as-practice field. As described in Chapter 2, the SAP field 
has been criticised for being overly descriptive, lacking broad social and historical 
perspective, and critical and creative edge (Cummings, 2002; Carter, Clegg & 
Kornberger, 2008; Stacey, 2010, Vaara & Whittington, 2010).  My account sets out an 
adaptive strategic management practice along with three ontological management 
capacities and supporting practices that complement the advice given in Disclosing 
New Worlds and other SAP accounts and remedy their potential nihilism. In so doing, 
I address the concern held by other Heideggerian SAP scholars, such as Chia and Holt, 
that their indirect action approach, inspired by the ‘strategic blandness’ of Francois 
Jullien, still requires engaged practices to avoid pure quietism and to enable more 
radical, world changing action (Chia & Holt, 2009, pp. 252-254). By working to 
critique and transform a domain of practice from within, the Heideggerian approach of 
adaptive management that I develop here will connect with and address the concern for 
criticism and meaningful creativity held by Cummings, Carter et al., Stacey, and Vaara 
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and Whittington while avoiding the unmasking critique described in Chapter 2 that 
seeks to critique from outside the regime of meaning and hence risks leaving workers 
alienated from their own lives.  
Finally, the account of fundamental, historical moods developed in the current 
study complements and elaborates on the accounts of mood presented by Holt and 
Cornelissen (2014) and Shotter and Tsoukas (2014). Their studies are the first to 
highlight the effects of moods on firefighters’ understanding of a crisis and a 
physician’s dealing with a case of sexual harassment and propose the positive role of 
mood to deal wisely and swiftly with such challenging situations. My study extends 
and situates their accounts of moods within a broader historical consideration of 
different fundamental moods and the kinds of strategic management that they open up. 
I proposed composure as the specific mood that is missing from the bored and distress-
less moods of agility and that can counter its overwhelming generation of novelty. 
My thesis also has significant shortcomings and limitations. Two empirical 
limitations seem especially prominent to me. The first is that because the study deals 
only with published, though generally first-hand, texts it necessarily leaves empirical 
observations of real strategic management practice, even my own practice, outside of 
its scope. Secondly, such studies are also retrospective accounts of practice and non-
comparative. Future studies would engage in twinned case, action research studies of 
both agile and adaptive strategic management practice in order to develop assessments 
of both of their efficacies.  
Conceptually, one might also read Koch’s accounts and wonder about both their 
sincerity and also the extent to which his beers and brewing practices are truly a radical 
transformation of ordinary technological capitalism. For the first limitation, one would 
ask to what extent is Koch’s story-telling and proud presentation of his own story an 
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accurate reflection of what really went on and still goes on? It is true that I have relied 
more heavily on Koch’s own recounting of the history and practices of The Boston 
Beer Company than I did in the case of AB-InBev, although Falconi’s account of AB-
InBev’s practices is also first-hand. I drew heavily on Koch’s account because it is the 
richest and most recent of such accounts. It would surely have been perverse not to and 
I have tried also to point out where Koch’s sales-style is noticeable. In the final section 
of Chapter 7, I noted the existing literature questioning the role played by management 
memoirs and guru literature (Thrift, 2005, 2008; Guthey, Clark & Jackson, 2009; 
Alvesson & Spicer, 2011). These criticisms are significant and further research would 
be needed both in the cases cited and in other sectors to evidence and support my 
argument. However, despite the fact that there have been conflicts and challenges in 
that journey with both co-founder Rhonda Kallman and principal corporate adversary 
AB-InBev, I also found nothing substantive in several newspaper and internet searches 
that contradicts Koch’s account of The Boston Beer Company’s history or practices. 
Clearly, future studies would want to interview many more people involved along the 
course of its history and observe and interview those people engaged in the practices 
of its business today. Regarding the second limitation of whether adaptive practice is 
truly radical, while I agree with Heidegger’s cautioning about the forlornness of the 
hope of doing away with technology in entirety, even so, our paradigmatic exemplar 
Jim Koch still uses many agile practices and his American beers, still substantially 
using German hops, cannot truly be called local. Has he engaged in an almighty 
“Authenticity-wash”? Again, further primary research could inquire in to the actual on-
the-ground practices and further inquiry into the transformed kind of economics 
discussed above would undoubtedly assist in this addressing the question. But I would 
also issue one word of caution, the weakness of the unmasking critique, described in 
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Chapter 2, is that it leaves practitioners fatally under-confident and disabled from 
taking further action. I would recommend continued transformative disclosure as an 
affirmative way to build on Koch’s accomplishments and open up further truly radical 
strategic management that build economic and ethical value. 
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Postscript: The Role of the Strategy Consultant 
I began this thesis with a description of my own frustrating and despairing 
experiences as a strategy consultant promising strategy that was meaningful and 
liberating while, in actuality, inexorably tightening the grip held by the cycles of 
narrowly financial productivity. The reader of this thesis might wonder whether the 
thinking it sets out has made any difference to the strategy practice of the author. 
Throughout this research project, I have continued to work actively as a strategy 
consultant and my research work and my strategic practice have, of course, informed 
each other. It would require a quite different research project to report on and analyse 
what I have discovered in the practical setting but, remembering Clegg’s 
admonishment of the Strategy-as-Practice school’s neglect of practical engagement 
(Clegg, 2011), I think it is appropriate to report briefly on three observations from my 
actual practice that suggest that adaptive strategy can make a contribution to relieving 
despair and frustration and to building economic and ethical value. The observations 
line up with the three ontological capacities: cultivating the sacred, sensibility, and 
composure and suggest a particular role for the adaptive strategy consultant. 
Firstly, I have observed from working with senior executives to reveal and 
commit to a focal thing and practice is both rewarding and critical to those who are 
particularly skilled and well-disposed to the financial aspects of strategy. My 
experience has been that attending to and declaring the focal thing and its practices, 
that around which a company’s creation of value is organised, is a highly controversial, 
politicising and meaningful activity. For some, it appears to bring a sense of relief that 
necessary financial conversations no longer float free but are now connected to making 
a contribution to a wider community. It also appears to liberate them to do more of the 
activity that personally resonates with them, whether it be energy engineering, 
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workforce solutions or insurance. However, for others, it also sets up a kind of levelling 
or deflationary opposition that seeks to deflate the importance of the focal thing by 
levelling it down simply to the circulation and accumulation of capital as a source of 
power. My experience suggests that this opposition comes down to a politicising stand 
about realism and power. Whereas, in my view, those strategic leaders who adopt the 
focal thing widen and enrich their appreciation of reality, their conversations appear 
more grounded in material and historical realities, more pluralistic, and thus, truer, the 
deflationary leaders level out the complexities of reality to a simpler financial thread 
while arguing that the focal realists are naïve and that it is they who have the best grip 
on the reality that matters most. Holding a position for the focal requires a political and 
existential stand about one’s grip on reality given that the “reality that matters most” 
depends on choices as to who matters most, in other words, political questions of 
power. I argued earlier that the CEO strategists themselves have a choice as to the 
strategic styles they adopt. I argued that only the adaptive kind of strategic management 
creates both ethical and economic value and hence creates a good life for the many. In 
contrast, the agile strategy rips strategists from their roots and enters them into a race 
for continual reinvention that leads to absurdity. I have found that presenting the simple 
grid, laying out the stakes of the choice as to what is sacred, and working through this 
choice with a CEO or other strategist is a helpful way for them to frame and make that 
choice, with at least a modicum of freedom. 
This last point brings me to my second and third observations. I suggested that, 
in order truly to think, one needed to develop sensibility to one’s own and other styles 
and the composure to think in the face of paradox. In my practice, I have found that 
working with a business to reconstruct and explore the different epochal styles at work 
across the business’ management, industry, and political-economic world history is a 
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valuable exercise in opening the space for greater freedom. I have conducted interviews 
with staff past and present, document analysis of strategy documents, and various kinds 
of cultural analysis of, for instance, industry advertisements to support conversations 
that reveal the style of understanding at work today and those that have held sway in 
the past. Mixing conversations with old and new employees, especially those present 
in the company before the de-regulation and privatisation era of the 1980s, makes more 
resonant the thought that a current common sense may not last for ever and sharpens 
the existential choice for its preservation or transformation. Similarly, I have used adult 
development assessment tools to support a conversation with strategists as to how 
composed thinking can be cultivated among individual executives, leadership teams, 
and a wider organisational culture (Kegan, 1982, 1985; Kegan, Laskow Lahey, Miller, 
Fleming & Helsing, 2016; Rooke & Torbert, 2005; Dreyfus 2008a, 2008b). In these 
theories, individuals and collectives develop their capacities to make sense of situations 
from a conventional sense-making that habitually follows the orthodox style of 
thinking or convention at play in a world to a post-conventional sense-making that 
holds the convention in question as it works within it and blends in other ways of 
making sense of a situation. The post-conventional stages resemble the composed 
thinking that I described above. My experience has been that bringing the historical 
and the adult development inquiries together in the context of the choice as to the style 
of strategic management seems to raise the degree of freedom brought to the question 
of the meaningfulness of a company’s strategic management work. 
So, yes, the despair and frustration I experienced as an agile strategy consultant 
has been ameliorated and adaptive strategy work can return meaning and freedom to a 
nihilistic economic world. But the role of strategy consultant is different too. In my 
preface, I described the role of the strategy consultant as the detached, scientific, 
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“quant”, the playful, artsy and informal creative, and the agile commitment Viking. All 
these roles might still be appropriate at one time or other in a consulting relationship. 
However, I follow Wrathall (2011b) in proposing a more fundamental role for the 
philosophical, adaptive strategy consultant. If our guiding telos is to stimulate strategic 
thinking then, just as for the original philosopher Socrates, our role must be to be a 
“corrupter of the youth” – so that strategists too can have a free choice again.  
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Notes 
i For an overview of the approach see http://www.fastcompany.com/32920/group-genius and Pergamit 
& Peterson, 1997. For a critical account of such management consulting approaches see for example, 
Fleming (2009) and Clegg et al. (2012).  
ii For example, Winograd & Flores, 1987; Goss, 1996, Spinosa, Flores & Dreyfus, 1997. 
iii It is appropriate to say something at the very start of this thesis about the difficult question of 
Heidegger’s active and un-recanted Nazism. Heidegger was, of course, a well-known Nazi. He was 
appointed Rector of the University of Freiburg in 1933 where he developed Nazi-influenced 
educational policies and was also publicly put on trial after the war and banned from teaching. 
However, publication of his private notebooks and private family correspondence reveals him to have 
been both a fervent supporter of Hitler and his National Socialism from as early as 1931 and a 
convinced anti-Semite (Gordon, 2015; Zielinski, 2016). Was Heidegger’s thinking tainted by, even 
intertwined with his Nazism? Is it possible to retain Heidegger’s thinking and separate it from his 
Nazism? The question troubles me enormously, even at the end of a programme of PhD study. I take 
heed of, and hope I work within, the careful separation of Heidegger’s philosophy and his Nazism by 
scholars such as Thomas Sheehan and Iain Thomson both of whom argue that the core of Heidegger’s 
thinking was in place before his support of Nazism and that his later work must be thought through 
meticulously to sift out the philosophy from the Nazism (Thomson, 2005; 2011; Sheehan, 2015). I also 
accept Alain Badiou’s argument for the importance to think though the good philosophy from the bad 
in even the most terrible of situations, “As long as Nazi thought is not itself thought through it will 
continue to dwell among us, unthought and therefore indestructible” (Badiou, 2007, p.4). However, in 
the end, the task is exceptionally challenging and I look forward to interacting rather less with 
Heidegger in the years to come.  
iv Henceforth, for simplicity, I will use “agility” and “agile” interchangeably with the more 
Heideggerian “technology” and “technologically” and most often use the more familiar management 
terminology of “agility’. 
v For an overview of such ana-theistic re-imaginings of the sacred, see Kearney & Zimmerman, 2016. 
vi Retrieved 24th May 2016 from http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-10-25/the-plot-to-
destroy-americas-beer  
vii See for example, various essays, especially those of Dale Jacquette and Michael Lynch, in Hales 
(2007). See also Gray (2015); Rail (2012); Roth (2015). 
viii For instance, see Mitchell (2015, p.206). 
ix I must acknowledge the careful, insightful and vigorous assistance of Charles Spinosa in helping me 
to construct this wide-ranging account of Heidegger’s argument here and in Chapter 3 as well as of 
Hubert Dreyfus’ teachings on Later Heidegger available in private recordings made at Berkeley in 
2001 and the publicly available accounts of Mark Wrathall cited through the text.    
x Heidegger calls it the Spielraum (Heidegger 1962, p.141) 
xi The word “co-opt” derives from two Latin roots. “Com-” meaning “together” and “optare” meaning 
“to choose. Hence, co-opt is to choose to bring or gather together. The sense of co-opt meaning to 
"take over" that particularly pertains here is a recent twentieth century development. 
xii Richard Rorty reportedly argued for years that Nietzsche’s sole mistake was thinking the cost of the 
loss of sacred heavy (Charles Spinosa, personal communication). The extent to which agile 
practitioners experience the loss, consciously or subconsciously as heavy remains an empirical 
question, for further research.  
xiii See Cummings (1999, pp.59-60) for a description of the grid as an apparatus or dispotif for 
analysing the episteme or understanding of being at work in a particular text. 
xiv See Cummings (1999, pp.184-185) for an argument for the selection of "low-brow" texts that show 
the "'background noise', the taken-for-granted assumptions or 'murmur' that supports the formation of 
Management" rather than leading-edge and contested texts. 
xv The materialist analysis of the mood of a text is primarily inspired by the developing literary field of 
reading for mood see Gumbrecht (2008, 2012); Morton (2009a, 2009b); and Ngai (2012). 
xvi While the inspirations for reading for charged distinctions comes from Richard Rorty and Charles 
Spinosa, the methodical techniques are inspired by Lacanian Discourse Analysis in Psychology, Ian 
Parker Theory & Psychology, Vol. 15(2), 2005; From the Conscious Interior to the Unconscious 
Exterior, David Pavon-Cuellar, (2010); and the suggestions for a Heideggerian Discourse Analysis in 
Truth and Unconcealment, Mark Wrathall, (2011). 
xvii This ontology of insertions and chains includes not only the explicit account of Heidegger’s of 
worldhood but also inter alia of (1) skilfulness of human existence, (2) receptivity, (3) the history of 
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being, (4) world preservation and world transformation as respectively the maintenance and 
transformation of style, (5) commitment (6) history-making skills and (7) das Gestell and the Age of 
Technology 
xviii C. Roland Christensen describes the case method thus, “A terrain of which I have made a thorough, 
geodetic survey, not from a desk with pen and ruler, but by touch, by getting down on all fours, on my 
stomach, and crawling over the ground inch by inch, and this over an endless period of time in all 
conditions of weather.” (Christensen quoted in Flyvbjerg, 2001, p.133.)  
xix For a revealing translation of the same passage, excluding the final sentence, see Sheehan (2010, 
p.83). 
xx Heidegger calls it the Spielraum (Heidegger 1962, p.141) 
xxi In What is Called Thinking, Heidegger calls it an Entsprechung (Heidegger, 2004, p.10.) 
xxii For detailed accounts of virtuoso action without thinking see Dreyfus (2008a, 2008b). For a recent 
challenge to Dreyfus’ account of mindless expertise, see Montero (2016). 
xxiii I follow Wrathall (2011b) in translating Besinnung as sensibility rather than reflection or 
mindfulness, firstly, to emphasise Sinn or sense in its etymology and also, in part, to avoid the 
connotations of Eastern and Western New Age mindfulness practices, which are quite distinct. 
xxiv One may identify examples from the SM practitioner literature attuned to each of the various 
epochal styles that Heidegger described. For instance, the idealised business model approaches of 
Osterwalder and Pigneur (2010) seem to be a contemporary re-disclosing of the Platonic Greek 
theoretical style. Similarly, Mintzberg’s emergent approaches to crafting strategy that are always 
observing and measuring one’s organisation up to the affordances offered by the creation retain 
something of the piety of Christian poîesis (Mintzberg, 1987). For an extended account of these earlier 
styles, see Hancocks (2013). 
xxv For instance, all except Sull are named in Harvard Business Review's 50 Most Influential Gurus 
(2011) (See http://hbr.org/web/slideshows/the-50-most-influential-management-gurus/1-christensen). 
Sull was named at No 5 in CNN's 2008 list of Ten New Gurus You Should Know see 
http://money.cnn.com/galleries/2008/fortune/0811/gallery.10_new_gurus.fortune/5.html . Both 
accessed on November 21st 2013. 
xxvi For Batista see: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-24754636 and for Falcone see: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financial-crime/10253622/Billionaire-Philip-Falcone-banned-
from-financial-sector-for-five-years.html  
xxvii Recently, Sull has begun to consider the seeming contradiction between the different expertise 
required for preserving and transforming a world. He describes an “insider-outsider” leader dichotomy 
to explain the successful and failed transformations of Samsung and Daewoo, respectively. However, 
his explanation gives no explanation of how the dichotomy can be overcome only that in some cases it 
is and in others it is not. (Sull, 2015, pp.182-184). 
xxviii Denning and Dunham, 2010, p. xxiii. 
xxix Flores’ PhD thesis was the first integration of Heideggerian ontology of practical understanding, 
embodied mood and expressive-constitutive language and the speech act philosophy of John Austin 
and John Searle. (Flores, 1979). 
xxx See Dreyfus & Kelly (2011, pp.220-221). Spinosa is a close associate of both authors and is 
acknowledged in the book for his ‘fascinating and instantaneous’ feedback that ‘often led [the authors] 
in new directions’ (p.225). 
xxxi The Heideggerian terms are “disclosers” and “disclosing that they are disclosers”. 
xxxii The final arguments of the book cite and rest upon a number of longer essays (Dreyfus 1992, 1995, 
2005a, 2005b, 2008a, 2008b; Dreyfus & Spinosa, 1997, 2003).  
xxxiii Spinosa, Flores, and Dreyfus (1997: p.172, p.206n.2). 
xxxiv Spinosa, Flores, and Dreyfus (1997: p.168). 
xxxv Spinosa, private correspondence. 
xxxvi Spinosa, Flores, and Dreyfus (1997, pp.6-7). 
xxxvii Ibid., p.67. 
xxxviii Ibid., p.51. 
xxxix Wrathall and Lambeth, 2011. 
xl See Carlos Brito CEO ABI presentation, 1 September 2015 Guangzhao, China. Downloaded on 19 
December 2015 from http://www.ab-inbev.com/investors/presentations.html and “Our Business" 
overview downloaded on 19 December 2015 from http://www.ab-inbev.com/investors/our-
business.html. 
xli Chief Disruptive Growth Officer, Pedro Earp, took a BSc degree in Financial Economics at the 
London School of Economics (Downloaded 14th October 2016 from http://www.ab-inbev.com/our-
story/our-team.html)   
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xlii AB-InBev’s disruptive innovation business is called ZX Ventures. Even in the space of craft beer 
skills the drive for technologisation is clear, see for instance http://zx-ventures.com/journal-
entries/2016/8/29/cicerone (Downloaded 14th October 2016). 
xliii http://business.time.com/2012/12/27/trouble-brewing-the-craft-beer-vs-crafty-beer-cat-fight/ 
xliv See http://www.ab-inbev.com/go/innovation.cfm cf. Heidegger’s description, cited above, of the 
traditional woodsman versus the modern timber manager. 
xlv From: http://www.marketingweek.co.uk/profile-ab-inbev-cmo-chris-burggraeve/4000900.article 
xlvi Ibid. 
xlvii From: http://adage.com/article/news/a-b-inbev-millercoors-losing-share-fix/244178/ 
xlviii Zook and Allen name these three OODA loops – “a closed loop learning system” (Zook & Allen, 
2012, pp.137-160). 
xlix From: http://money.cnn.com/2013/08/15/leadership/carlos-brito-inbev.pr.fortune/ 
l There is a deeper point to be made here. Heidegger is sceptical about quantification. He “associates 
our obsession with quantification (which ends up replacing quality with quantity) with the very 
nihilistic technological onto theology which he hopes to help us to transcend” (Thomson, 2011, p.37). 
li From: http://money.cnn.com/2013/08/15/leadership/carlos-brito-inbev.pr.fortune/  
lii Wrathall, 2011, pp.202-203. 
liii Drawing on Old English, “adaptation” carries connotations of being towards (ad-) happiness (-apt, 
as in fitting, a happy fit).  
liv Account re-constructed primarily from Hill & Rifkin, 1999, Chapter 12; Bamforth, 2011; Koch, 
2016. 
lv Other examples include Illy Coffee’s sponsorship of art events to engender aestheticism and 
symbolic value as cultural norms (see 
http://www.artsprofessional.co.uk/magazine/277/article/sponsorship-revisited) or Patagonia’s 
development of business and campaigning tools to support environmental activism (see 
http://earthtalk.org/patagonia-tools-for-grassroots-activists-book/). 
lvi Again, “we” is used here to denote contemporary Western selves and for the sake of avoiding 
clumsy locution and repetition. 
lvii In particular, Wrathall (2011b, 2013, and personal communication) and Wrathall and Lambeth 
(2011a), as well as Borgmann (1987, 1992, 2006, 2007, 2010), Dreyfus (2008a), Dreyfus and Kelly 
(2011). 
lviii For an overview of the differences and similarities see the exchanges between Dreyfus and Michael 
Zimmerman an advocate of such transpersonal psychological approaches in Wrathall and Malpas 
(2000). 
lix Hill & Daneshku, June 15, 2015 AB InBev’s hard-nosed kings of beer, Retrieved on March 10 2016 
from http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/d6029592-0eb9-11e5-8aca-00144feabdc0.html#slide0. 
